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Abstract 
Recent times have seen the world fall far short of its responsibility to protect and support 
refugees in crisis. Recognizing this reality, policymakers and scholars are beginning to 
push for a reassessment of the traditional solutions to refugee crises implemented by 
states, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations. This manuscript aims to 
shed light on how these policymakers can coalesce around more effective solutions in the 
future. To do so, it will analyze three case studies of refugee crises in Jordan: the 
Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians. The cases will seek to answer how and why Jordan 
chose to ―solve‖ each crisis in the ways that it did. It will then assess how various 
―solutions‖—meaning policies, programs, or partnerships aimed at improving the 
livelihoods of refugees—have affected each group of refugees differently. The 
effectiveness of these solutions will depend on a number of factors which constrain or 
enable Jordan‘s ability to support refugees. Ultimately, the findings reveal that some 
solutions will remain unattainable to refugees in the near future. Others solutions, 
however, are evolving in ways that open doors to new, alternative solutions which 
possess significant potential to deliver the rights and meet the needs of the world‘s 
refugees more effectively. In a world fraught by the persistence of global refugee crises, 
it will offer a few reasons why we should believe current United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, when he says there is ―some hope.‖ 
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Introduction                                                              1                             
 
We are at a watershed, where success in managing forced displacement globally requires 
a new and far more comprehensive approach so that countries and communities aren't left 
dealing with this alone…but there is reason for some hope. 
 
 
—Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018.1 
 
 
Migration has persisted throughout the entire span of human history. Only in 
relatively recent times, with the rise of the international state system and creation of 
national borders, has it transitioned into a highly politicized, regulated issue that is 
subject to legal control. And only in the very near past has it become a global source of 
crisis. If history is any indication, the challenges of international migration and refugee 
crises will be an unavoidable reality of the twenty first century.  
The concept of the ―refugee‖ formally emerged after the Second World War with 
the establishment of the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly created 
two primary refugee agencies: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
2
 
                                                 
1
 UNHCR, ―Forced Displacement above 68m in 2017, New Global Deal on Refugees Critical,‖ (June 19, 
2018) https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/6/5b27c2434/forced-displacement-above-68m-2017-new-
global-deal-refugees-critical.html.  
2
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will hereafter be referred to as ―UNHCR‖; 
similarly, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East will be 
referred to as ―UNRWA.‖  
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The mandates of each organization differed greatly. UNHCR addressed various 
populations displaced in Europe as a result of the war, whereas UNRWA specifically 
handled Palestinians displaced from the 1947 war with Israel. UNRWA quickly set to 
work establishing ―relief and works‖ operations in countries hosting Palestinian refugees. 
In contrast, UNCHR held a more limited role in providing legal advice to states and 
refugees facing crisis.  
Nearly seventy years later, these organizations still stand as the primary 
implementers and innovators of refugee policy. The definition of a refugee, set forth in 
the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, remains the same as it 
was in 1951. To be sure, the UNHCR and UNRWA have evolved enormously: an entire 
body of laws and policies surrounding the protection and rights afforded to refugees, 
called the ―international refugee regime‖, has arisen from the efforts of these 
organizations and their member states to address refugee crises. Yet the persistence of 
their operations begs an important question: why, after all this time, do they remain 
necessary?    
The world is much different today than it appeared in 1951. Over 68.5 million 
people are now forcibly displaced worldwide. Of that figure, a staggering 25.4 million 
individuals are defined as ―refugees‖ by the UNHCR and UNRWA.3 It is clear that either 
the refugee regime established in 1951 failed to adequately prevent the proliferation of 
refugees or that the world progressed in such a way as to render the institutions unable to 
                                                 
3
 UNHCR, ―Figures at a Glance‖ (June 19, 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html. 
As of June 2018, 19.9 million refugees existed under the UNHCR mandate, and another 5.4 million existed 
under the UNRWA mandate.  
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handle the change. In actuality, it was a bit of both. Interstate relationships have become 
more complex; conflict has become far more concentrated in the intrastate sphere; the 
economy has ―globalized‖; borders have become increasingly securitized; and 
environmental strains have caused numerous natural disasters. New states have been 
formed, old regimes have collapsed, and power structures have shifted in ways that have 
had a substantial impact on the livelihoods of those within their borders. A significant 
effect of this volatility and interconnectedness has been a rapid increase in the creation of 
refugees.  
One of the most consequential results of these changes is the fact that the average 
duration of refugees‘ displacement has grown far beyond what can be considered 
temporary. More than half of the 25.4 million people who are considered refugees under 
the UNHCR or UNRWA mandates exist in Protracted Refugee Situations, which the UN 
defines as  ―one in which refugees find themselves in a long- standing and intractable 
state of limbo.‖4 In other words, they are refugees for whom the international refugee 
regime has failed to provide an adequate solution. By many standards, they are 
considered to be the most vulnerable among all refugees.  
Despite these profound world developments, the international refugee regime has 
evolved relatively little. The restrictive definition of a refugee as someone who flees from 
                                                 
4
 UNHCR, ―Figures at a Glance.‖ Protracted Refugee Situations will hereafter be referred to as ―PRS.‖  
For the statistic on protracted refugees, see Alexander Betts et. al. ―A Fair Share: Refugees and 
Responsibility Sharing,‖ Refugee Studies Centre (Oxford Department of International Development: 2017), 
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/news/a-fair-share-refugees-and-responsibility-sharing-new-report-and-policy-
brief-for-delmi.  
For the definition on protracted refugees, see UNHCR, ―Towards Solutions for Protracted Refugee 
Situations‖ (2007) http://www.unhcr.org/46934d4f2.pdf.   
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their country of origin on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution persists. The 
three ―durable solutions‖ to refugeehood set forth by the UNHCR remain entrenched in 
the system as well. These solutions—repatriation, integration, and resettlement—
continue to be the automatic recourse of nearly all refugee policy. Increasingly, however, 
the nature of both the refugee crises themselves and state responses have called into 
question the validity of these solutions.  
In recent decades, many states have become definitively less inclined to host 
refugees and share the responsibility of their care. Today, 85 percent of the world‘s 
refugees reside in the developing world. The incredible strain they place on developing 
states—many of which already struggle to provide for their own people—has created 
instability, economic turmoil, political strife and security threats. Developed states 
generally justify their exclusion of refugees by sending nominal amounts of aid and 
claiming that they act in the interest of their own national security in shutting their 
borders. As evident by the increasing divide between host states and donor states, the 
world is trending towards a severe separation of ―us‖ and ―them‖ on the issue of refugees.  
In seeking to understand the proliferation of refugeehood, scholars have delved 
deeply into the question of why individuals and populations leave their country of origin. 
They pose a wide range of theories from varying perspectives which, together, provide a 
sensible framework through which one can predict and explain movement. A number of 
other important questions relating to refugee movement are also explored, such as the 
plight of Internally Displaced Persons, the disproportionate hardships faced by female 
refugees as opposed to males, the impact refugee influxes have on host countries, and 
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more. The reasons why refugees move and the repercussions of such movement have 
been thoroughly explored in the refugee and forced migration studies literature.  
Yet what is to be done after displacement has already occurred is far less 
developed. Many scholars analyze the aftermath of refugee crisis, but there is little united 
discourse on the standards by which refugee crises can claim to be ―solved.‖ Nearly all 
agree that the durable solutions proposed by the United Nations are no longer a one-size-
fits all remedy: repatriation is an impossible option for refugees from states which have 
failed or dissolved into warfare; states increasingly shut their doors to resettlement; and 
integration often sends waves of discord through communities that buckle under the 
weight of hosting massive refugee influxes.  
The term ―solution‖ refers generally to the prevention of crises which lead to 
displacement or the remedy of conditions which result from displacement. Given that the 
crises which lead to displacement are often unpredictable and varied—such as natural 
disasters or warfare—the following analysis will pursue the latter definition, in using 
―solution‖ to mean that the remedy of conditions after displacement has occurred. Yet 
there is very little consensus among policymakers today on how solutions should be 
achieved.    
Why, in the seventy years since the inception of the international refugee regime, 
has the world not been able to agree upon an effective solution to refugee crises?  In part, 
this question can be explained by the fact that scholars view refugee crises through a 
number of different lens that lead to conflicting conclusions about what constitutes 
remediation or success. Furthermore, it illustrates a gap in the scholarship of refugee and 
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forced migration studies literature requiring fulfillment. It is time to combine the distinct 
perspectives of scholars, the lessons the international community has learned from 
enduring years of refugee crises, and the laws and existing policies of the current regime 
into a comprehensive conclusion on how to offer better solutions to refugees.  
To be sure, the aforementioned research related to refugee movement, host-
country impact, and much more is also very important. Refugee crises must be 
understood from their inceptions to their resolutions in order to be adequately addressed. 
Yet we should be well enough equipped by now to turn from analysis that is almost 
exclusively retroactive to that which anticipates effective, realistic solutions in a 
proactive manner. Studies of how different actors have responded to refugee crises are 
informative only so far as they can show us how to better solve the refugee crises of the 
future. Unfortunately, the states, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, private businesses, and individuals that constitute the primary ―actors‖ in 
the refugee regime are often constrained by the reality that most states would prefer to 
defer the issue of caring for refugees to others. Appeals to refugees‘ fundamental human 
rights have not proven sufficient to defray these costs of cooperation.  
What, then, is an effective solution to a refugee crisis? How can the primary 
actors of the refugee regime effectively act to remedy crises before they become 
protracted? The aim of this thesis is to shed light on the progress that has been made and 
the path towards the future of this question.   
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The definition of a refugee used throughout this paper will be that which the 
United Nations established in the 1951 Convention and amended in the Protocol passed 
in 1967. It defines a refugee as someone who:  
Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
5
  
 
In turn, a refugee crisis is defined generally as a large movement of individuals displaced 
as a result of an event or condition which causes such fear of persecution. Although 
internally displaced persons, individuals fleeing from climate change disasters, and other 
types of displaced persons are cause for concern as well, the limitations of the current 
definition will be upheld for the purposes of this analysis.  
 Scholars grapple with determining what constitutes an ―effective‖ refugee 
solution in different ways. Some focus on the concept of movement, suggesting that if 
refugees possessed the right to move freely between borders, they could allocate 
themselves more efficiently and developing states would not be left bearing an undue 
burden. This offers refugees the freedom to choose which solution best fits their own 
interests and needs, circumvents political obstacles to movement, and addresses issues of 
development directly. Refugees, in this mobility-centered model, are theorized to have 
                                                 
5
 UNHCR, ―Note on the UNHCR‘s Mandate‖ (October 2013),  http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/protection/basic/526a22cb6/mandate-high-commissioner-refugees-office.html. This definition holds for 
all refugees except for Palestinians, who are instead classified under UNRWA‘s mandate. 
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much more autonomy and power to act as individuals who contribute positively to the 
global society.  
 Others posit that the key to remedying the refugee dilemma is through political 
and legal change to the international refugee regime. Viewing states as the primary actors 
in directing refugee policy, they argue that the definition of a refugee, the process through 
which the UN and states respond to their displacement, and the rights owed to refugees 
should be redrawn to better reflect the current global political system. They analyze the 
extent to which international law regarding refugees has been implemented, and draw a 
wide range of conclusions on how these laws, as well as state policies, should enforce or 
limit the place of refugees in society.  
Another field of study relating to solutions connects refugees and economics. 
Generally, the intersection between the two manifests itself through issues of allocating 
aid and facilitating development within refugee-hosting countries. Development-based 
solutions are no new concept, and many scholars still believe that they can be a powerful 
tool, given the disparity in responsibility sharing. Furthermore, some of the recent 
literature that has arisen by economists and refugee scholars analyzes refugees as 
economic actors seeking to construct new lifestyles for themselves, and examines what 
factors influence how they do so. They seek to explain the variation in economic 
outcomes of refugees and their interactions with local and global markets, discussing the 
incentive structures of refugees, host states, and local and international businesses to 
better understand and predict why certain outcomes occur.  They look to solutions which 
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create opportunities for human flourishing and better systems of preference-matching 
between economic actors. 
Given the plethora of scholarship and refugee crises available for examination, 
this project will narrow its primary analysis to examples found within the country of 
Jordan. Refugees have always played an integral role in the politics, economy, and socio-
cultural composition of Jordan. Today, the country is home to the second highest share of 
refugees per capita in the world.
6
 Yet, for such a refugee-oriented state, Jordan still lacks 
a clear national policy standard on the rights and treatment of refugees within its borders. 
It has applied a number of different policies towards different groups of refugees and 
implemented a variety of programs that have had a diverse range of repercussions on 
refugees‘ post-displacement conditions. Some refugee populations, such as the 
Palestinians, have existed in Jordan for more than seventy years; others, such as the 
Syrians, have arrived quite recently and face a very different set of realities. Thus, Jordan 
is a prime example to study the success of a variety of different types of refugee 
solutions.  
 This project will draw upon three case studies of refugee populations in Jordan: 
the Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians. It will assess how various ―solutions‖—meaning 
policies, programs, or partnerships aimed at improving the livelihoods of refugees—have 
affected each group of refugees differently. The effectiveness of these solutions will 
depend on a number of factors which constrain or enable Jordan to make the policy 
decisions that it does. As a result, the conclusions that the case studies in Jordan produce 
                                                 
6
 ―Interactive Map 1960-2015,‖ Migration Policy Institute (2016), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/international-migration-statistics. 
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on why certain solutions proved more effective than others can offer insight as to how 
other refugee crises should be addressed in similar ways.  
The following analysis will draw dually upon previous scholarship on the 
aforementioned case studies and data compiled from a number of sources. Scholarly 
works are predominantly published by the Oxford Refugee Studies Centre and other 
universities, as well as a variety of research and think tank groups, civil society 
organizations, and international refugee organizations. Data sources include the UNHCR 
and UNRWA databases, research publications provided by partner institutions of the 
UNHCR and UNRWA, numerous opinion surveys, and original interviews conducted in 
Jordan and Palestine.  
The structure of the thesis will be as follows. Chapter 2 will review the theoretical 
literature surrounding the question of what makes for an effective refugee solution. In 
doing so, it will draw upon research from sociological, political, legal, humanitarian, and 
economic disciplines. It will explore three main perspectives: mobility-based solutions, 
political and legal solutions, and economic solutions. Among these theories lie ideas 
about the proper viewpoint from which refugee crises should be considered and who the 
major actors formulating solutions should be, as well as how effective solutions can be 
achieved. These theories will help frame the case studies‘ discussions of why Jordan 
pursued its policy decisions, and how those decisions affected the lives of refugees.  
Chapter 3 will analyze the history of the international refugee regime and the 
actors who have influenced its course. It will review the evolution of the United Nations‘ 
refugee policies, focusing particularly on the traditional durable solutions set forth by the 
11 
 
UNHCR. The general history of how these solutions have been applied and what factors 
impacted their efficacy will be discussed. This chapter will also offer an overview of the 
major developments in state or regional laws regarding refugees that have been 
formulated in response to major refugee crises.  The second half of this chapter will 
provide an overview of Jordan‘s long history as a refugee-hosting state, and conclude by 
offering a current snapshot of the economy, political atmosphere and the socio-cultural 
environment in Jordan.  
Chapter 4 will discuss the methodology of the thesis. It will explain the dependent 
and independent variables which will be analyzed in the case studies. Moreover, it will 
explain why Jordan and the three refugee crises were chosen as the focus of analysis. 
Original interviews will supplement reports produced the UN, NGOs, and the Jordanian 
government to offer both quantitative and qualitative assessments of refugees policies 
and programs.  
 Chapters 5 through 9 will contain the cases studies. Each case will include a brief 
history of the initial crisis which led to the refugees‘ displacement and subsequent 
settlement in Jordan. It will then assess what this paper terms the ―initial responses‖: the 
early decisions Jordan made in regards to refugees‘ movement across borders, the types 
of aid they received, and the initial rights they possessed. It will then analyze which 
factors affected the implementation of the durable solutions. Throughout, it will draw 
conclusions on the primary factors which motivated Jordan to pursue certain solutions 
over others, and how these solutions affected the lives of the refugees.   
12 
 
 Chapter 10 will supplement the case study chapters with original research 
conducted in Jordan and Palestine. Chapter 11 will conclude by analyzing the three 
refugee crises in Jordan in tandem, highlighting their positive commonalities and 
suggesting explanations for their differences. The analysis will emphasize what actions 
the international community, states, and ordinary citizens themselves must take in order 
for effective solutions to find a place in reality. In a world fraught by the persistence of 
global refugee crises, it will offer a few reasons why we should believe High 
Commissioner Grandi when he says there is ―some hope.‖  
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Literature Review                                              2                             
 
 
I. Introduction  
 Scholarship surrounding the question of solutions to refugee crises draws 
primarily from the field of refugee and forced migration studies. The following analysis 
relies on scholarly books and articles that seek to explain the theoretical bases of refugee 
crises through ideas grounded in mobility, political/legal theory, and economics. Other 
aspects of the analysis will draw from the conceptual frameworks authors offer for their 
analysis of individual case studies of refugee crises. While many scholars express a 
central ideology behind their commendation of appropriate solutions, they often traverse 
multiple disciplines in doing so and offer complex, comprehensive approaches that defy 
singular categorization. The solutions themselves, rather than the authors, will thus be 
organized into three groups: mobility, political and legal, and economic.   
Necessary to understanding these proposed solutions is to first examine what 
scholars infer when they use the term ―solution.‖ As Martin Gottwald points out, there is 
no codified definition of ―solution‖ found within international refugee law or the 
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UNHCR mandate.
1
 Supplementary publications by the UNHCR state that a solution is 
that which ―ends displacement in the aftermath of conflict.‖2 This language is ambiguous: 
is the end of displacement a return to one‘s host country? Is it acquiring citizenship? 
Achieving a certain standard of living? Recognizing this shortcoming, many scholars 
begin their theoretical analyses by offering their own definition, which serves as the 
normative framework for their subsequent argument.  
At the broadest level, most scholars agree that a solution can occur at one of two 
points in the timeline of a refugee crisis.
3
 The first is before the crisis occurs. A solution 
can be that which remedies the conditions which initiated the refugee crisis itself. While 
this type of solution may be ideal on the grounds that it prevents displacement and creates 
stability, the likelihood that either individual states or the international community as a 
collective could accomplish such a task successfully is highly dubious. The causes of 
refugee crises range from economic turmoil and political unrest, to civil wars and 
genocide—all of which are difficult to control, much less remedy with the ease or speed 
necessary to avoid the formation of a crisis.
4
 
                                                 
1
 Martin Gottwald, ―Back to the Future: The Concept of ―Comprehensive Solutions,‖ (Refugee Survey 
Quarterly Volume 31, Issue 3: September 1, 2012): 101–136, https://doi-
org.proxy.bc.edu/10.1093/rsq/hds010.  
2
 UNHCR, ―Durable Solutions: Preliminary Operational Guide‖ (January 2016), 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/durable
_solutions_guide_011116.pdf. 
3
 G.J.L. Coles, ―The Human Rights Approach to the Solution of the Refugee Problem: A Theoretical and 
Practical Enquiry,‖ in A.E. Nash (ed.), Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees under International 
Law (Nova Scotia, The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988): 195–222.  
4
 This is not to say that conflict prevention and resolution is not an important focus of scholarship; indeed, 
there is a great deal of literature addressing this subfield. The UN plays an active role in practical 
prevention as well. 
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The second is remedying the conditions that arise as a result of refugees‘ flight.5 
Given the difficulty in the first type of solution, it is here that the majority of scholars 
center their attention. Scholars interested more specifically in protracted refugee crises 
tend to focus on the conditions which arise after an initial period of humanitarian 
response and aid, in which providing for the immediate safety of the refugees is the 
paramount concern of relief organizations and host countries. Following this post-
emergency phase, international responders generally turn to the three ―durable‖ solutions 
in UNHCR policy: repatriation, local integration and resettlement.
6
  However, scholars 
like Alexander Betts and Martin Gottwald point out that many refugee crises necessarily 
become protracted because of the fact that this quick transition from humanitarian aid to 
long-term solutions fails to materialize, causing refugees to become caught in a 
dependent care-and-maintenance system.
7
  
This trend characterizes many of the older protracted refugee crises observed 
today. Discussing PRS in particular, Betts asserts that ―solutions‖ imply a pathway out of 
intractable limbo found within these systems.
8
 In a similar vein, Gil Loescher specifies 
that a refugee crisis with ―no solution‖ occurs when refugees remain in their country of 
first asylum under perpetual care of international or national aid.
9
 Thus, even reaching the 
point at which the traditional durable solutions can be implemented may be the first level 
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of solution. Much of the following literature and subsequent case studies will take a step 
back and analyze refugee crises holistically, assessing both the initial responses to crises 
and the implementation of durable or long-term solutions.  
The ideas of scholars diverge when addressing what marks the point at which 
refugees relinquish their status as a refugee. Many argue that resolution of refugee status 
hinges on citizenship. When a refugee, regarded as a ―stateless person‖ in international 
law, acquires the right of belonging to a country or is repatriated in their country of 
origin, they can be said to be protected by the laws of that state. This formal protection, 
some believe, thus constitutes a solution to their plight. Indeed, the text of the 1951 
Convention declares that individuals relinquish their refugee status if they acquire, or re-
acquire, a nationality.
10
 Yet some scholars contend that formal citizenship can mean little 
when states are experiencing a crisis or circumstances which cause them to fail to 
adequately safeguard the rights of its citizens. Instead, they argue that a solution 
manifests itself when individuals experience a full and lasting restoration of their rights, 
which may not necessarily be bound to a specific state.
11
 This report will analyze 
arguments that put forth both of these claims.  
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For the purposes of this project, the literature analyzed will be limited to that 
which addresses solutions for refugees who fall under the original mandate of the 
UNHCR and UNRWA. This necessarily excludes Internally Displaced Persons, climate 
refugees, and other types of irregular or forced migrants. This is not to say that these 
peoples are less important, or that the discussed solutions do not apply to them. Indeed, 
there is a growing literature on the need to include non-refugee migrants into the 
discussion of protection and solutions.
12
 Still, given that the majority of UN resources 
and data restrict their observations to individuals with official refugee status, it is 
necessary to simplify the analysis.  
Additionally, the following analysis will feature only a limited number of voices 
which argue that refugees are not a relevant or important geo-political concern. This is 
due to the rather obvious fact that almost all scholars who write about refugee solutions 
do so with the belief that refugees do, in fact, deserve the attention of scholars and 
policymakers. Those who see refugee solutions as a non-issue do not typically write 
within the refugee studies arena, and thus offer few meaningful contributions to the 
literature surrounding solutions. Still, a few scholars advocating for more restrictive 
solutions will be included to demonstrate the diversity of thought between thinkers in 
different disciplines. These voices are also prominent in public opinion surrounding 
refugees today, and will not be discounted when considering the feasibility of potential 
policies within certain regions or states.  
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The reviewed literature will begin with that of mobility solutions. Scholars within 
this subfield focus on the issue of free movement, which they perceive as a human right, 
in arguing that refugees should be the primary actors facilitating the resolution to their 
conflict. In other words, refugees should be allowed to choose which solution they 
believe best fits their unique needs. Constraining individuals within artificially 
constructed state boundaries deprives refugees of critical rights and destabilizes the 
international system. On the other hand, the literature on political solutions views the 
primary actors of the refugee system to be states, and offers that solutions are found 
through the implementation of effective policies and legal structures. Many criticize the 
inefficiencies in allocation of the current refugee system and point to ways international 
cooperation can reform and redistribute the responsibility of supporting refugees.  
Economic solutions incorporate a mix of both theories in viewing refugees as 
rational actors seeking to maximize their personal outcomes, but acknowledging that 
these outcomes are necessarily constrained by states and their political decisions. They 
address employment within host states, development-led refugee aid, microfinance 
programs, and entrepreneurship as avenues through which solutions can be pursued.  
Each category of scholars analyzes the validity of the current durable solutions 
put forth by the UN differently. While several believe that new solutions should be added 
or woven into the existing durable solutions to improve their efficiency, others posit that 
the entire framework of durable solutions should be reworked due to the reality that the 
these solutions no longer apply in the current international refugee climate. Others target 
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different principles of refugee-hood outlined in the 1951 Convention and its subsequent 
Protocol, as well as state and regional policies, in their critiques.  
Lastly, as previously mentioned, many of the scholars discussed below will defy 
simple categorization. The majority argues for the solution they believe is most 
important, but include that other measures must be taken as well in order for the system 
to be effective as a whole. The most effective solution may very well be a set of solutions 
that originate from various categories and scholars.  
As will become clear, the framework through which one examines refugee crises 
matters a great deal. As Annette Junemann states:   
Historians can tell us that migration is as old as mankind; economists can tell us 
that migrants are far from being a burden to national economies; lawyers can tell 
us that existing frameworks or the lack of them are very much a cause of irregular 
migration.
13
  
 
In a similar vein, the three frameworks discussed below will draw very different 
conclusions about how solutions for refugees can be pursued in an effective manner. 
They do so by varying three components: who the most important actors are within the 
system, why the current system requires reform, and what mechanisms or avenues should 
be implemented to affect change. While the following literature tends to agree that the 
migration and conditions experienced by refugees constitute an important, consequential 
issue, it follows many different and at times conflicting arguments in doing so. A table 
summarizing the different actors, policy goals, and frameworks of each theoretical 
solution is located at the end of the chapter.  
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II. Mobility Solutions  
 Mobility solutions begin from the standpoint that the conceptualization of 
solutions in the current international refugee regime is fundamentally flawed. This theory 
draws its origins from the scholarship of the late 20
th
 century, which argued that the 
durable solutions to refugee crises were not working as effectively as intended. Katy 
Long, perhaps the most prominent scholar in this theoretical field, points out that most of 
these scholars tended to focus on the individual shortcomings of each strategy. Yet more 
recent scholarship has taken a step back and focused instead on the entire structure of 
durable solutions itself.
14
 Many scholars question why the durable solutions are rooted in 
the idea that refugees must be ‗fixed‘ to a place in order for their displacement to be 
resolved, and for the crisis to be considered solved.
15
 Indeed, all the durable solutions set 
forth by the UNHCR are contingent on refugees‘ location: repatriation is a return to the 
country of origin, local integration is a remaining within a country of asylum, and 
resettlement is moving from the asylum country to a third country. The ways in which 
these solutions are administered have been criticized as highly deterministic on the behalf 
of the state.  
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Who are the Actors? 
These solutions are thus characterized most generally by the belief that past 
research and policy has focused its attention too closely on states in the international 
refugee regime, leaving behind the needs and beliefs of refugees in doing so. While many 
acknowledge the importance of states, they view the most important actors in refugee 
politics to be the refugees themselves. They see the status of refugee-hood as a condition 
which violates the innate human right of the freedom to move. Starting from the very 
basis of the current system, then, they examine how giving refugees the choice over their 
movement might very well change the outcome. In doing so, they question what 
constitutes the underlying ―problem‖ in refugee crises, and how this problem differs 
when one analyzes the situation from the perspective of refugees themselves.  As Long 
states, ―Refugee and state perspectives on the problems displacement creates are often 
very different: it follows that they are likely to demand very different solutions.‖16  
Refugeehood, to these scholars, is much more than a physical problem.
17
 They 
demonstrate that both states and the international refugee regime often treat it as such in 
addressing a solution as a process through which refugees are shuffled, moved, or 
ordered to remain in place in a way that fits the particularities of the crisis and state 
preferences. Once refugees acquire a permanent location, the acquisition of citizenship 
rights follow. Yet these theorists find trouble in the idea that physical settlement is 
necessary in order for these political rights to be achieved. For the refugee, it is often 
political or human rights that are paramount; though location matters, it is largely a 
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reflection of the stability of a state and the rights associated with it, rather than a good in 
itself.
18
 As Martin Gottwald, another prominent scholar, states: ―From a human rights 
approach, the ‗problem of refugees‘ is the denial of their basic human rights that are 
commonly associated with citizenship.‖19 For these scholars, the acquisition of human 
and political rights is the element of the durable solutions which is most necessary to 
promote.  
 
Targets of Reform  
Why has it been so difficult for the traditional durable solutions to guarantee these 
rights? Many scholars in this category begin their critique of these solutions by 
highlighting that a number of geopolitical realities have evolved to become incongruent 
with the nature of the solutions as they are currently implemented. Refugee situations 
have grown increasingly protracted; the crises which initiate refugee movements have 
become more difficult to solve; globalization has led to an immense proliferation of 
international movement by a plethora of peoples; and other types of migrant regimes now 
hold important influence over refugee issues, to name a few.
20
 Long also names the fact 
that available asylum space is shrinking in the West and conditions in host states are 
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growing increasingly fragile.
21
 Many also allude to the clear evidence that the 
proliferation of irregular migration is dangerous to many refugees‘ lives and necessarily 
at odds with national law enforcement and security.
22
 Unfortunately, the arena in which 
refugee crises must be solved is becoming increasingly more risky and complicated for 
refugees, states, and other actors to handle.  
From this point, Long builds her theoretical argument for mobility by analyzing 
the shortcomings of the durable solutions. Looking first at resettlement, she states that the 
lack of asylum spaces and massive numbers of refugees indicate that resettlement does 
not offer a ―practical‖ solution to mass displacement.23 The process through which formal 
third-country resettlement through the UNHCR occurs often takes at least two years. 
Refugees have little to no say regarding to which country they are resettled, and irregular 
migration from the country of resettlement is a common result.
24
 The most pressing 
concern Long raises about resettlement, however, is the fact that political reception does 
not always lead to economic or social integration into the community. If refugees do not 
have access to proper employment, economic self-sustainability or social capital within 
their country of resettlement, Long states that it is ―highly questionable‖ whether this 
solution can be called effective.
25
 Gottwald agrees, adding that resettled refugees who 
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live dependent on aid for years are often unable to attain self-sufficiency and become a 
burden for local healthcare and social service networks in resettlement countries.
26
  
Local integration is also highly contentious to states and their local populations, 
and thus is rarely implemented successfully.
27
 The most common result of this is the rise 
of protracted refugee situations, where refugees become entrenched in the first ―phase‖, 
so to speak, of the refugee life cycle.
28
 States keep these refugees under their ―protection‖ 
by placing them in camps within their borders, but simultaneously deny their right to 
sustain themselves through resources accessible to other citizens within the state. Like 
resettlement, the issue at the hand is one of physical space as well as individual rights.  
The last durable solution—repatriation—is likewise problematic. While refugees 
may be able to regain their citizenship within their host country in a political sense, the 
rights associated with such citizenship often do not follow in states that are war-torn or 
remain in the post-crisis period.
29
 The existing regime would consider this to be a 
theoretically successful solution; but without providing refugees access to a sustainable 
livelihood, mobility scholars would disagree.
30
 Again, focusing on the idea that the rights 
to economic sustainability, socio-political stability, education, and the like are most 
important to refugees leads these scholars to conclude that most refugee repatriations do 
not represent successful solutions.   
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Mechanisms for Solutions  
 In criticizing these solutions, Long does not mean to suggest that they be 
completely eradicated. Quite the opposite, she believes that their intent to give refugee 
rights should be retained, but that the goal of an ―end to movement‖ should be replaced 
with the right to move. At its root, mobility gives refugees back the control over their 
physical livelihoods that many lack under the current solutions. By mobility, Long means 
the formation of legal pathways of migration between states through which refugees 
could move on either a temporary or a permanent basis.
31
 This movement could occur 
between the country of asylum and country of origin, between the country of asylum and 
a third country, and within countries of origin and asylum as well as within third 
countries.
32
 In essence, then, Long believes that integrating mobility into the existing 
durable solutions would greatly improve their efficacy.  
Much of the mobility that Long has in mind involves certain members of a 
refugee network pursuing labor migration. The majority of each network—most likely, a 
family—could remain within regions in which the state fails to provide them with the 
right to a sustainable livelihood, and send only select members to pursue labor to provide 
for such livelihood in other states.
33
 In this sense, repatriation and local integration could 
be seen as more viable solutions. The physical aspect of the refugee problem could be 
solved by remaining in the country of first asylum or origin country, and the rights aspect 
could be solved through ties and remittances from the laborers abroad. Even within a 
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state, this could allow refugees to move outside humanitarian spaces and contribute to 
development, if citizenship is not an available option.
34
 In regards to resettlement, Long 
likewise explains that many refugees view this solution as a path to the education, 
employment, and wealth of the West that is largely unavailable in countries of first 
asylum. If refugees were given the legal right to move—and this right was recognized by 
Western countries—refugees could ascertain rights through their own initiative of 
allocating themselves in a way that maximizes their personal gain.
35
    
 Gottwald argues much of the same, though he emphasizes a more comprehensive 
approach. He argues that mobility should be integrated into a multi-sectoral, 
comprehensive solution that aims to provide refugees the opportunity to pursue self-
sufficiency within the bounds of international refugee law, requiring cooperation from a 
variety of actors.
36
 If given the ability to move, individuals can capitalize upon personal 
livelihood opportunities. Larger refugee communities, too, can diversify risk.
37
 Although 
the theory Gottwald provides on comprehensive refugee solutions is extensive, he offers 
fewer concrete examples than Long regarding their practical implementation.  
 
Drawbacks and Comparisons   
Certain aspects of mobility solutions are not incongruous with other theories. 
Some legal refugee scholars, lamenting the rise of irregular or illegal migration that stems 
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from ineffective solutions, agree that non-host states must open more avenues for legal 
migration if they are to hold host countries responsible for irregular migration.
38
 Many 
economic theorists likewise embrace the idea of integration into the global economic 
system through labor migration.
39
 Moreover, Long‘s connection of mobility and 
development opportunities has been explored in depth by economic theorists. Integrating 
mobility into certain frameworks could find plausible support among the other 
conceptualizations of solutions.  
This theory seems to suggest that the enormously belaboring problem of the 
unequal responsibility host countries bear in hosting refugees and providing for solutions 
could be solved through increased mobility. Disproportionate burden-sharing arises 
largely from the fact that donor countries would prefer to give monetary aid to refugee 
crises rather than support the physical movement of refugees into their territory, thus 
avoiding all the impacts of refugees crises that are non-monetary—and, at that, paying far 
less for refugee crises as a percentage of their GDP than host countries. Thus, this 
theoretical solution could have significant implications if it was indeed successful in 
circumventing the system which has perpetuated this responsibility divide. Ideally, it 
would correct the power imbalance which exists between states by giving refugees the 
right to choose which physical location may be best suited to providing them with their 
rights.  
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The glaring drawback in this theory comes from the fact that ―free‖ movement 
insinuates all states must allow refugees to move through legal, freely flowing channels. 
Scholars speak very little about how this free migration could be achieved. Moreover, 
they depend on the fact that the UNHCR and other international organizations that 
closely regulate solutions would agree to step back and allow refugees to choose 
solutions for themselves, with the prerequisite that states would also allow them to do so. 
Full-scale implementation of free movement thus seems unlikely; and even integration 
into the durable UN solutions would be a gradual and lengthy process. Unlike the other 
theories of political or economic change, allowing for increased mobility has been 
implemented only selectively. The UN has begun to include features of mobility into 
recent refugee plans, but their effects largely remain to be seen.
40
 Thus, applying the 
framework of mobility to current crises will be far more based in hypothetical analysis 
than the other solutions.   
Furthermore, it is not clear that pursuing the principle of freedom of movement 
will allow for a sustainable allocation of refugees. On one hand, it may effectively 
overcome the responsibility-sharing problem if refugees actually have the desire and 
capacity to go to states that have not previously felt the pressures of refugee crises. 
However, if they would continue to move to areas of high refugee concentration, as is 
normally the case, this effect would not materialize. Moreover, incentivizing all states to 
agree that open borders are desirable is an incredibly daunting task. States would have to 
independently adopt this policy in their domestic legal system, ratify and implement an 
                                                 
40
 UNHCR, ―The Global Compact on Refugees‖ (September 13, 2018), 
http://www.unhcr.org/5b3295167.pdf.  
  
29 
 
international treaty that lays out the same, or some variation of the two. Given the current 
political atmosphere surrounding international migration and the limited ability of the UN 
to enforce binding law, this result seems unlikely.  
It may also be difficult for host states to be convinced that free movement may 
not simply lead to more refugees flowing into their territories, even temporarily. 
Although most refugees may want to relocate to less crowded, more sustainable states, 
the reality is that many lack the means or connections to do so. Only a select group of 
refugees may be able to benefit from such a solution. Long does not discount this 
entirely, recognizing that some aspects of the durable solutions must remain in place. 
Still, estimating where refugees may move or how their networks will form could be 
difficult, and result in unforeseen and unintended consequences. Refugee movement 
could become highly concentrated if uncontrolled, boding poorly for the host state. 
What‘s more, inequities between refugee families and populations are likely to arise if 
movement is unregulated. Nicholas Van Hear explains that movement is largely based on 
existing connections or capital, meaning that socio-economic status and national identity 
would predominantly determine movement.
41
  
Still, free movement remains a relevant policy option for protracted refugee 
situations. As described previously, PRS refugees remain in situations of protracted care 
for years, unable to escape largely due to the gridlock between state policy, international 
requirements and refugee desires. As Sari Hanafi explains, ―host [countries] and 
humanitarian organizations have dealt with protracted refugees as objects to be 
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administered, rather than as potential subjects of historical or social action.‖42Analyzing 
refugee crises through the framework of mobility may offer a new perspective on such 
situations that directly prioritizes the rights of refugees.   
 
III. Legal-Political Solutions 
 Theories of political or legal refugee solutions originate from a much broader 
literature on international law and policy. As Alexander Betts argues, ―Refugees are more 
than simply a human rights issue… The refugee and the state system are two sides of the 
same coin, and the former cannot be understood without reference to the latter.‖43 Given 
that refugees move across state borders, respond to both national and international crises, 
and necessitate the aid of multiple states and international organizations, their common 
classification as a subject of international relations is clear. Within the field of 
international relations theory, there is a wide range of beliefs regarding who constitutes 
the major actors within the broad system of global governance. Nearly all scholars, 
however, concede that the first and foremost is the state. States are the key creators of 
international law, the negotiators behind multilateral policies, and the bodies responsible 
for upholding peace and security among its peoples. The issue of refugees is thus one of 
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many global public goods problems—such as global warming, terrorism, trafficking, and 
much more—that states must address as an international community.44  
 
Who are the actors?  
Unlike mobility scholars, legal and political theorists view the task of creating 
sustainable refugee solutions from the perspective of the state. States, in the traditional 
sense, are sovereign bodies motivated by principles of territorial supremacy and self-
preservation.
45
 Refugees, in their eyes, are primarily stateless people who must regain 
their place in the current state system. Scholars recognize that the fundamental issue with 
the refugee regime lies in the laws and policies established by states, rather than the 
individual, and pursue ways to fix or realign these systems. Explained in this context, 
Ramesh Thakur and William Maley state that ―The phenomenon of the ‗refugee‘ can thus 
be seen as reflecting a failure of the states-system properly to perform its tasks.‖46 The 
end of refugeehood, then, should be a restoration or creation of citizenship—the legal 
recognition of a subject or national in a state or commonwealth.
47
 Some emphasize the 
need to ensure that refugees also acquire the rights associated with citizenship, as argued 
by mobility scholars. Most, however, focus more simply on the general acquisition of the 
legal status of citizen.  
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These scholars believe that the traditional mechanisms of international politics 
can serve as the tools of solutions. International law, treaties, conventions, and other 
multilateral agreements between states largely represent the avenues through which they 
see solutions being created. In contrast with the mobility conception, legal/political 
theorists can be thought of as seeking to improve the efficiency and enforceability of the 
existing international refugee regime from within the system itself. Rather than focusing 
on the incentives or preferences of refugees, these scholars analyze how states come 
together to make successful—or unsuccessful—policy regarding refugees, and what 
factors motivate or stymie such actions. They take state concerns about security and 
resource depletion related to refugees seriously, and view states as the only actors which 
have the legitimate power to make and enforce laws. If solutions are achieved through 
states, states will be more willing and able to help refugees, and thus refugees will feel 
the benefits through a trickle-down like effect. Cooperation and responsibility sharing are 
a large focus of such literature. 
 Other legal/political scholars begin from a more critical view of the system, 
arguing that the international refugee regime was necessarily formed in the interest of 
certain Western powers in ways that benefited their own interests disproportionately over 
others.
48
 They believe that developed states continue to undermine the system today, 
through tactics such as national laws which deter entry or declare it illegal under the 
guise of security or sovereignty concerns.
49
 They argue, ―under those circumstances, one 
can argue that those states which are happy to harvest the benefits of the system owe 
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duties towards those whom the system has failed.‖50 The tension between domestic 
politics and international norms, they believe, cannot be ignored. They demonstrate that 
some countries even go so far as to exploit international norms—such as the 
Responsibility to Protect—in pursuit of an underlying national agenda. These scholars 
tend to argue that the legal and political framework which classifies the current 
―international refugee regime‖ should undergo a more rigorous, modernizing reform that 
reflects current realities of the state system, rather than those of the 1950s in which it was 
created.  
 
Targets of Reform  
Conceptualization of legal/political solutions generally begins with a critical 
analysis of the existing relevant laws and policies. Guy Goodwin-Gil, a well-established 
scholar in the field, explains that the refugee in international law is characterized by both 
the principle of state sovereignty, as described above, and by the humanitarian principles 
deriving from general international laws and treaties.
51
 All states, in accordance with the 
UN Charter, are under an obligation to prevent refugee outflows and cooperate to resolve 
refugee issues.
52
 Whether cooperation happens in actuality varies, but the call for states to 
do so certainly exists.  
Many scholars thus begin, like Goodwin-Gil, with the foundation of refugee law: 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its subsequent 1967 Protocol. 
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Contained within these resolutions is the legal definition of a refugee and a number of 
enumerated rights which states must grant to refugees within their borders.
53
 Many legal 
scholars analyzing these foundational documents today conclude, unsurprisingly, that 
refugees enjoy few of these rights in actuality.
54
 B. S. Chimni writes that as early as 1983, 
Grahl-Madsen noticed ―‗in country after country a tendency toward a more restrictive 
interpretation and application of important provisions, sometimes even a disregard for 
rules of international law‘.‖55 Alexander Betts asserts that today, this non-compliance 
with socio-economic rights is nearly universal.
56
 One could go as far as to say that some 
of these rights, such as that to engage in wage-earning labor, participate in national 
industries, and travel, are now assumed to be rights which refugees should not be 
granted.
57
  
States even disagree upon the definition of a refugee under international law. As 
B.S. Chimni states:  
The battle over definitions of the term ‗refugee‘ expresses the more obvious 
aspects of the relationship between knowledge and power. The abandonment, 
since the early 1990s, of attempts to contest the partial nature of the definition of 
‗refugee‘ contained in the 1951 Convention shows how Refugee Studies took its 
cue from state policies.
58
  
 
Chapter 4 will examine the contested definition of a refugee in greater detail.  
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Another symptom of the uneven application of international law which scholars 
observe is the increasing tendency of states to unilaterally create their own refugee 
policies that are invariably more restrictive. National policies which seek to isolate states 
from the issue of refugees push the responsibility of addressing their plight onto other 
states and international actors within the system. Yet as Jan Claudius Volkel points out, 
the increasing ―securitization‖ of migration—particularly relating to refugees—is not 
subsequently increasing national or global security.
59
 Clearly, pursuing national refugee 
policy has not proven to be a successful solution in most states, for either their own 
interests or those of the refugees themselves. As the prospects for cooperation between 
states on refugee policies appear increasingly dismal, scholars turn to analyzing how the 
structure of the system could be realigned so as to reverse this concerning direction.  
 
Mechanisms for Solutions  
The most relevant intersection of international legal/political theory with refugees 
to solutions is the field of international cooperation. Like Goodwin-Gil and Alexander 
Betts, many scholars examine international refugee law in lieu of the duty states hold to 
cooperate in resolving refugee crises. Nearly all find it apparent that such cooperation 
often fails to materialize in significant and predictable ways. Betts explains that studies of 
cooperation focus on either state‘s contributions to asylum efforts, which are the 
protection of refugees on their territory; or burden sharing, meaning the role states play in 
the protection of refugees on the territory of another state.  
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Much of the theoretical literature relating to solutions focuses its attention on the 
latter issue of burden sharing. Burden sharing, or responsibility sharing, is the amount to 
which each state aids other states in their efforts of hosting refugees and reacting to 
crises, through financial contributions or resettlement.
60
 As harped on previously, 
developing states undoubtedly bear a much more substantial burden than developed 
states, hosting more than 85 percent of the world‘s refugees. Here, scholars draw upon 
some of the same mechanisms that international political theorists utilize when generally 
seeking to solve collective action problems.
61
  
Burden sharing literature begins with the credible assumption that the refugee 
regime is characterized by an asymmetry of power between the global North and South. 
Northern states are generally thought of as more powerful, resource-wealthy ―donor‖ 
states; whereas Southern states are generally ―host‖ states that bear much of the 
responsibility of providing for refugees. Early work on this subject examined refugee 
protection as a global public good.
62
 Burden sharing, analyzed with game theory, was 
theorized to be a Prisoner‘s Dilemma game in which states had strong incentives to free 
ride. Given the large payoffs from doing so—and the lack of strong international norms 
to dictate otherwise—successful cooperation was predicted to be limited.63 More recent 
literature, such as that by Loescher and Betts, finds that the cooperation problem is better 
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explained by a Suasion game. This game is characterized by asymmetrical payoff 
structures—given the North/South power imbalance—where Northern states have little 
incentive to cooperate and Southern states have little choice but to follow the lead of the 
North, resulting in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
64
 Game theory has helped scholars 
understand why certain outcomes are prevalent and, perhaps more importantly, how 
payoffs should be adjusted in order to achieve cooperation.  
To overcome this cooperation problem, Betts believes that strong issue linkage is 
necessary. Issue-linkage, or the connection of refugee solutions to states‘ broader 
incentives to uphold security, regularize migration, and pursue development, has been a 
key aspect of the UNHCR‘s success in facilitating cooperation.65 Without such linkages, 
the current structure of international law lacks incentives and enforceability. He argues 
that a reinterpretation of the law through a method of ―soft international legalism‖ could 
lead to a more effective regime in which levels of cooperation can be increased.
66
 As will 
become clear in the following section on economic solutions, Betts also believes that an 
equitable responsibility sharing system must include a number of different and complex 
mechanisms that are not just legal in nature.
67
   
Other scholars look at attempts to enhance cooperation through international or 
regional conferences. The classic example offered by scholars is the International 
Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in Africa I and II, held in 1981 and 1984. Many 
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agree that while the conferences did little by way of improving the outcome of the 
refugee crisis they meant to address, they held important lessons for the years to come 
about the need for development aid and projects to accompany refugee programs in low-
income countries of asylum.
68
 According to Volker Turk and Madeline Garlick, they also 
proved that states would require much more evident proof that their monetary aid would 
be directed towards durable solutions.
69
 The conferences were thus influential through 
their ability to direct the course of international debate on policy priorities and formulate 
a stronger normative argument for addressing the inequities between states which arise as 
a result of refugee movement. Other conferences, such as the Comprehensive Plan of 
Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees (CPA), would prove more tangibly successful in 
halting irregular movement.
70
 The aim of such conferences, according to these many 
scholars, is to create a ―more predictable government structure‖ through which refugee 
crises can be addressed.
71
  
Scholars theorize a wide variety of legal/political solutions in addition to those 
named above. Loescher and Monahan, for example, posit that ―multi-party commissions 
can contribute to securing and maintaining the necessary level of agreement and 
commitment among states.‖72 This theory is not dissimilar to those previously discussed, 
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in emphasizing that cooperation can be fostered if norms relating to burden sharing are 
developed with more rigor and oversight.  
Some scholars take a much different view of solutions, seeing them as an issue 
which is innately tied to state regime type. They posit that refugee situations could be 
prevented more effectively if countries chose to democratize, and thus believe that 
refugee crises should be tied to state efforts to spread democracy.
73
 While the United 
States, for example, has justified intervention in crises abroad by appealing to 
humanitarian ideals and the ―Responsibility to Protect‖ doctrine, it may be more accurate 
to say that it predominantly seeks to promote democracy and support the development of 
its desired regime in doing so.
 74
 A range of theorized solutions exists in between these 
two highlighted.  
Still others emphasize the need to lower the transaction costs between states of 
addressing refugee crises. They highlight that both instrumental-communitarian and 
hegemonic models of cooperation can be used to predict the effects of doing so. In the 
first model, state interaction and cooperation depends on each state‘s autonomous 
calculation of its values and interests. In the latter, states are persuaded or deterred from 
action by a singular hegemon, whose interests dominate international politics and hold 
immense sway over policy outcomes.
75
 Considering refugee crises within these differing 
contexts can hold implications about which aspects of the state system—such as 
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individual state interests versus those of the hegemon—should be targeted to achieve 
cooperation.  
Another model, championed by Alvin Roth, posits that the international 
community should seek to implement a ―preference-matching‖ system in which the 
resettlement or solution interests of refugees are matched to those of a state. This model 
contains the hope that if all states engaged in such a system, each would host or support 
refugees with which they feel the most cultural or socio-economic connection, and are 
thus most willing to aid.
76
 Still, this proposal seems idealistic in assuming that all states 
would be willing to host refugees at all, and overlooks the reality that many would prefer 
to maintain their current status as a ―donor‖ rather than ―host‖ to refugees.  
 
Drawbacks and Comparisons  
The discussion of legal-political solutions has revolved around how states and 
international bodies can reform or encourage compliance with international law and 
policy by changing their incentive structures. Although states‘ interests are clearly 
paramount, one should not fall into the trap of oversimplifying this framework to the 
notion that states care only about their own interests, rather than those of refugees. To be 
sure, many states have the interests of refugees and human rights in mind when creating 
these policies. These theories aim to show that effective interstate cooperation in regards 
to international refugee law and policy is necessary to ensuring that both refugees and 
states more sustainably interact. Goodwin-Gil concedes that ―for any solution to be 
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ultimately satisfactory, the wishes of the individual…in light of the connections which he 
or she may have with one or another State, cannot be disregarded entirely.‖77 Thus, just 
as mobility solutions must be reconciled within the framework of the state system, so too 
must legal-political solutions acknowledge that such policy goals must align, at least to 
some degree, with the desires of the individuals they target.  
A more ―realist‖ view of interstate relations can lead to quite different conclusions 
about the power of international law and policy. David A. Martin argues that treaties 
regarding international refugee policy cannot be viewed as legal bulwark: to do so would 
be to greatly exaggerate the legitimate force they hold, and ignore the political realities of 
state interests. Rather, he believes that states must observe ―painful and counterintuitive 
limits‖ to protection in order to maximize its strategic potential. The international 
community should recognize that it is within states‘ best interests to limit refugee inflows 
at a level that the each state can economically and politically tolerate.
78
 In essence, realist 
political theory posits that successful international cooperation surrounding the formation 
and implementation of legal and political solutions is unlikely.  
Regardless, there seems to be little doubt among refugee scholars in all subfields 
that every foreseeable solution should include some element of a political solution. Even 
mobility scholars, such as Long, acknowledge that refugee crises ―still require political 
solutions, even if migration may represent a refugee's best socioeconomic strategy 
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thereafter.‖79 Although the nature of legal-political solutions is clearly highly variable, it 
is safe to assume that either a mobility or economic solution should include legal or 
political change as well.  
Legal-political solutions are particularly strong in their ability to clearly position 
refugees within the international global order. They place the ability to influence 
solutions in the hands of the most powerful actors—states—and demonstrate that changes 
in law and policy dictated by states can lead to more favorable outcomes for refugees on 
a number of fronts. In doing so, many specifically target the deficiencies of international 
politics today, by suggesting new methods through which interstate cooperation can be 
pursued and burdens between states can be redistributed to benefit both states and 
refugees themselves. Still, likening the issue of refugees to that of a ―global public good‖ 
or similar issues which create collective action problems does not necessarily render the 
issue any easier to solve. Many issues—perhaps the most obvious being climate 
change—have been repeatedly identified and targeted as subjects of international 
agreements but witnessed little progress as a result. Refugee crises are no new issue; and 
viewing solutions through the lens of increasing interstate cooperation is not a novel idea, 
either. Thus, situating solutions within the context of international cooperation may only 
be an early first step in actually achieving the intended results.  
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IV. Economic Solutions 
Finally, we arrive at economic solutions. In many ways, economic solutions 
combine elements of both of the aforementioned theories and pave a middle ground 
between the ideological conflicts between the two. They offer perhaps the most holistic 
view of the current realities of the international system, and propose a wide range of 
tangible solutions. These include—but are certainly not limited to—development, 
employment and labor integration, microfinance systems, and entrepreneurship. 
Economic solutions also introduce a new subset of actors into the conversation: the 
private sector. Many economic scholars acknowledge the growing influence of multi-
national corporations in world markets and on individual governments, accounting for the 
interests of multiple different actors including refugees, governments, NGOs, and private 
companies in their conceptualization of solutions.  
Previously, the intersection of refugee studies and economics generally came in 
the areas of refugee livelihoods and the impact of refugees on host areas and societies.
80
 
Alexander Betts, the most prominent scholar on refugee economics, posits that such a 
field is limited in that it fails to consider how a broader view of refugees‘ economic lives 
can hold implications about which kinds of interventions will succeed. His work in 
developing the link between refugee economies and solutions, grounded in extensive data 
analysis, has been monumental in shifting the field towards market-based solutions and 
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informing major policy decisions of the World Bank, the United Nations, and other major 
international actors in the refugee regime.
81
  
 
Who are the Actors?  
The first element of this theory hinges on how we are to consider refugees as 
actors in the international refugee regime. Not unlike scholars of mobility solutions, 
economic scholars believe that refugees should be given much more autonomy to better 
their own situations. Yet economic scholars make the clear distinction that refugees must 
be considered autonomous economic actors, rather than simply individuals endowed with 
human rights. Scholarship on political economies has largely lacked interest in the role 
refugees‘ play within economies, assuming simply that it is minimal. Alexander Betts 
lists a number of these assumptions: 1) that refugees are economically isolated, 2) that 
they are a burden on host states, 3) that they are economically homogenous, 4) that they 
are technologically illiterate, and 5) that they are dependent on humanitarian assistance.
82
 
Likewise, Karen Jacobsen describes that refugees are generally viewed as being 
traumatized and entirely dependent on aid organizations and host comminutes for 
support.
83
 The research of both scholars aims to demonstrate that these assumptions are 
largely untrue, and prevent policy makers from pursuing the most beneficial solutions.  
While it is certainly valid that many refugees are initially quite mentally, 
physically, and socio-economically dependent, a growing body of literature has 
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highlighted that refugees quickly begin to interact with existing markets or create new 
markets in the communities to which they flee. Even within camps, refugees have 
devised novel and highly successful ways to generate income both as individuals and as 
broader communities. In doing so, these refugees are acting as economic theory assumes 
any other individual within a market would: as utility-maximizing agents who seek to 
extrapolate as much value from their available resources as possible. Betts qualifies that 
refugees‘ unique position in between three institutions is crucial to their study. These 
include their place in between state and international governance authorities; between 
formal and informal sectors of the economy; and between national and transnational 
economies.
84
 
Evaluating refugees under this framework allows scholars to predict their actions 
and the effects of those actions with far more capacity than under the previous 
assumption about their dependency. Importantly, this literature has also contested the 
common perception that refugees are necessarily a drain on local and national economies. 
Much of the recent scholarship demonstrates that refugees can fill necessary gaps in labor 
forces, aid in the development of capital and industry, and even alleviate the need for aid 
in becoming self-sustaining. Economic scholars thus seek to redefine the answer to the 
question, as stated by Alexander Betts, of ―What difference does it make – in economic 
terms – to be a refugee?‖85  
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 The second element of ―refugee economics‖ considers the other major actors 
within the refugee regime: states and international organizations. Scholars recognize that 
these actors play a key role in formulating policies affecting the economic activity of 
refugees, from extending rights such as employment and citizenship to creating programs 
specially tailored to refugees‘ economic needs, like the creation of special economic 
zones. Thus, the utility of refugees is necessarily constrained by the interests of states and 
international organizations in ways which economic agents who are not refugees are 
immune. Refugees moreover face constraints in terms of income, language, culture, etc., 
that can easily be quantified or factored into common utility models.
86
 Together, these 
elements create a world in which refugees are independent, utility maximizing actors that 
are constrained by the specific political, legal, and socio-economic decisions of the states 
and international organizations with which they interact. 
 
Targets of Reform 
 At the most basic level, economic solutions seek to make refugees self-sustaining. 
This is particularly apt for protracted refugee situations, in which humanitarian assistance 
to encamped refugees is perpetuated and inevitably diminishes over time. Betts argues 
that such a model of dependence prevents refugees from reestablishing their own 
livelihoods, and instead believes that opportunities for education, connectivity, 
electricity, transportation, access to capital, and the right to work should be extended to 
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refugees in protracted situations.
87
  Mohammed Al-Husban and Carl Adams, studying the 
Za‘atari refugee camp in Jordan, argue the same. They further explain that the 
assumption that refugees can eventually return to their communities of origin is flawed 
by the fact that aid is often delivered to the areas where most people are returning, rather 
than abandoned towns.
88
 Given this reality, refugees should be able to develop the 
capability to rebuild their own communities themselves or establish a new livelihood 
elsewhere. 
 A variety of case studies in North Africa and the Middle East have explored the 
notion of self-sustainability within refugee camps. Such refugee economies, as Betts 
terms them, encompass the entire resource allocation system relating to a refugee 
community.
89
 These systems often exist informally, but exploring how they are created 
and sustained can offer direction as to how aid organizations and host governments can 
more efficiently develop refugees‘ opportunities for self-sustainment. These systems are 
characterized by a variety of networks: networks between different groups of refugees, 
between the refugee economy and the local community, and between the refugees and 
their families or friends to which they send remittances.
90
 Perhaps counter-intuitively, 
studies show that refugees are far more likely to turn to neighbors, families, and extended 
communities for economic aid than they are to approach aid organizations.
91
 Recognizing 
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that creating self-sustaining communities and decreasing aid are much more preferable 
than perpetuating reliance on relief organizations, scholars argue that organizations and 
governments should seek to recognize, map, and support such networks.
92
 This also 
contrasts greatly with the common perception that refugees exist in economic ―enclaves,‖ 
and instead suggests that they naturally integrate and generate growth between various 
markets and populations.  
 
Mechanisms for Solutions 
 Scholars have theorized a wide range of complementary economic solutions. To 
begin, microfinance programs provide an example of how effective the aforementioned 
networks can be. Access to credit is a major impediment to refugees‘ development of 
financial capital. As a result, refugees have developed innovative ways to fill this gap 
through reliance on networks within camps. Rotating credit savings programs and 
business consortiums, formed by groups of refugees attempting to start or advance small 
businesses, help overcome the barrier of being denied access to loans and reduces the 
burden of common expenditures.
93
 ―ROSCAs‖ are pools of money to which members of 
a community contribute, and can borrow from with the promise to repay the debt when 
possible.
94
 Many case studies find that access to effective informal microfinance 
mechanisms such as these have a significant positive impact on refugees‘ incomes.95 This 
                                                 
92
 Betts, ―Refugee Economies in Kenya,‖ 47.  
93
 Ibid, 32.  
94
 Jacobsen, ―The Economic Life of Refugees,‖ 28. 
95
 Betts, ―Refugee Economies in Kenya,‖ 48.  
  
49 
 
leads scholars to conclude that if host governments or aid organizations, like the 
UNHCR, were to facilitate the implementation and growth of such systems, refugees 
could reach high levels of self-sustainability far more quickly than under existing 
arrangements. Host states could furthermore avoid the creation of protracted, aid-
dependent populations.  
 The employment of refugees within camps is highly variable based on region and 
largely dependent on refugees‘ preexisting level of education. In general, economic 
activity tends to be informal and possess low financial risk. This often includes activities 
such as farming and running small businesses, as well as more illicit markets such as 
prostitution or smuggling.
96
 The most common activity is trade. Encamped refugees trade 
in everything from goods (e.g., vegetables, coffee, gold) to aid (food rations and ration 
cards) to a wide range of services.
97
 In many cases, refugee camps become hubs of 
economic activity within the surrounding regions in which they are situated. Encamped 
refugees further contribute to economic growth by acting as buyers of products and 
services from local sellers in the host communities, or through larger trade networks.
98
 
Allowing such economic activity to grow unregulated represents a significant loss 
in potential tax revenue for the host country. Indeed, there is growing evidence from 
many case studies that such positive economic contributions would likely outweigh the 
problem of increased competition within markets or for employment.
99
 Although states‘ 
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often fear that allowing refugees to work will limit the jobs available to their own people, 
Betts‘ finding that refugees engage in diverse economic activity regardless of whether 
they have formally been granted the right to work should indicate that regulating their 
activity would be beneficial.
100
 Scholars like Alexander Betts and Karen Jacobsen who 
study refugee economies advocate that formalizing economic activity through 
employment permits and work programs would bring benefits to both refugees and host 
economies.  
The proliferation of urban refugees has also prompted scholars to assess how they 
differ, in economic terms, from refugees in camps. Because most urban refugees do not 
receive humanitarian aid, they are forced to exert greater self-reliance and generate 
income by integrating local economies.
101
 Within urban areas, refugees engage in 
informal and formal labor depending on the employment regulations enforced by the host 
government. Many also become entrepreneurs, who create their own businesses that can, 
in turn, employ both refugees and native workers and hold the potential to be taxed and 
regulated if legitimized by governments.
102
 Scholars point to the fact that if donor states 
supported initiatives such as microfinance programs, vocational training, and small 
business development, refugees would transition to self-sustainable status and away from 
one of perpetual aid, at a far lower cost to both donor and host governments.
103
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Other scholars also point to the value of interstate employment; specifically, labor 
migration.
104
 Katy Long, discussed at length in the mobility solutions section above, has 
also written extensively on the necessity of establishing greater paths for refugees to seek 
employment outside the country to which they fled. She finds that preventing labor 
market participation by refugees encourages illegal or unreported work, mass 
deportations, and xenophobic attacks.
105
 Allowing refugees to pursue labor migration and 
send remittances back to their refugee communities can create self-sufficient populations, 
which could expand the tax-base of host communities and increasingly contribute to the 
labor skills pool. Within their countries of employment, labor refugees could address 
labor shortages in both unskilled and skilled labor.
106
 The UNHCR or other aid 
organizations could facilitate such labor migration by encouraging states' to incorporate 
bilateral migration treaties into repatriation arrangements, providing access to vocational 
training, and paying migration permit costs.
107
  
 Although the previous solutions are rather recent proposals, the link between 
refugees and development has a long history within international refugee policy. Betts 
points out that even before the official formation of the refugee regime in the 1950s, 
development was used as a tool by the League of Nations in the Greek refugee crisis of 
1922-1924.
108
 Development-based solutions gained a more official footing in 
international policy after the ICARA conferences of the early 1980s. Spurring this change 
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was a general recognition in the international community that humanitarian aid may not 
be sufficient to address refugee problems in states where much more systemic, long-term 
problems related to underdevelopment persisted.
109
  
Integrating refugee and development aid has historically been addressed by both 
the UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme with varying success. 
Often, the UNHCR will ―hand off‖ a refugee project, so to speak, to the UNDP to 
―ensure that the infrastructure of an area was developed and that the refugees became 
economically and socially viable communities within a region.‖110 Betts outlines that the 
most successful development initiatives were those in which three conditions were met: 
donor states provided ―additionality‖ in development assistance; host states recognized 
additional development assistance must be accompanied by increased opportunities for 
self-reliance; and the UNHCR and development agencies effectively collaborated to 
create projects benefiting host states, donor states, and refugees.
111
  
 Lastly, scholars such as Betts and Naohiko Omata have begun to explore the 
connection between private business and refugee economies.
112
 The theoretical 
component of such literature is grounded in the conception of refugee assistance not as a 
global public good, which only states or international organizations acting on behalf of 
states can supply, but in the theory of ―private provision of public goods.‖ This theory is 
applicable when situations can be created in which the provider of the good can accrue 
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some benefit from which others who do not are excluded.
113
 Involvement from private 
companies often manifests itself in the form of the employment of refugees, which can be 
supported through a number of arrangements. 
Alexander Betts champions the use of ―special economic zones‖ as one such 
mechanism. Special economic zones represent physical areas of land which possess 
different investment, production and trade regulations than the rest of the state to promote 
development in areas that typically lack labor and inward investment. In Jordan, a 
partnership established between private companies, states, and international organizations 
enables refugees to work in these special economic zones.
114
 In fact, it was Alexander 
Betts who formed the policy for the King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area in 
Jordan, which will be the large focus of a Chapter 9.
115
 Policies like the creation of 
special economic zones seek to bridge the gap in incentive structure between global 
business, host governments, and refugees. In doing so, they recognize refugees as 
potential economic assets.  
 
Drawbacks and Comparisons  
  Clearly, economics can be applied to the analysis of refugee solutions in a 
number of useful ways. Theories of economic solutions importantly take into 
consideration the incentives and desires of many actors within the refugee system, 
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including host governments, refugees, donor states, international organizations, NGOs, 
private corporations, and local populations. These solutions acknowledge the reality that 
one of the primary reasons states are wary of supporting refugees—through resettlement, 
aid, or other measures—is because the perceived economic costs of doing so appear to 
outweigh the benefits. By demonstrating the ways in which refugees can contribute to 
economic growth and development within states, economic theorists seem to successfully 
overcome this major impediment to refugee protection. 
 Moreover, all of the aforementioned economic solutions emphasize the need to 
move away from a refugee system which creates aid dependency and towards one which 
fosters self-sustainability. Such a concept holds particularly important implications for 
protracted refugee situations, in particular, which are characterized by a chronic lack of 
relief aid, years of living in camps, and wearied host governments. Still, public opinion in 
many states is wary of the potential negative repercussions the economic integration of 
refugees could hold.
116
 The political circumstances of refugee-hood may also pose a 
barrier as well, as extending economic opportunities may decrease refugees‘ claims to 
return to their country of origin or the necessity that they do so. The question of which 
actors should be responsible for forming agreements between host states, aid 
organizations, and private businesses about economic solutions remains as well.   
Experience shows that states often fail to act as economic rationality dictates they 
should to maximize their own benefit. Rather, political concerns, public opinion, and 
competing theories can hold a stronger sway over their policy decisions. Economic 
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solutions have struggled to find footing amidst such a politicized landscape, and may 
continue to face opposition in implementation.  Increasingly, though, international 
organizations and non-state actors, like private corporations, have begun to take the lead 
in integrating economic and market-based solutions into both preexisting frameworks and 
new policies of refugee solutions. If such initiatives prove successful, economic solutions 
are likely to find growing traction in the coming years.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 The categorization of solutions to refugee crises above allows for clear 
comparison of how theorists view the actors within the system, the areas of refugee law 
and policy most in need of reform, and mechanisms through which solutions should be 
pursued. The perspective each group of scholars offer holds very different implications 
for the dialogue surrounding solutions and for the space where policy or legal changes 
should originate in the future.  
 It has hopefully become clear that scholars address refugee solutions from a wide 
variety of conceptual perspectives and theoretical bases. Many clash directly over the 
importance of certain issues, the prominence of specific actors, and the methods with 
which solutions are pursued or prioritized. Still, they allow for opportunities to combine 
or modify solutions based in ways that would enhance the viability of the ―system‖ of 
solutions that respond to a refugee crisis as a whole. While cooperation between actors—
such as governments and private businesses—is often necessary, the scholars above 
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suggest a number of ways in which incentives can be realigned to foster benefits in 
coordination for all parties.  
In reality, which solutions are rendered most effective may not be determined by 
those with the most accurate theoretical conceptions but rather by the environment in 
which they are presented. Accompanying each refugee crisis is a unique set of constraints 
which limits the responses of certain actors or certain solutions. A financial collapse in a 
host country would not bode well for the feasibility of a solution based in economic 
integration, for example. As Betts concludes, ―every major refugee hosting context 
should have an economic policy and strategy specifically for refugees and the immediate 
host community, based on robust analysis and consultation.‖117 Although the 
aforementioned solutions are far from a comprehensive list, they represent the focus of 
current scholarship which informs policy decisions and shapes international discourse on 
refugees.  
 The next chapter will supply the historical background necessary to understand 
the case study analyses that follow. It will address both the history of the global refugee 
regime and the history of the Jordan as a refugee-hosting state.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117
 Betts, ―Refugee Economies in Kenya,‖ 48.  
  
57 
 
Table 2.1 Comparing Theoretical Solutions 
 
 
Source: Original Compilation by Author. Material drawn from sources analyzed in this 
chapter.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Theoretical 
Solution 
 
Major 
Actors 
Targets of 
Reform 
Goals Policy Options 
Mobility Refugees Durable solutions 
as state-centric; 
excessive focus on 
citizenship rather 
than rights 
Rights-first 
approach; give 
refugees more 
power to 
determine their 
own solution 
New migration 
pathways; 
interstate work 
permits; refugee 
choice 
Legal/Political States Int‘l law & policy 
outdated, lack 
accountability; 
need burden 
sharing  
Facilitate 
interstate 
cooperation, 
strengthen int‘l 
law, build realistic 
state policy 
Reform refugee 
definition, 
interstate 
conferences and 
committees 
Economic Refugees, 
States, 
UN, 
NGO‘s & 
IO‘s, 
Private 
Business 
Lack of economic 
rights hinders 
growth within host 
economy & 
prevents self-
reliance 
Promote 
economic 
integration; create 
cooperation 
between economic 
actors  
Work permits, 
development, 
microfinance, 
entrepreneurship, 
partner w/ 
business 
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Historical Background                                   3                             
 
I. Introduction 
 The historical context in which modern refugee crises are analyzed is highly 
significant. Although migration is an ancient phenomenon, the concept of the ―refugee‖ 
arose in recent times. Over the past century, the movements of refugees have become 
increasingly well-documented by scholars, states, and global governance actors. 
Examining the changing nature of refugeehood amidst the evolving international refugee 
regime is essential to understanding current refugee policy.   
 Conceptualizing refugee policy in Jordan requires three elements of background. 
To begin, this chapter will provide an analysis of the United Nations‘ role in addressing 
refugee crises. The primary UN body tasked with overseeing refugee operations is the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR has formally 
operated in Jordan since 1997, and is highly influential in refugee protection and aid 
services. Despite the lengthy history of the UNHCR, the original definition of a refugee it 
set forth in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol still 
stands as the primary source of international refugee law. It encompasses all refugees, 
save for Palestinians, in its berth. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the 
Near East and Palestine (UNRWA) persists as the United Nations‘ refugee agency for 
displaced Palestinians. Given the United Nations‘ long history of working with refugees, 
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this chapter will analyze the evolution of its operations and policy implementations 
alongside greater historical conflicts and political environments.  
 It is equally important to understand the history of Jordan. Examining Jordan‘s 
transition into statehood, relations with other states in the region, and domestic economy 
and society provides insight on how certain factors influence the government‘s formation 
of refugee policy. The knowledge of the circumstances and events predating the refugee 
crises Jordan experienced are an important aspect of this discussion.  Additionally, this 
chapter will consider other types of socio-economic and political issues Jordan has faced 
in recent years.  
Lastly, the legal foundations of refugee policy within Jordan will be considered. 
Jordan holds a long history as a refugee-hosting state, and its economy, society, and 
international relations are largely shaped by the influence of refugees and other migrants. 
Assessing these aspects of Jordan in tandem provides the proper backdrop against which 
the efficacy of Jordan‘s refugee policy solutions can be discerned.   
 Lastly, Jordan‘s experience with refugees will be placed in the context of the 
broader scope of worldwide refugee issues. The analysis will highlight the most 
important current crises and recent global trends in refugee displacement. It will assess 
the existing distribution of refugee protection, demonstrated through the amount of 
monetary aid states contribute towards refugee relief services, the physical resettlement 
of refugees to third countries, and the number of refugees hosted within countries of first 
asylum. It will furthermore provide critical figures on the progress of durable solutions 
for individual refugees and protracted refugee populations.  
  
60 
 
 
II. History of the UNHCR and the UNRWA 
 
 Although scholars debate the influence that global governance organizations hold 
over policy issues, there is widespread agreement that the UNHCR has played an integral 
role in formulating refugee policy and carrying out substantial refugee protection and 
services operations. UNWRA, on the other hand, is a much smaller agency whose 
mandate for action has shrunk considerably over the years. Taken together, the histories 
of the UNHCR and the UNRWA demonstrate how the issue of refugeehood became an 
increasingly salient and complex issue over time in the face of various geo-political 
developments.  
 
Establishing the “Refugee”  
The legal definition of a ―refugee‖ is a modern conception of the 20th century. 
Nonetheless, accounts of exiled and persecuted people fleeing from their homelands exist 
well before the modern age. Hundreds of years ago, sites of worship were purportedly 
used as sanctuaries for the displaced across the Middle East and parts of Europe, who 
often fled from religious persecution or warfare. It was not until the advent of the modern 
state-system with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that the notion of movement across 
borders became regulated by any individuals or states.
1
 The Treaty identified refugees as 
people who had lost the protection of their own state, and highlighted the importance of 
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offering asylum.
2
 In the 18
th
 and 19th centuries, various European countries and the 
United States also chose to formally recognized individuals seeking asylum from 
religious persecution.  
Following the First World War, the closure of borders throughout Europe created 
refugee flows that were large and unprecedented. In 1921, the Red Cross and other non-
governmental organizations lobbied the newly-formed League of Nations to formally 
address the growing issue of refugee movement on the international level. The League 
listened, and created the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. 
3
 The initial 
definition of a refugee adopted by the Office of the Commissioner stated that sufficient 
conditions to be called a ―refugee‖ existed if someone was outside their country of origin 
and without the protection of the government of that State.
4
 In contrast to the modern 
conception, populations were granted refugee status—not individuals. In other words, a 
sizeable number of a people must have existed outside of state protection in order for an 
individual within that group to be deemed a refugee. A refugee fleeing civil war and 
revolution in Russia, for instance, was defined as ―‗any person of Russian origin who 
does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the Union of 
Socialist Soviet Republics and who has not acquired another nationality‘.‖5  
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The first legal instrument used for the international protection of refugees was 
introduced in 1921 by the Office‘s first High Commissioner. The Nansen Passport, 
named after Fridtjof Nansen, served as a temporary identification paper for displaced 
persons who often faced difficulty achieving asylum without identifying legal 
documents.
6
 Faced with repatriating 450,000 prisoners of war, Nansen enlisted the 
support of government and volunteer agencies to aid the League in providing legal status, 
economic independence and/or repatriation to the displaced. Long before the creation of 
the modern-day refugee regime, Nansen realized the importance of mobilizing 
international cooperation and seeking long-term solutions to refugees‘ plight.  
Although the Office of the High Commissioner was established with good 
intentions, it would prove ill-equipped to handle the displacement of more than fifty 
million refugees in the aftermath of the Second World War. Such massive displacement 
clearly necessitated a much stronger and more systematic mechanism of distributing aid 
and finding long-term solutions.
7
 After attempting unsuccessfully to coordinate the return 
of the displaced refugees, the Allied Powers created the UN Relief and Rehabilitation 
Agency in 1943 to handle repatriation efforts. Its work was gradually taken over by the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO). Formed in 1946, the IRO initiated movement 
towards a more legalized definition of a refugee that retained the aspect of national or 
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group characterization.
 8
 Its operations included maintaining the first refugee camps, 
offering vocational training and integration services, and reconnecting refugees with lost 
relatives.
9
  
In 1949, the United Nations began to seek a broader approach to the refugee issue 
beyond the mandate of the IRO. Several states, such as the United States, emphasized 
that any future definition that the UN adopted regarding refugees must be narrowly 
tailored and extend only legal protection to individuals identified by its criteria. States 
also debated which kinds of migrants were to be included in the definition. For instance, 
they questioned whether individuals displaced within their own country should receive 
protection.
10
 Despite these disputes, the United Nations approved the Statue of the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950.
11
 In July 
1951, a convention hosted in Geneva subsequently set forth the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. 
Together, the Statute of the UNHCR and the 1951 Convention provide clear 
instructions and limitations for UNHCR activity. The UNHCR was mandated to ―provide 
international protection‖ and seek ―permanent solutions for the problem of refugees‖—a 
mandate that still stands today.
12
 At its establishment, the UNHCR was limited to work 
that was purely humanitarian and social in nature, and thus entirely non-political. 
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Moreover, a refugee covered under its mandate was defined as an individual displaced as 
a result of events occurring before January 1
st
, 1951, and who is outside their country of 
origin and unable or unwilling to avail themselves of its protection ‗owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted‘ or for ‗reasons other than personal convenience‘.13 
States were given the discretion to limit the application of the definition to only those 
refugees fleeing from Europe. The Statute also extends to:  
Any other person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no 
nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has or had a 
well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the 
government of the country of his nationality, or if he has no nationality, to 
return to the country of his former habitual residence.
14
  
 
The limited nature of the above definition was often justified on the grounds that 
―extending protection to such individuals could mean offering asylum to every poor 
person in the world‖.15 Still, it was highly criticized by non-Western states for its 
exclusion of many other kinds of migrants and its Eurocentric focus.
16
  
 In addition to defining a refugee, the Statute sets forth a number of rights states 
must guarantee to refugees in their displacement. First, it forbids states from penalizing 
refugees for their illegal entry or stay. Once within a state‘s borders, refugees were also 
promised basic rights such as that of primary education, employment, access to courts, 
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freedom to move, and provision of proper documentation.
17
 Lastly, one of the most 
important principles states must abide by was that of non-refoulement.
18
  Non-
refoulement, which precludes states from repatriating refugees against their will, is 
fundamental to the protection mandate of the UNHCR.  
 
  
UNHCR: The First Forty Years 
The initial operations of the UNHCR were rather limited. With little funding and 
a highly restrictive mandate, the UNHCR addressed crises in a manner described as 
―reactive, exile-oriented and refugee-centric.‖19 The first major crisis it tackled was that 
of Hungarian refugees in 1956, in which the UNHCR raised funds to assist the countries 
of asylum and sought solutions through third-country resettlement and repatriation.
20
 
Such initiatives were largely successful, and the following years would see the UNHCR 
continue to assign the responsibility of handling refugees to host states—rather than the 
countries of origin—and focus on local settlement and resettlement as durable solutions.  
Limited as it was by the geographical and temporal specifications of its mandate, 
the UNHCR faced difficulty when refugee crises began to emerge in the developing 
world in the 1950s and onwards. Decolonization processes led to the creation of a large 
number of refugees in Africa and Asia, and newly-added member states to the UNHCR 
resultantly pressured the organization to extend its activities to these unstable regions. 
                                                 
17
 UNHCR, ―1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee,‖ 
https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html. 
18
 Ibid.   
19
  Loescher et. al., UNHCR, 21. 
20
 Ibid.  
  
66 
 
The UNHCR obliged, using what is referred to as a ―good offices‖ policy to justify its 
involvement in Tunisia in 1957.
21
 Circumventing the restrictions of the 1951 Convention, 
this policy allowed the UNHCR ―to use his good offices in the transmission of 
contributions designed to provide assistance‖ to refugees outside the Convention 
definition.
22
 Often, the interests of Western powers like the United States supported such 
involvement: seeking to establish influence over newly-formed states, they wielded 
assistance to refugees as a tool to do so.
23
 States made little distinction between the 
military, development and refugee aid they offered. Subsequently, the General Assembly 
resolved to allow the UNHCR to expand the scope of its assistance and protection 
abilities for both refugee and host populations, allowing for greater emphasis on 
development-based programs.  
The end of the 1960s saw policy changes bring the refugee definition outlined in 
the 1951 Convention in line with its modern conception. The 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees eliminated the geographical and temporal restrictions of the 1951 
Convention, allowing the UNHCR to more formally address refugees fleeing from 
conflict arising outside of Europe.
24
 Still, by retaining the language of a ―well-founded 
fear of persecution‖, the definition appeared to exclude a number of refugees in third 
world countries fleeing from natural disaster, war, or political and economic turmoil, 
rather than persecution.
25
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As a result, a number of regional organizations established their own operational 
definitions of a refugee. In 1969, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) held a 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Crises in Africa. The new 
definition declared by the Convention moved away from the language of persecution and 
instead defined refugees as those fleeing ―external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either a part or the whole of the 
country of origin or nationality.‖ 26 This definition allowed individuals fleeing from the 
war, violence, and civil disturbances facing many African regions at the time to be 
considered refugees. The Cartagena Declaration in Latin America likewise established a 
very similar definition.
27
 Although these regional definitions do not trump the UNHCR 
definition on the international level, they do hold legal significance between the states 
which formed the agreements.  
In the 1970s, the UNHCR emerged as the focal agency among international 
organizations for handling humanitarian crises. It increasingly advocated for the human 
rights of refugees through international human rights organizations and trans-national 
advocacy networks. Moreover, it placed a renewed emphasis on resettlement as the 
preferred refugee solution.
28
 The economic turmoil of the early 1980s, however, 
challenged states‘ openness to accepting resettled refugees. Conservative Western 
governments increasingly feared large and irregular refugee inflows, such as that of the 
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Cubans into the United States in the Mariel Boatlift crisis of 1980.
29
 Many states severely 
restricted their asylum policies as a result. In response, the UNHCR issued critical 
monitoring reports of refugee aid in a number of these states. Targeted member states 
took offense, and began conducting refugee policy discussions outside of the formal 
UNHCR sessions.
30
 Clearly, the mandate of the UNHCR and the interests of its most 
powerful members had begun to diverge.   
Many of the current trends observed in refugee policy today can be traced back to 
developments of the 1980s. Refugee displacement lengthened, and camps struggled in 
providing long-term care to what would become protracted refugee situations. Moreover, 
as the presence of non-governmental organizations in international politics proliferated, 
the UNHCR faced increasing competition for scarce aid and resources from its donors. 
Consequentially, UNHCR funding per refugee fell by fifty percent by the end of the 
1980s.
31
 It was evident, as Loesher et. al state, that ―the international community failed to 
devise comprehensive or long term political solutions or to provide any alternatives to 
prolong camp existence, and finding solutions for these refugee situations became 
increasingly difficult.‖32 Recognizing the organization‘s shortcomings, the High 
Commissioner at the time sought to turn its attention towards root causes of refugee 
crises in their origin countries.
33
 Given the difficulties associated with doing so, success 
was quite limited.  
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From the 1950s to the end of the 1980s, the UNHCR evolved from a small agency 
with limited power and influence over refugee crises to a massive, highly active 
organization that directed refugee policy internationally. The operations it undertook 
were largely responses to the political interests of its member states—though the power 
imbalance between developed and developing states left the great powers at the time with 
the majority of the control over the limitations of the UNHCR‘s activities. The best 
―solution‖ to each refugee crisis, which took the forms of facilitated onward migration, 
repatriation, or resettlement, clearly evolved in response to these interests and other geo-
political contexts of the time.    
 
Post-Cold War Refugee Policy: the 1990s 
 The changing global environment that emerged following the end of the Cold War 
necessitated that the UNHCR expand its operations. Within the course of a decade, the 
scope of UNHCR activities became far more comprehensive. The organization began to 
pursue long-standing policies to refugee flows rather than reacting only to individual 
crises, extend increased protection to Internally Displaced Persons, and provide greater 
humanitarian relief in crises.
34
 Simultaneously, heightened security concerns in Western 
countries drove them to adopt increasingly restrictive asylum policies that frustrated the 
UNHCR‘s efforts towards enduring solutions.  
 The nature of the conflicts enabling refugee crises changed remarkably in the 
1990s. In the past, refugees had often fled persecution resulting from wars fought 
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between two or more states. After the Cold War, however, intra-state violence and civil 
war began to render many states increasingly too fragile to support their own people.
35
 As 
a result, the kind of protection and aid displaced peoples and their origin and host 
communities needed from the UNHCR changed as well. The number of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP), individuals who are displaced from their homes but remain 
within the borders of their origin country, bloomed with the rise of intra-state conflict. 
Despite the fact that IDPs existed outside the official definition of a refugee set by the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, the body chose to extend its services to IDPs and 
provide them with humanitarian aid.
36
 By 1996, formally defined ―refugees‖ constituted 
only 50 percent of the population of concern for the UNHCR.
37
  
As UNHCR involvement in humanitarian crises expanded, non-governmental 
organizations emerged as important partners in the aid process. In 1994, they delivered 
10-14 percent of total international aid—more than the entire United Nations system. 
Specific countries, such as the United States, moreover chose to direct the majority of 
their bilateral humanitarian aid through NGOs.
38
 Today, NGOs continue to play an active 
role in many aspects of refugee crises on local, national and international levels. The 
UNHCR has established a number of formal partnerships with ―implementing partners‖, 
which include other UN agencies and international organizations that often possess 
                                                 
35
 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
36
 Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World.  
37
 Loescher et. al., UNHCR, 55.  
38
 Ibid, 51.  
  
71 
 
technical or subject expertise, to aid in carrying out its operations.
39
 While NGOs are 
often helpful partners to the UNHCR, competition for donors has led to talk of the 
―crowding‖ of protection space services. 40  Some scholars and policymakers view the 
high concentration of aid organizations as inefficient. In spite of this backdrop, the 
UNHCR retains its supremacy as the international refugee organization.  
 In the 1990s, repatriation became an increasingly desirable solution for refugees 
outside their country of origin. Countries in the global North were growing more 
concerned about national security and expressed their reluctance to intervene politically 
or militarily in third-world conflicts. Instead, they preferred to contain refugee-producing 
crises within their region of origin and resolve these conflicts through peace-building 
measures.
41
 Southern states, facing declining support from donor countries and often 
restricted by Structural Adjustment Programs, simultaneously grew more hostile towards 
refugees in their regions. As a result, governments in all areas of the world increasingly 
turned to the UNHCR and NGOs to alleviate, prevent or contain refugee crises by 
limiting the wide dispersion of asylum-seeking refugees. It thus became the responsibility 
of the UNHCR to conclude whether safe return to refugees‘ countries of origin was 
indeed possible. From there, the organization facilitated processes of reintegration, 
rehabilitation, and development in the areas to which refugees returned.
42
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Facing this challenging global environment, the UNHCR was forced to reconsider 
its role and relations with states in the formation of refugee policy and aid. It was clear 
that the international community was far less willing to intervene and support UNHCR 
operations than the organization had hoped. In an attempt to circumvent the politicized 
nature of security and aid, the UNHCR began changing its rhetoric to that of human 
security and rights. The UNHCR passed Resolution 1208 in 1998 outlining how states, 
regional organizations, and the UN should respond to the security implications of refugee 
movements, formalizing a new approach.
43
 A more specific ―ladder of operations‖ policy 
was developed within refugee camps to handle issues of insecurity in delivering aid and 
providing protection as well.
44
  
 The UNHCR underwent yet another shift around 2000 when a severe financial 
crisis seriously limited its budget and received donations.
45
 This was paired with a more 
conservative High Commissioner and an observed reduction in intra-state conflict around 
the world. As a result, the UNHCR experienced significant cutbacks in its operations. 
States began to talk of the injustice in ―burden-sharing‖ that had emerged, in which the 
host states increasingly bore the responsibility of providing protection and support for 
refugees while traditional ―donor‖ states offered only limited asylum and felt very few 
repercussions of the crises outside their monetary donations.
46
 As a result, host states 
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increasingly limited the quality of the asylum they offered to refugees. The most common 
limitations included denying refugees of the right to work and the freedom to move.  
A more tangible response developed when the UNHCR began its Global 
Consultations on International Protection in late 2000. The UNHCR initiated these 
Consultations for the purpose of reconciling the protection needs of refugees and interests 
of states. After two years of discussions with state representatives, NGOs, and policy and 
legal experts, the organization passed the Declaration of Geneva, which reaffirmed the 
importance of the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR as the primary institution tasked 
with addressing refugee crises.
 47
  
Shortly after, the General Assembly also endorsed a new Agenda of Protection. 
The Agenda outlined a specific plan of action for the UNHCR, states and NGOs to 
enhance respect for the principles of the 1951 Convention; respond to the security 
implications of refugee movements; improve burden sharing with countries that have 
specific protection needs for refugee women and children; and other similar measures.
48
 
Following this Agenda was a policy called ―Convention Plus‖, which was soon replaced 
by the current ―Comprehensive Plans of Action‖ (CPAs). Each CPA is designed 
specifically for each country involved in hosting or resettling refugees. The plans they 
contain place a renewed interest on self-sufficiency as a means of protection.
49
 Thus far, 
the success of CPAs is largely dependent on the region in which they are implemented.   
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Present Operations and Targets of Reform   
 The present operations of the UNHCR under High Commissioner Filippo Grandi 
place an increased focus on Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS). Although the 1990s 
saw many emergency refugee crises arise that demanded immediate attention, by 2006 
nearly two thirds of the refugees in the world existed in PRS.
50
 Many of these situations 
are seriously underfunded and lack foreseeable large-scale solutions in the near future. In 
response, the UNCHR has passed a number of wide-reaching resolutions. Most recently, 
it introduced the Global Compact on Refugees.
51
 The general aims of the Compact 
include easing pressure on refugee-hosting countries, enhancing the resilience and self-
reliance of refugees, facilitating more third country resettlement through innovative 
mobility mechanisms, and stabilizing conditions in countries of origin.
52
 Methods of 
achieving these goals include expanding access to safe places for refugees by providing 
monetary aid to existing refugee networks; providing special protection for children; 
strengthening access to asylum; and increasing global integration with its non-
governmental and private partners.  
 In regards to long-term solutions, the Compact reaffirms the continued 
importance of the traditional durable solutions of voluntary repatriation, resettlement and 
local integration.
53
 Stating that the most effective way to achieve a solution is through 
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eliminating the root causes of displacement, it calls upon the political and security 
cooperation, diplomacy, development and promotion and protection of human rights 
outlined in the United Nations Charter to prevent new crises from emerging.
54
 It 
acknowledges, however, that such fundamental changes require time. In the interim, the 
Compact suggests that durable solutions, alongside ―local solutions and complementary 
pathways for admission to third countries‖, be adapted to the specific situations within 
each country.
55
 While the Compact seems to offer little by way of tangible operational 
change, it does signify recognition that existing solutions have thus far proven 
inadequate. Importantly, it also acknowledges that the UNHCR must adapt to the 
unfortunate political realities of proliferating crises and decreasing aid which persist 
today.  
 One of the more tangible developments in UNHCR policy of recent times 
concerns urban refugees. Globally, more than 60 percent of refugees currently live in 
urban areas, as opposed to camps or rural regions. The move to urban areas was largely 
precipitated by the declining conditions of camps in PRS. Many of these camps faced 
rising rates of poverty, unemployment, inadequate education, and psychological 
problems.
56
 In contrast, urban areas offered improved employment prospects, access to 
transnational social or financial networks, and opportunities for self-sufficiency.  
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Prior to 1997, the UNHCR lacked any formal policy directing how aid and 
protection should be provided to urban refugees. The 1997 Comprehensive Policy on 
Urban Refugees promised to ―ensure protection‖ and ―maximize solutions‖ for urban 
refugees, as well as provide for assistance in a coordinated and ―cost-effective‖ manner.57 
The policy faced a great deal of backlash from NGOs. They criticized the policy‘s 
language of refugee ―containment‖, and rejected the idea that the needs of economically 
and socially diverse individuals could be addressed in a uniform manner. Heeding this 
criticism, the UNHCR replaced the Comprehensive Policy in 2009 with the Policy on 
Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas. This current policy allows for far more 
targeted assistance in developing country and city-specific approaches.  
Through this community-based approach, the UNHCR collaborates with urban 
refugees and host communities to ensure that refugees are given the opportunity to 
locally integrate successfully, gain access to social welfare programs, and experience 
formalized protection.
58
 Some consider the policy rather impractical, due to the time-
sensitive nature of refugees‘ plight. Still, it is widely agreed to be a substantial 
improvement from the ―Comprehensive Policy‖ enacted previously. As PRS situations 
continue to proliferate and the UNHCR moves away from camp-based policies, urban 
refugee policy will likely develop a great deal in the years to come.  
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UNRWA: the Other Refugee Agency 
As noted, the UNHCR‘s mandate extends to all groups of people who fall under 
the Convention and Protocol‘s definition of refugee except for Palestinians. This is due to 
the fact that the United Nations created a separate agency before the UNHCR to address 
the specific issue of Palestinian refugees, called the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency in the Near East and Palestine (UNRWA). The United Nations General 
Assembly established UNRWA in 1948 following the passage of United Nations 
Resolution 242 and subsequent outbreak of war between Israel and Palestine.
59
 Along 
with UNRWA, the UNGA also formed the United Nations Conciliation Commission for 
Palestine (UNCCP). While UNRWA was given a ―relief and works‖ mandate towards the 
refugees, the UNCCP was mandated with providing them with protection and seeking 
durable solutions to their displacement.
60
 
In contrast to the UNHCR, UNRWA defines a Palestinian refugee as a ―person 
whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 
1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.‖61 
Due to the protracted nature of the Palestinian refugee situation, this mandate has been 
renewed to cover four generations of Palestinians. The text of the mandate remains 
unchanged today. Nonetheless, UNRWA has chosen to extend its services to Palestinians 
displaced by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and subsequent conflicts as well.  
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The operations of the UNCCP were much more short-lived. Once it became clear 
by the 1950s that Israel would not compromise in its refusal to allow for Palestinian 
return, the General Assembly cut funding for the organization. The dissolution of the 
body meant that the protection mechanism and search for durable solutions for 
Palestinian refugees dissolved as well. This shortcoming still persists today. It is 
exacerbated by the fact that there exists no consistent definition of a Palestinian refugee, 
or clear policy on what rights, aid, or protection should be awarded to them under 
UNRWA.
62
 Although this ambiguity has been widely recognized as a major source of the 
protracted instability surrounding Palestinian refugee status, little change has been made 
to improve upon the mandate or create a new mechanism for protection.  
Today, the activities of UNRWA consist mainly of running education, health, 
relief, and social service programs both inside and outside of refugee camps. The 
organization holds no responsibility for running the refugee camps themselves, as this 
falls into the jurisdiction of the host government. Their activity can be summarized with 
the following:  
 UNWRA promotes respect for Palestinian refugees‘ rights through 
monitoring, reporting and intervention; 
 Delivers its services in a manner that promotes and respects the rights of 
beneficiaries; 
 Ensures that protection needs are addressed in all aspects of programming, 
policies and procedures; 
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 Advocates in public statements as well as private interventions with a broad 
range of interlocutors to promote the protection of refugee rights.
63
 
Like the UNHCR, UNRWA is funded almost entirely by donations from member states 
and other international organizations, such as the European Union. In recent years, 
UNRWA has fallen extremely short on their budget goals. Average annual spending per 
refugee has fallen from $200 to $110.
64
 Chapters 5 and 6 will examine the effects of these 
financial shortfalls in greater detail.  
History proves that the ability of the UNHCR and the UNRWA to effectively 
carry out their mandates is highly dependent on the political interests of their member 
states. Such an arrangement can be beneficial if states are willing to intervene and act 
through these institutions. If they are not, however, it is difficult to coordinate the 
cooperation necessary to render the long-term aims of the institutions effective. 
Moreover, it is clear that global developments, such as the changing nature of warfare 
and globalization, have affected significantly affected refugee flows in ways that states 
and international institutions have thus far been unable to control. Given these realities, 
the coming years will likely continue to challenge the institutional power of the UNHCR 
and UNRWA.  
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III. History and Politics in Jordan  
 
History and Society  
 The following section will provide a brief overview of Jordanian history. It will 
begin with the period preceding the formal establishment of statehood in Jordan. After 
briefly examining important developments in Jordan throughout the remainder of the 20
th
 
century, it turns to contemporary conditions and concerns within the state. It concludes 
by considering a range of issues which Jordan is likely to face in the upcoming years.   
Early inhabitants of the land of Jordan consisted mostly of small-scale farmers 
and traders. The coming of Islam in 632 initiated an era of Islamic rule over Jordan by the 
Umayyads, Abbasids, Fatimids, Seljuks, Ayyubids, and the Mamluks empires, until the 
Ottoman Turks displaced the Mamluks in 1517 and ruled the region for the next 400 
years.
65
 In the early twentieth century, the growth of a new Ottoman regime through the 
―Young Turks‖ incited dissatisfaction among the Arabs and kindled the rise of the 
Hashemite family to power. The Hashemites claimed descent from the Prophet 
Muhammad and were led by the grand sharif and emir of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali Al 
Hashimi. With the onset of World War I, Sharif Hussein gained the support of the British 
and led a military offensive, called the Arab Revolt, against the Ottomans in 1916. They 
emerged victorious, and rule over the land transferred to the British.
66
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Following the war, the League of Nations decided that the Allied Forces should 
retain their power in the Middle East. Great Britain declared its sovereignty over Iraq and 
Palestine, and soon divided the land of the latter into Palestine and ―Transjordan.‖67 The 
first son of Sharif Hussein, Abdullah, acceded to the titular head of the Transjordan 
regime while British officials presided over the region‘s governance. Amman was 
established as the political epicenter and focus of state power.
68
 Although the land 
remained sparsely populated, Abdullah introduced initial developments in infrastructure 
and education. Many Arabs also served alongside the British in a powerful military unit 
called the ―Arab Legion.‖69  
The years leading up to World War II were marked by growing conflict between 
Zionist Jews and Palestinians in the land neighboring Transjordan to the West. In 
November of 1947, the United Nations passed the Partition Plan for Palestine calling for 
the creation of an Arab state alongside a Jewish state, with UN control over Jerusalem.
70
 
The British subsequently terminated their mandate, which had existed over the territory 
since 1923, in May of 1948. The Jews‘ Zionist leadership declared the state of Israel into 
existence shortly after. Such decisions instigated the onset of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, 
which Palestinians refer to as the Nakba, fought between Israel, Palestine, and numerous 
other Arab Nations.
71
 Armies from Transjordan, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi 
Arabia advanced into historic Palestine. Ultimately, Transjordan‘s superior military 
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forces prevailed. By the end of the war, they possessed both the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem territories.
72
  
Abdullah had long supported the idea of a united Transjordan and Palestine under 
the rule of the former. Regardless, the acquisition of new territory was largely considered 
a victory for Transjordan. As a result, however, more than 458,000 Palestinian refugees 
entered Jordan during and after the war.
73
 West Bank Palestinians soon represented 
nearly one-third of the total population in Jordan, and would play an integral role in the 
development and cultural formation of the Jordanian state in the years to come. Chapter 5 
will offer much greater context on the displacement of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.  
Meanwhile, Transjordan had also gained independence from Great Britain in 
March, 1946, through the Treaty of London. It was called the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Transjordan. In 1949, following the first Arab-Israeli war, it was renamed the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan. Six years later, Jordan became a member state of the newly formed 
United Nations.
74
 
 Less than two years passed before King Abdullah was assassinated by a 
Palestinian gunman. He was replaced by his first son, Talal, in 1951. Talal quickly 
abdicated the throne to his younger brother, Hussein.
75
 Regional warfare and internal 
instability, largely caused by migration, characterized much of the next forty years of 
King Hussein‘s rule. Following the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 
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1964, war broke out once again between Israel and the Arab nations. Israel quickly 
occupied the entirety of Jordan‘s territory west of the Jordan River. As a result, another 
large influx of 300,000 Palestinian refugees entered Jordan‘s East Bank.76 In 1970, 
tension between East Bank Palestinians, the Jordanian government, and domestic 
Palestinians led by local guerilla organizations culminated in the conflict of Black 
September. The fighting elapsed when the PLO and Palestinian guerilla fighters were 
eventually expelled from the kingdom.
77
 This event will be considered further within the 
context of the Palestinian case study.  
 In the following two decades, Jordan largely abstained from direct intervention in 
regional conflicts. Although recent times had strengthened its diplomatic relations with 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan remained neutral in the Gulf War of 1990 and did not show support 
for Western military intervention.
78
 The outbreak of war drove an estimated 1 million 
Iraqi refugees into Jordan, as well as nearly 300,000 Palestinian workers who had 
migrated to the Gulf for employment from Jordan.
79
 In the latter half of the 1990s, Jordan 
also made the controversial decision to establish peace with Israel. The government 
worked to resolve many of the long-standing economic, security, and territorial disputes 
between their lands—a process which continue today.  
 After King Hussein‘s death in 1999, his son Abdullah II became the new monarch 
of Jordan. Soon after he assumed control, King Abdullah II sought to implement large-
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scale economic reform and political liberalization programs. He additionally pursued 
stronger diplomatic relations with the United States, supporting its ―war on terror‖ but 
never declaring official support for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Jordan 
experienced a second significant wave of Iraqi refugees as a result of the invasion. In 
2011, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war instigated yet another historic migration of 
refugees across its borders. The number of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan is 
currently upwards of 700,000.
80
 The inclusion of other types of displaced persons and 
unregistered individuals from Syria drives this figure into the millions.
81
 As Chapters 8 
and 9 will discuss, Jordan has struggled to deal with the responsibility of providing 
shelter, protection, and integration for these refugees.  
 
Jordan in the 21
st
  Century 
 Today, Jordan remains a small state with a rather weak economy. Possessing few 
natural resources and almost completely dependent on imported energy, Jordan is 
extremely reliant on foreign assistance and labor.
82
 Its economic development has been 
closely linked to labor mobility and migration. The oil-producing Gulf States, with a high 
demand for foreign workers, have long been a destination of Jordanian labor migration. 
The remittances sent back by migrant workers constitute a significant portion of revenue 
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for both independent business growth and state-sponsored projects.
83
  Given its 
dependence on remittance-driven income, Jordan is often referred to as the world‘s only 
―only oil-economy with no oil.‖84 Outside of the oil industry and its remittances, native 
Jordanians and migrants in Jordan occupy jobs in industries such as agriculture, tourism, 
construction and service provision.
85
  
  In addition to receiving labor remittances from its foreign workers, Jordan has 
also capitalized upon the waves of refugees and migrants that conflict has driven onto its 
land. Victoria Kelberer defines the ―phenomenon of using host status and refugee policy 
as primary mechanisms of international rent-seeking‖ as refugee rentierism.86 From 1948 
to the 1990s, nearly all the aid flowing into Jordan came from the United States and 
UNRWA, as a result of the inflow of Palestinian refugees.
87
  
Once Iraqis displaced by the Iraq War began arriving after 2003 as well, the 
Jordanian economy became even more tied to the aid and resources which accompanied 
their presence. The UNHCR, with its broader mandate and higher levels of funding than 
the UNRWA, emerged new source of aid within the country in the latter years of the 
crisis. As latter chapters will discuss, financial incentives would play a significant role in 
determining Jordan‘s policies towards certain groups of refugees.88 Today, some aid 
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packages set aside up to 25 percent of their funds to support local Jordanians as well as 
refugees to incentivize them to continue their roles as hosts to refugees.
89
   
 
Politics and Society Post-Arab Spring  
 Beginning in 2011, massive uprisings overturned regimes throughout the Middle 
East in what became known as the Arab Spring. Jordan was an exception, remaining 
relatively stable throughout the uncertain period. Still, it experienced a fair share of 
protests and demonstrations calling for democratic reform. Protests featured youth 
activists, Islamists, leftist and nationalist political parties, and trade unions and 
professional associations. 
90
 Curtis R. Ryan details that the protests—which were largely 
peaceful—focused on three main areas of concern: ―the revival of a long-dormant 
political liberalization process; the restoration of the fuller economic and social safety net 
that had eroded in an era of privatization and other neoliberal economic reforms; and a 
serious effort to stamp out widespread corruption in public life.‖91  
Protests subsided after two years, and the reforms produced included changes to 
the constitution, electoral laws, political party and media laws; the creation of a new 
Constitution Court; and the election of a new Parliament.
92
 Perceptions of whether these 
reforms would actually hold tangible implications for Jordanian society and politics, 
however, were mixed: the government touted reform as another display of Jordanian 
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exceptionalism, but opposition activists argue that the monarchical power structure 
remains relatively unaltered and policy changes have yet to take effect.
93
  
Jordan thus emerged relatively unscathed from the turbulent Arab Spring 
uprisings that shook many of its neighbors in the region. Still, some scholars doubt that 
the relative stability observed in Jordan today will endure.
94
 Jordan relies heavily upon its 
national alliances to uphold peace and security within its borders, and a number of those 
important alliances have been strained by recent developments. Despite the official peace 
it has made with Israel, recent violence and talks of a new peace deal have caused 
backlash from both the Jordanian people (many of whom are Palestinian) and the 
Jordanian government, which has reiterated its desire for a two-state solution and rejected 
any plan which transfers Palestinians into the land of Jordan.
95
 Jordan‘s neighbor to the 
North—Syria—also remains an extremely unstable following its civil war. The case 
study chapters will examine issues related to Palestine and Syria in further detail.  
Extremism in Jordan has been on the rise since 2015.
96
 As of October 2018, 
Jordan was the third largest supplier of foreign fighters to the Islamic Caliphate. 
Domestic factors like unemployment and poverty, marginalization, poor governance, 
and religious education likely contribute to recruitment and membership. Many 
Jordanians believe that the presence of Syrian refugees has also raised the salience of 
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the issue. Refugees living in camps face high levels of poverty, unemployment, crime, 
and hunger, which all have the potential to contribute to radicalization.
97
 Although 
Jordan has established a hard policy against collaborating with the Islamic State, it has 
faced difficulties controlling their recruitment. Recently, however, the international 
community has begun to take a more active interest in counterterrorism efforts in 
Jordan. In March of 2018, the United States established a counterterrorism training 
center near Amman and pledged long-term military aid to increase state security 
measures.
98
 The effect of such efforts largely remains to be seen.  
Thus far, Jordan has proven to be successful in evading much of the violence and 
instability which has plagued its Arab neighbors. The extent to which this relative peace 
will hold in the future—particularly in the face of issues such as water scarcity, 
increasing terrorism, and growing socio-political tensions—is uncertain. The next section 
will look more closely at the laws and policies Jordan holds as standard for refugees and 
migrants. 
 
IV. Refugee Law and Policy in Jordan  
 Given the long history Jordan holds with migration and refugees, Jordan is often 
considered to be a welcoming and accommodating destination for the displaced. As 
future chapters will show, however, this perception does not paint an altogether realistic 
picture.  Today, Jordan lacks a clear policy framework to address refugees and asylum 
seekers within its borders. Like many other states in the Middle East, Jordan is not a 
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signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, it 
established a ―Memorandum of Understanding‖ (MOU) with the UNHCR in 1997 to 
formally codify the protection space of refugees within their borders and streamline 
policy responses.
99
 Numerous other Middle East states, such as Egypt and Lebanon, 
likewise use MOUs to formally interact with the UNHCR.  
The Memorandum of Understanding between Jordan and the UNHCR specifies a 
number of agreed-upon practices regarding the UNHCR‘s operations in Jordan and the 
treatment of refugees under Jordanian policy. Firstly, the MOU stipulates that Jordan 
accept the definition of a refugee laid forth in the 1951 Convention, without the 
geographical and time limitations.
100
 It also requires that Jordan grant refugees certain 
rights within its borders, including that of non-refoulement, or the right to not be forcibly 
repatriated; the right to courts, legal assistance and counsel; and the freedom to practice 
their religion and educate their children without discrimination.
101
  The UNHCR is also 
required to provide monetary and material assistance to the refugees and asylum seekers 
entering Jordan. In emergency situations, it notes that both Jordan and the UNHCR 
should cooperate to provide ―quick responses‖ by establishing a joint emergency 
mechanism to allocate food, water, sanitation, shelter, medical treatment and physical 
safety to refugees and asylum seekers.
102
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It is important to note that the MOU leaves out a number of rights for refugees 
included in the 1951 Convention, such as the freedom to move and the right to a public 
education. Moreover, it addresses only the provision of the right to work for refugees ―if 
the laws and regulations [of Jordan] permit.‖ In other words, if a refugee is legally 
residing in Jordan, they will only have the opportunity to work if the laws and regulations 
passed by the government permit them to do so.
103
 The same is said of refugees holding 
degrees ―recognized by the competent Jordanian authorities‖ seeking to practice liberal 
professions: unless the government gives them the right to do so, they may not capitalize 
upon their prior education.
104
 In effect, such ambiguity allows Jordan to retain control 
over the rights refugees hold to participate in Jordanian society and economic life during 
their stay.  
 
 With regards to long-term solutions, the MOU declared that the UNHCR would 
endeavor to find durable solutions—―be it voluntary repatriation to the country of origin 
or resettlement in a third country‖—within six months of recognition of refugee status.105 
Another clause exempts refugees from any overstay fines or departure fees.
106
 Given the 
high numbers of protracted refugees in Jordan today, this time restriction seems quite 
unrealistic —a fact which both parties seemed to recognize, in providing a safety net for 
those refugees who could not be provided solutions in only six months. Today, the 
requirement that the UNHCR provide durable solutions within six months is largely 
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ignored. Various other aspects of current policy in Jordan likewise fail to align with the 
MOU it signed twenty years ago. Many scholars point out that while the MOU may have 
been an important historical step in establishing a relationship between the UNHCR and 
Jordan, it had little tangible impact on the states‘ refugee policy.107  
 Aside from the MOU, brief references are made to refugees in the Jordanian 
Constitution and labor laws. Article 21(1) of the Jordanian Constitution states that 
―[p]olitical refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or for their 
defense of liberty.‖108 Given that there is no accompanying law which qualifies the status 
of refugees and asylum seekers specifically, however, these groups fall under the 1973 
Law on Residency and Foreigners‘ Affairs. The law defines a foreigner as anyone who 
does not have Jordanian nationality, and refers to refugees only in conjunction with other 
groups of foreigners. Although the law does not address the conditions under which 
refugees can be admitted to the country, it does provide authority to the Minister of the 
Interior to issue regulations concerning the travel documentation that Jordan may grant to 
refugees within its borders.
109
 The lack of clear policy regarding refugees and asylum 
seekers is indicative of the fact that the Jordanian government prefers to preserve its 
ability to treat refugee crises on an individual basis, extending or withholding rights and 
protection based on the socio-political or economic environment which prevails at the 
time.  
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 Lastly, it is interesting to note that Jordan has been a member of it has been a 
member of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, or ExCom, for a number of 
years.
110
  ExCom manages administrative tasks, budgetary matters and organizational 
decision-making for the UNHCR. Jordan‘s role in the committee indicates that it desires 
a voice in the actions that the refugee body takes and recognizes its authority in refugee 
crises within its border and the broader region.  
 
V. Current Refugee Realities 
 Contextualizing Jordan‘s refugee crises among global flows and trends is equally 
important to understanding the backdrop against which they have developed. In addition 
to its field work, the UNHCR publishes extensive reports on refugee movement, aid, 
access to solutions, demographics, and far more. The following visuals and statistics will 
highlight the global trends most relevant to the discussion of protracted refugee crises, 
burden sharing, and durable solutions.  
 
Statistics on Current Crises 
 The map below depicts the distribution of aggregate numbers of refugees 
throughout the world. Turkey hosts the greatest number of refugees, at 3.5 million. The 
vast majority of these refugees have fled from the Syrian conflict. Uganda and Pakistan 
host the second and third largest amounts at roughly 1.4 million refugees each, followed 
by Lebanon, Iran, Germany, Bangladesh, and Sudan.     
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Figure 3.1 Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017. Source: UNHCR, ―Global 
Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017,‖ https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. 
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 Often, the UNHCR will choose to measure refugee populations in comparison to 
the population size of the host countries in which they reside. In doing so, a rather 
different story emerges. Lebanon clearly leads the list at the end of 2017, with 164 
refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, or roughly 1 in 6 refugees to current citizens. Jordan was 
second, with 71 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, or about 1 in every 14 people. If 
Palestinians under the UNRWA were included in the above statistics, the figures rise to 1 
in 3 in Lebanon and 1 in 4 in Jordan.
111
 African countries hold five of the remaining spots 
in the top ten, and European countries only two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Number of Refugees per 1,000 Inhabitants. Source: UNHCR, ―Global Trends: 
Forced Displacement in 2017,‖ https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf.  
 
  
Below, Figure 3 illustrates aggregate number of refugee flows from country of 
origin for 2016 and 2017. Nearly every country experienced an increase in refugee 
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outflow, with the most significant being the Syrian Arab Republic, South Sudan and 
Myanmar. The number of Syrian refugees in 2017 is more than double that of the second 
and third largest crises, Afghanistan and South Sudan, and more than five times that of 
the fifth, Myanmar. Overall, more than two thirds of the refugees came from these five 
crises alone.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Major Source Countries of Refugees. Source: UNHCR, ―Global Trends: 
Forced Displacement in 2017,‖ https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. 
 
In comparison to the urgent needs of current crises, less attention is paid to the 
needs of protracted refugees. Nearly 13.4 million refugees, or two thirds of the all 
refugees, existed in protracted situations at the end of 2017—representing an increase of 
11.6 million from 2016. Roughly 3 million of these protracted refugees, predominantly 
from Afghanistan, have been displaced for more than 38 years. Another 3.5 million exist 
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in protracted refugee situations of between 10 and 37 years. Refugees displaced between 
five and nine years numbered 6.9 million, of which the majority originated from Syria.
112
 
In 2017, three refugee crises were given the new status of ―protracted‖: refugees from the 
Central African Republic in the DRC, South Sudanese in Ethiopia, and Syrians in Egypt. 
Two situations, being Eritrean refugees in Israel (due to a reduction below the required 
population of 25,000) and Malians in Burkina Faso (mainly due to a revivification 
exercise), were no longer considered protracted. 
113
  
 
Statistics on Durable Solutions 
 Repatriation 
 The figure below tracks repatriation from 1992 through the end of 2017. While 
return has never been particularly high, topping 25 percent only in 1994, it has been 
particularly low in recent years. 2017 saw roughly 6 percent of refugees return to their 
country of origin, as compared to 5 percent in 2016. Given the protracted nature of 
conflict and state fragility within many of these countries, low levels of repatriation are 
not surprising and will likely persist.  
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Figure 3.4. Refugee Returns, 1992-2017. Source: UNHCR, ―Global Trends: Forced 
Displacement in 2017,‖ https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf.  
 
 
Resettlement 
The contrast depicted in the figure below between the numbers of resettlement 
applications the UNHCR receives and the number which is it able to approve reveals a 
concerning trend: increasing resettlement needs are being met with fewer resettlement 
opportunities. Of the 1.2 million resettlement applications in 2017 (which does not 
account for Syrian refugees), only 75,200 were approved. This represented a 54 per cent 
drop from 2016 due to the decline in states‘ resettlement quotas. According to 
government statistics, the number of resettled refugees rises to 102,800 when those 
admitted outside of UNHCR assistance are included.  
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Figure 3.5 Resettlement Needs and UNHCR‘s Annual Submissions 2011-2017. Source: 
UNHCR, ―Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017,‖ 
https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Submissions and Departures by Destination. Source: UNHCR, ―Global 
Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017,‖ https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. 
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Although the United States continued to be the main recipient of resettlement 
submissions in 2017, their acceptance of 26,782 refugees indicates a 75 per cent drop 
compared to 2016.  
 
 Local Integration 
It is slightly more difficult to provide a conclusive measure of the extent of local 
integration for refugees. According to the UNHCR‘s Global Trends 2017 Report 
(emphasis added):  
During 2017, 28 countries reported at least one naturalized refugee. The total 
number of newly naturalized refugees stood at 73,400, a considerable 
increase on the 23,000 reported in 2016 and 32,000 in 2015. The main reason 
for this rise was that Turkey reported naturalizing 50,000 Syrian refugees in 
2017 as opposed to none reported previously, accounting for more than two-thirds 
of naturalizations (68 per cent). Canada has continued a trend of declining 
naturalizations, with 10,500 in 2017 compared with 16,300 in 2016 and 25,900 
in 2015. Other countries that reported large numbers of naturalized refugees 
included the Netherlands (6,600), France (3,800), and Belgium (1,900).
114
  
 
In other words, much of the ―increase‖ in local integration observed was due to new 
reports emerging from one country, rather than a widespread upward trend.  
 
Donor contributions  
 As shown below, donors to the UNHCR can opt to donate either ―unearmarked‖ 
or ―earmarked‖ funds for the UNHCR‘s distribution. While the organization strongly 
encourages the donation of unearmarked funds, some of its largest donations come in the 
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form of earmarked funds from the United States, Germany, and private donors, allowing 
them to control generally for what purpose their donation is used.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Donor Contributions. Source: UNHCR, ―Global Trends: Forced Displacement 
in 2017,‖ https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. 
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Although the largest individual donors appear to be developed states and private donors, 
the figure below depicting aggregate contributions demonstrates that donations from the 
Middle East and Africa consistently dwarf that of Europe and the Americas.
115
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Contribution by Region. Source: UNHCR, ―Global Trends: Forced 
Displacement in 2017,‖ https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. Last updated December 
5, 2018.  
 
 
Taken together, these statistics on the progress of solutions illustrates the growing 
gap between needs and provisions for an increasing number of refugees. It furthermore 
highlights the poignancy of scholars‘ discussions of the persistent inequity of burden 
sharing and the impact of the increasingly protectionist policies pursued by certain states. 
Simply put, these trends underscore the fact that the UNHCR‘s durable solutions are not 
working for many refugees. Repatriation is rarely an option, asylum applicants vastly 
outnumber asylum recipients, local integration is declining, and the UNCHR remains 
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seriously underfunded. Although no act of aid should be discounted, it is clear that the 
international community is failing to support the UNHCR‘s mission to aid, protect, and 
solve the plight of refugees.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The histories of the UNHCR, UNRWA, the state of Jordan, and the durable 
solutions share the persistent truth that the primary determinant of refugee policy is the 
state. While the UNHCR has proven quite successful at organizing international 
cooperation for refugee aid, recent years have seen it fall far short of the contributions 
necessary to adequately address crises and facilitate solutions. States have largely failed 
to control refugee flows by targeting their root causes or managing their movements, and 
many refuse to address their displacements after the fact. The UNHCR and UNRWA face 
an increasingly difficult task in amassing the international cooperation necessary to 
continue the course of their operations in the years to come.  
The discussion of Jordan highlighted that migration, foreign influence, and 
regional conflict have characterized much of the country‘s history. This background 
enables an understanding of how the government and people of Jordan form their 
opinions today—especially with regards to refugees. Jordan lacks an explicit refugee 
policy, meaning that its treatment of different groups of refugees is not determined by 
codified laws and is highly variable. A combination of factors, such as a high dependence 
on foreign aid and a tightly-regulated monarchical political structure, constrain and 
influence these decisions in a number of ways. Understanding what has shaped its 
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economy, society, and domestic and international affairs thus allows for an accurate 
perception of its contemporary policies.  
The next chapter will examine the methodology of this project. It will define the 
dependent and independent variables which will be analyzed in each of the case studies, 
and explain why Jordan—and more specifically, Palestinian, Iraqi and Syrian refugees—
were chosen as the subjects of the cases.  Lastly, it will explain the nature of the sources 
upon which the case study analyses rely. Sources primarily include reports provided by 
the UN and research institutions, as well as original research conducted in Jordan. 
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Methodology                                                       4                            
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The three case studies of refugee policy in Jordan contained in this project are the 
Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian crises. Studying these cases in tandem allows for the 
observation of how policy responses and the nature of solutions changed or persisted 
between each crisis, and what factors motivated these deviations or continuities. This 
chapter will explain the dependent and independent variables analyzed in each of these 
case studies. The dependent variable—―solutions‖—will be assessed with regards to 
independent variables capturing factors both within and outside of Jordan that influence 
its refugee policy. The efficacy of different solutions will then be compared across crises.  
Next, the discussion will turn to why this project chose to focus on refugee crises 
in Jordan, as opposed to those in another refugee-hosting state. It will conclude by 
examining the two primary methods of data collection used in the analysis.   
 
 
 
II. Defining the Variables 
 
In each case, the dependent variable at study is the ―solution‖ to the refugee crises 
being analyzed. This will be measured both in its composition and its effect. The first 
aspect, composition, addresses the responses or policies that comprise the solution. A 
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―solution‖ can take on a wide definition. It can indicate either one or multiple policies 
pursued in tandem by any number of actors which affect the formation of refugee policy. 
After the Palestinian displacement of 1948, for example, the Jordanian government and 
UNRWA agreed that setting up camps and providing for the local integration of refugees 
would constitute the prevailing policies at the time. On the other hand, a ―solution‖ may 
also be a wide range of less clearly defined responses from different organizations or 
governments. In the recent Syrian crisis, the Jordanian government, the UNHCR, NGOs, 
and a number of international organizations pursued a variety of multilateral policy 
responses which included encampment, integration, resettlement, the provision of work 
permits, and much more to address the crisis.  
In defining the solutions for each crisis, the analysis will simultaneously address a 
second question: to what extent did the solutions prove effective? An ―effective‖ solution 
indicates it improves the livelihood of the refugees it intends to benefit.
1
 Typically, in 
order to be sustainable, effective solutions also provide some benefit to the citizens of 
Jordan or further the state‘s general interests. The efficacy of certain solutions is more 
straightforward to measure than others. Resettlement, for example, can be measured 
through records of the number of refugees who were officially resettled by the UNHCR. 
On the other hand, local integration requires comparison of the livelihoods and opinions 
of refugees and citizens of Jordan, which are not as easy to assess concisely. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of all solutions often evolves over time. Each solution will 
thus be assessed not as a static ―success‖ or ―failure‖, but rather as a continuous process.  
                                                 
1
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 The efficacy of solutions will be measured with regards to two sets of 
independent variables. The first set is external variables. These are factors which may 
have influenced Jordan‘s refugee policy from sources outside of the state. External 
variables include the following:   
1. Presence/extent of UNHCR/UNRWA aid. The extent of UN involvement in 
each crisis varies. In some cases, aid may be limited to registering asylum seekers 
or providing resettlement services. In others, aid may encompass offering cash 
assistance, running education and health facilities in camps, facilitating local 
integration, and much more.  
2. Other countries’ responses to the crisis. Policy responses in Jordan may be 
influenced by the solutions pursued in other countries—including both 
neighboring states, and donor states. The number of refugees the United States 
agrees to resettle, for example, might affect how many very vulnerable refugees 
Jordan must address within its borders. In another instance, if a neighboring state 
refuses to recognize the asylum claims of incoming refugees and closes their 
borders, these refugees may instead seek asylum in Jordan. Other states‘ policies 
have the potential to impact the refugee inflows into Jordan and the policies 
which result a great deal.  
3. International monetary donations to Jordan in response to the refugee crisis. 
The level of donations flowing into Jordan to aid their efforts in addressing 
refugee crisis has a significant effect on the government‘s ability to respond 
effectively to crises. The character of this aid matters as well, in that it can be 
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directed solely at refugees or paired with development aid for Jordanians 
themselves. 
4. Diplomacy/International Alliances: As a resource-poor state, Jordan receives a 
great deal of monetary and political support from many Western countries on a 
regular basis. Often, its refugee policy is influenced by its desire to maintain 
favorable relations with these states.   
 
The second set of independent variables is internal variables. Internal variables 
include domestic conditions within Jordan that may have influenced its refugee policy. In 
this analysis, these include the following:  
1. The health of the economy. Economic conditions in Jordan can affect which 
solutions the government may be willing to accept. High unemployment rates 
among low-skilled workers, for example, can make it difficult for the government 
to justify extending work permits to low-skilled refugees.  
2. Socio-cultural conditions. Refugee crises can have significant socio-cultural 
implications as well. Large refugee populations necessarily alter the demography 
of Jordan in ways that its citizens may resent.  
3. Political conditions. The government may choose to extend or deny support to 
refugees based on the political contexts of their displacement. The stability of 
political conditions in Jordan can also influence the governments‘ willingness to 
extend support to refugees.  
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4. Public opinion. All of the above factors contribute to the formation of public 
opinion regarding refugees in Jordan. Additionally, the impact of former refugee 
flows affects opinion as well: the longevity of Palestinian refugees‘ stay in camps, 
for example, made Jordanians very wary to establish camps for the Iraqis who 
arrived years later.  
 
In some cases, only a few of these internal and external variables may be present. 
In others, these variables may all matter a great deal, and other factors not listed may very 
well be at play, too. Rather than pinpoint one specific variable that affected the nature of 
the solution, then, all relevant variables will be assessed in each case for their relative 
importance.  
 
III. Case Studies  
 
 Scholars and policymakers analyze refugee policy within a variety of regions and 
regime types. Jordan provides a particularly interesting state to study for a number of 
reasons. Since its creation as a state in 1946, Jordan has been host to numerous refugee 
populations that have had a significant influence on its development. The largest and 
most influential of these refugee inflows have been the Palestinians, Iraqis and Syrians. 
Jordan has never formalized an official policy towards refugees in their borders; instead, 
it addresses each crisis on an ad-hoc basis, often cooperating with a plethora of domestic 
and international organizations in doing so.  
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 Moreover, unlike many other countries in the region, Jordan has retained relative 
political stability in the wake of the Arab Spring. This consistency allows for regime type 
to serve as an important constant among all three refugee crises. Still, given its small size 
and weak economy, Jordan has been subject to a number of external shocks as a result of 
the conflicts and instability that have played out in neighboring countries over time. 
Refugee influxes have been just one of these shocks; oil shocks, the Gulf wars, the 
proliferation of terrorism, etc., have also been significant. Internally, Jordan has suffered 
from a water scarcity crisis, high unemployment, a declining education system, and 
political unrest, as well. Despite its relative stability, then, Jordan remains a resource-
poor and economically unstable state.  
 In effect, these characteristics suggest that Jordan is a prime example of a 
―typical‖ refugee-hosting country—meaning a state outside of the developing world that 
has historically been a host of refugees and recipient of international aid. As Chapter 2 
explained in great detail, these refugee-hosting states experience the real brunt of the 
responsibility of hosting refugees over the years. Thus, we should expect that Jordan‘s 
refugee policy has evolved at least partly in tandem with the broader trends experienced 
by the international community as a whole. Analyzing refugee policy in Jordan will allow 
us to observe the effects of poor burden-sharing by the rest of the world. In other words, 
the results found in the case studies in Jordan can be extrapolated to other regions and 
refugee crises.  
More specifically, the analysis will focus on the process of how the actors 
involved in the Palestinian, Iraqi and Syrian refugee crises determined policy responses 
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to the refugee inflows. Initial responses include, but are not limited to, whether refugees 
were allowed to cross the border into Jordan, given prima facie refugee status or 
citizenship, received aid from NGOs or the UNHCR/UNRWA, and/or placed in camps. 
Long-term solutions included repatriation, local integration, resettlement, and 
―alternative‖ solutions.  
The three cases were chosen primarily due to the fact that they each address the 
nature of solutions differently. In the Palestinian case, the Jordanian government has 
consistently pursued a policy of integration. Iraqis faced a much less welcoming 
environment, as Jordan chose to extend very little aid to the displaced and instead 
encouraged resettlement or onward migration. Lastly, the Syrian refugee crisis has 
prompted the Jordanian government to partner with the UNHCR and other international 
organizations and businesses to test a wide variety of solutions. Because the Syrian crisis 
is largely still ongoing, it represents a particularly relevant case whose solutions continue 
to evolve and develop. Moreover, these cases represent the three refugee crises which had 
the largest impact on Jordan, both in terms of their aggregate numbers and their long-
term effects.  
 
IV. Data Collection 
 
The analysis of each case will rely upon a variety of primary and secondary 
sources. The most important sources are three reports published by the UNHCR or 
UNRWA in conjunction with a Norwegian research institute, the FAFO Foundation 
(FAFO). FAFO partners with the United Nations to conduct surveys and publish 
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quantitative reports, like those on refugees in Jordan relied upon here. All three research 
publications by FAFO cited in this work were conducted with the help of the Government 
of Jordan. The data from these reports will be used to produce the tables and charts 
featured throughout the analysis. These will be supplemented by scholarly books and 
articles; data publications from the World Bank, UNHCR, and research institutes; news 
articles; and more.   
In addition, Chapter 10 will feature original interviews conducted in Jordan and 
Palestine. Within Jordan, I chose to conduct my research in Amman, due to the high 
concentration of refugees living in the city. In Amman, I interviewed number of NGO 
workers, refugees, and refugee scholars. I also attended a series of presentations offered 
by refugees at the Jesuit Refugee Services. The interviews were conducted with either: a). 
Palestinians living in Israel/Palestine, b). refugees in Jordan, c). individuals who work 
with refugees in Jordan. The full list of questions which were asked in the interviews is 
featured Appendix A. A number of public opinion surveys, such as the Arab Barometer, 
will complement my field research.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
This chapter sought to detail the various dependent and independent variables 
analyzed in each of the case studies; justify the choice of the three refugee crises in 
Jordan; and lastly, describe the methods of data collection used in the analysis. The next 
five chapters will study the cases of the Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians, respectively.   
  
112 
 
Palestinian Refugees: Part I                       5                   
 
I. Introduction 
 Palestinian refugees boast the longest displacement of any group of protracted 
refugees. This is due, first and foremost, to the failure of peace negotiations surrounding 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to resolve the question of refugee return. Unlike many 
other refugee crises which persist today, Palestinian refugees are prevented from 
returning home not only by political instability, ongoing violent conflict, a lack of 
opportunity for sustainable life, and more, but also by the law itself. The question of 
Palestinian return is invariably linked with much larger political issues of independent 
statehood and peace processes, and thus transcends beyond the range of material 
considered within the fields of refugee and forced migration studies. Given that the nature 
of Palestinian displacement is long and complex, the matter of solutions to their 
refugeehood is necessarily complicated as well.  
 The 1948 conflict in Israel and Palestine displaced Palestinians to many states in 
the Middle East and North Africa. A large majority went to Jordan. Although the focus of 
this chapter will be on the policies and responses Jordan has enacted, it is will also be 
necessary to analyze the broader policies, opinions, and laws implemented by other Arab 
states as well. Doing so allows for the realization that Jordan is, in many ways, an 
exception. The Arab states have historically coordinated their responses to Palestinian 
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refugee problems and acted as a collective. Jordan often chose to avert this coordination 
and formulate Palestinian refugee policies on its own terms. This fact holds particular 
significance in the realm of citizenship rights, which Jordan has extended to almost all 
Palestinians within its borders.  
The initial policy of encampment for Palestinians in Jordan soon gave way to 
local integration. While a few Palestinian refugee camps still persist in Jordan, the 
majority of Palestinians have integrated closely into Jordanian society—more so than in 
any other Arab country. To be sure, differences between the lives of native Jordanians 
(―East Bankers‖) and Palestinian-Jordanians can be noted in a number of categories. 
Nevertheless, Palestinian refugees, former refugees, or descendants of refugees comprise 
nearly half of the population of Jordan today. This reality makes Palestinians in Jordan an 
important case to study on the viability of integration as a ―durable‖ solution.  
 Given the long history of Palestinian refugeehood, it is necessary to provide a 
substantial overview of the events surrounding Palestinians‘ displacement. This chapter 
will explore the factors which prompted Palestinian migration; the political and legal 
responses provided by the Arab states; and the numerous political and socio-economic 
considerations which prompted Jordan to extend the policies and rights it has towards 
Palestinian refugees. It will begin with a short summary of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which is crucial to understanding the major displacements of 1948 and 1967 and the 
persistence of the Palestinian refugee problem today. It will then assess the displacement 
patterns themselves, analyzing why the Arab governments, the Western world, and the 
aid organizations involved responded in the ways that they did. Next, the policies and 
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agreements Jordan implemented as ―solutions‖ to the refugees‘ displacement will be 
examined. These solutions included the formation of camps, the implementation of 
international agreements, and the formulation of domestic laws and integration policies. 
The chapter will conclude by considering the effectiveness of these early solutions.  
 
II. Historical Background: The Israel-Palestine Conflict   
 The Arab-Israeli conflict existed at the forefront of political interaction between 
the Western and Arab worlds throughout much of the twentieth century. It remains an 
intractable conflict today, and continues to be a prevalent issue in regional and 
international relations. Despite various attempts at peace-making by Israel, Palestine, and 
other international actors, many aspects of the anticipated ―peace‖ have failed to 
materialize. Recent peace negotiations have featured issues such as the status of 
Jerusalem, the future of Israeli settlements, the borders between Israel and Palestine, 
security arrangements, and the release of prisoners.
1
 The question of whether Palestinians 
who fled as a result of the 1948 and 1967 conflicts between Israel and the Arab states 
should be granted the right to return to their homelands is another important issue on the 
table. The historical overview provided below—though brief—provides a backdrop 
against which we may understand the complexities Jordan navigated in formulating its 
Palestinian refugee policy. 
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 Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, ―Trump‘s Jerusalem Declaration and ‗The Ultimate Deal‘,‖ Brandeis 
University Crown Center for Middle East Studies (January 2018),  
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Roots of the Conflict 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict denotes the ongoing struggle between Israel and 
Palestine over a number of political, economic, and social conflicts tied to each people‘s 
perceived right to the land. The land itself plays a lengthy and important role in the 
history of both Jews and Palestinians, as both groups claim to have lived in the physical 
region which is now Israel and the Palestinian territories. Jewish history in Israel began 
with the Israelites in the land of Canaan, which was the region God promised to 
Abraham. They lived there for hundreds of years until driven out by the Romans in the 
second century.
2
  
The Palestinians, like the Israelites and the Jews, are also descendants of the 
ancient Canaanites and lived on the land under various rulers and empires over time. 
Although some modern scholars argue that Palestinians have not historically possessed a 
national identity like that of the Jews, others trace the culture and formation of 
Palestinian identity within the region of Israel and Palestine for hundreds if not thousands 
of years before the political conflict with the Jews began in the 20
th
 century.
3
 Today, all 
three Abrahamic religions recognize the historical significance of the land of Israel and 
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 Todd M. Ferry and Gregory Harms, ―Canaan–Palestine: Ancient History,‖ in The Palestine-Israel 
Conflict - Fourth Edition: A Basic Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2017), 
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Palestine: it represents part of the Islamic waqf, the Promised Land of the Jews, and the 
Holy Land to the Christians.
4
 
The modern Palestinian-Israeli conflict arose towards the end of the 19
th
 century 
with the establishment of Zionism in Eastern Europe. Zionism referred to ―Zion‖, or 
Jerusalem. In its original form, Zionism was a nationalist movement with the goal of 
creating a Jewish national state in the historic Land of Israel.
5
 At the time, Jews faced 
widespread and systematic anti-Semitism, often in the form of violent pogroms, in Russia 
and Eastern Europe.
6
 Various Jewish groups began to search for solutions to their plight 
and formed small, nationalist organizations to do so. Theodore Herzl, a journalist from 
Austria-Hungary, led a group of predominantly secular Jews in advancing the cause of 
Zionism.  
Herzl convened the first meeting of the Zionist Congress in 1897 in Basel, 
Switzerland. The Congress planned how to acquire the funds, public support, and 
diplomatic connections necessary to get Herzl‘s idea for a Jewish state off the ground. It 
is interesting to note that the Congress considered multiple different territories when 
assessing their land options for statehood. In addition to Palestine, Argentina and Uganda 
were legitimate options during the deliberation process.
7 
 In other words, the early 
Zionists did not believe the Jewish state was particular to Israel: it was simply the most 
convenient option for their settlement. Eventually, European Jews did choose Ottoman 
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Palestine as the land where they would establish their statehood project.
 
This choice was 
due, in large part, to the fact that the Jews claimed that the land was largely empty—
empty of white Europeans, that is, as Palestinians lay outside the normative European 
supremacist framework of ―people.‖8 Today, many Israeli Jews maintain the narrative 
that the land was essentially empty and uncultivated.
9
 
 
Zionism and the “Statehood Project” 
Zionists proclaimed Palestine the home of the Jews in 1897. Jewish migration to 
the land began shortly after, and continued into the early 20
th
 century.
10
 During World 
War I, the European powers became a more active presence in the region as they warred 
with the Ottoman Empire. In their efforts to secure victory, the British made offers to 
both the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs in the region soliciting their military aid in 
exchange for rights to the land.
11
 Although both the Palestinians and the Jews complied, 
the British chose to endorse the rights of the Jews; and in 1917, the Balfour Declaration 
announced British support for a ―national Jewish homeland in Palestine.‖  
At the time, only a small minority of peoples in the region were actually Jewish. 
In fact, nearly 90 percent were Arab.
12
 Regardless, as World War I drew to a close, much 
of the modern Middle East was partitioned into British and French mandated control. 
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Palestine was placed under a British mandate. As a result, the migration of European 
Jews to Palestine increased, peaking around the 1930s. The Zionist Organization 
encouraged Jews to purchase or settle new lands and build new lives, communities, and 
institutions in their ―homeland‖.13   
Arabs did not endure the mass arrival of the Jews into their land passively. As the 
Jews gradually settled more and more of their territory, the Palestinian Arabs found they 
were increasingly impoverished and deprived of land themselves. Violent rebellions 
broke out between the Arab and Jewish communities in the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
which were exacerbated by deteriorating global economic conditions and the onset of 
World War II.
14
 Notably, the Great Arab Rebellion of 1936-39 against the British sought 
to halt the expansion of Jewish ―settlements‖—illegal Jewish construction on Palestinian 
land—through both armed dissent and general strikes on Jewish goods.15  
Another notable development of 1936 was the publication of the Peel 
Commission Report. The Report, issued by the British under the League of Nations, 
recommended for the first time the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab-
Muslim state. Neither the Jews nor the Arabs saw this recommendation as desirable. 
Rather than heed its advice, both peoples continued to assert their sovereignty over the 
land.
 16
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In 1947, the British decided to withdraw from the territories and leave the matter 
of potential partition up to the newly-formed United Nations. As a result, the UN passed 
Resolution 181 calling for the end of the British Mandate in Palestine and the creation of 
the state of Israel on 55 percent of the land and the creation of a Palestinian state on 44 
percent of the land. The holy sites, from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, would become UN 
administered international zones.
17
 At the time, Jews represented about 32 percent of the 
total population and owned only 6 percent of the land.
18
 Given the disproportionate gain 
offered to them by the partition plan, the Jews readily accepted the Resolution. The 
Arabs, on the other hand, rejected it in full. The Jews responded by mandating that its 
military take the territories included in Resolution 181 by force. The figure below 
illustrates the borders drawn by the partition plan.  
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Figure 5.1 The Partition Plan, 1947. Source: ―UN General Assembly Resolution 181,‖ 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), 
https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/un%20general%20assembl
y%20resolution%20181.aspx. 
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On May 14, 1948, the Jewish Zionist leaders officially proclaimed Israel a state.
19
 
As a result, the Arab states invaded Israel. They were swiftly defeated. Israel succeeded 
in claiming land even beyond that which the partition plan recommended, controlling 
nearly 78 percent of the territory by the end of 1949.
20
 Palestinians refer to this war and 
resulting exodus of over 700,000 Palestinians from their homes as the Nakbah, or ―the 
catastrophe.‖21 The displaced fled to regions of the West Bank, Gaza, and the 
neighboring Arab countries. It is this displacement to which we now turn.  
 
III. Initial Displacement, 1947-1949: Early Responses and Temporary Solutions 
 The early waves of Palestinian displacement into neighboring Arab States played 
a crucial role in shaping government policies and public opinion towards refugees for 
many years to come. Most of the Arab states gained independence around the same time 
as their displacement, making Palestinians the first major refugee crisis they experienced 
within the newly-formed state structure of the region. This section will analyze the 
various political, economic, domestic and international factors dictating and constraining 
the Arab states as they formulated their response to the crisis.   
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Early Waves of Exodus  
The first exodus of Palestinians began on November 29, 1947.
22
 Merely days after 
the partition resolution passed, the outbreak of hostilities caused several tens of thousands 
of Palestinians to leave their homes. This first wave was comprised largely of upper-
middle class families from Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem, who were not driven out of their 
homes so much as seeking to avoid the escalating violent conflict.
23
 Their arrival in the 
cities of neighboring Arab states, such as Amman, caused very little disturbance: most 
had a second home located there, relatives with which to stay, or the financial means to 
pay for temporary lodging. Neither the hosts nor the refugees perceived their initial out-
migration as permanent. Instead, they anticipated the Palestinians would return after the 
war ended, which they presumed would occur in short time.
24
 
 Towards the end of March, 1948, the tides of war began to shift. Israel switched 
to a more offensive strategy and targeted heavily populated Arab areas allotted to the 
Jewish state in Resolution 181, including Arab Jerusalem, Tiberias, Haifa, the Hula 
Valley, and Jaffa. Between 200,000 and 300,000 Palestinians from urban and rural areas 
fled to Arab areas in the West Bank and nearby Arab countries, such as Transjordan.
25
 
The United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East reported that the 
refugees traveled by foot, car and ship, generally stayed together as village units, and 
took very few possessions with them as they left. Few expected to be gone long. Indeed, 
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many even gave their house keys to their Jewish neighbors to safeguard until their 
return.
26
  
This second wave of refugees differed from the first in a number of important 
ways. Rather than leaving by choice, they were driven out of panic, fear, economic 
privation and expulsion orders.
27
 Their flight was moreover much quicker and much 
larger in scale, and thus generated a more substantial impact on the communities in which 
they settled. Indeed, in the West Bank, food shortages emerged in towns unable to cope 
with the sudden influx.
28
  
 Transjordan, too, felt the stresses of high refugee numbers rather immediately. 
Given that the Transjordanian military was deeply involved in the war in Israel, it 
displeased some Transjordanians to see Palestinians fleeing from the conflict. They 
believed the refugees should return to fight for their land, as they felt the Transjordanians 
were doing for them.
29
 The Transjordanian government attempted to quell such 
sentiments, allowing all Palestinians to enter their lands and never attempting forced 
repatriation—as Syria and others tried, unsuccessfully, to accomplish.30 Still, the staunch 
opposition to the British that the vast majority of Palestinians displayed was problematic 
for the government, which was not yet independent of British oversight. Even King 
Abdullah noted to a British official in February 1948 that ―‗the exodus of Palestine Arabs 
into Transjordan…[were] all arriving thoroughly anti-British, and hence, might give [me] 
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trouble‘‖.31 From the beginning, the Palestinian migration into Transjordan proved to be a 
problem of not merely amassing the aid and resources necessary to alleviate the refugees‘ 
plight. Rather, it held a particular political significance that placed a strain on 
relationships between Transjordanians and within the government itself.  
 The third wave of Palestinian exodus resulted from the Arab invasion into Israel 
on May 15
th
, 1948. Leaders of the other Arab states, caught off guard, were surprised and 
altogether unprepared for the departure of the Palestinians from their lands. Almost all of 
the 300,000 individuals that fled as a result went to the Transjordan-occupied territories 
of Palestine or Transjordan itself.
32
 Another 10,000 Palestinians were displaced in mid-
July. In response to these massive influxes, the Transjordanian people took to the streets 
in anti-British and anti-King Abdullah protests.
33
 King Abdullah responded by advising 
that the people show patience towards their Arab ―brethren‖.34 Despite the apparent 
generosity of his response, it seems likely that the King was motivated more so by his 
territorial desires to secure the West Bank than by his compassion for the refugees alone. 
Still, the Transjordanian government worried at how it would provide adequate food and 
shelter during the coming winter months. Refugees, too, became increasingly concerned 
with finding an end to the war and returning home.
35
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Establishing Relief Efforts  
 At this stage in the crisis, there was very little coordinated activity with regards to 
relief and aid services for the refugees. The minor amount of aid offered to refugees was 
provided by local authorities and social committees.
36
 The Transjordanian government 
additionally offered about six shillings per month to each individual, as well as small 
food rations to the most needy.
37
 As meager as this seems, Transjordan proved to be the 
only state in the region offering organized aid to the refugees at the time. This was 
largely due to the fact that the other Arab governments continued to view the crisis as 
only temporary in nature. Moreover, they believed Israel would interpret refugee aid as a 
signal which legitimized the exodus of the Palestinians, thus making their return less 
necessary.  
The Western influences in the region—the U.S. and the British—were far more 
politically inclined to encourage resettlement in the Arab countries.
38
 While they held 
their own political motivations for doing so, in backing Israel‘s statehood, they rightly 
observed ―a complete lack of organization‖ among the Arab Nations. Indeed, within 
Transjordan they noted that there existed ―no funds or qualified personnel available for 
organizing camps, food distribution, and sanitation and immunization programs‖. 39 The 
difficulty Transjordan faced in seeking to aid refugees while leveraging them against 
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Israel debilitated the ability of governments and organizations to respond effectively—at 
least initially—to their displacement. 
 The overwhelming need for food, shelter and basic necessitates that the refugee 
crisis demonstrated eventually trumped the political difficulties of providing aid. The first 
local relief organization to be established, prompted by the British, was the Disaster 
Relief Project (later coined the Refugee Relief Project).
40
 Established by the United 
Nations, the Refugee Relief Project coordinated with local branches of organizations like 
the International Committee of the Red Cross to deliver aid to refugee populations in 
need. The Refugee Relief Project was said to be incredibly inefficient: the percentage of 
resources it wasted was close to 90 percent.
41
 Critics called for aid to be directed to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross instead, eliminating the middle man. The 
United Nations General Assembly responded by passing a resolution in December of 
1948 establishing the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRPR). The UNRPR coordinated with a number of preexisting aid organizations, 
including the League of the Red Cross Societies in Transjordan, to distribute relief 
supplies and medical aid.
42
 This temporary mechanism operated for a year before being 
replaced by UNRWA.  
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The Final Wave  
 The fourth, and final, wave of Palestine exodus in this period occurred in 
December 1948-January 1949. Israeli invasions expelled another 150,000-200,000 
Palestinians. Most went to the Gaza Strip, where the refugee death rate skyrocketed.
43
 In 
Transjordan, meanwhile, conditions within the temporary camps established by the Red 
Cross were deteriorating as well. Even the Jericho Camp, considered a ―model‖ camp for 
its effective administration and provisions for refugee work projects, lapsed into 
anarchy.
44
 From the onset, many perceived camps to be a dangerous establishment. 
Camps served to physically and psychologically isolate refugees from ordinary life, 
created environments where violence and danger could easily flourish, encouraged 
dependency on aid and facilitated at least short-term stay in the country of asylum. There 
was nearly universal agreement among the government, the people, and especially the 
refugees in Transjordan that the camps were an insufficient means to addressing the 
plight of the latter group. Still, with few other options available, camps persisted as a 
temporary method of organizing aid and protection.  
The Palestinian case clearly demonstrates that using camps to isolate and contain 
refugees was the default course of action, even before the establishment of formal refugee 
organizations. It is important to note that the reservations expressed about camps in the 
wake of the 1948 crisis are very much the same as those expressed today. Although they 
continue to be established in the wake of current refugee crises, camps pose many of the 
same issues for host countries, aid organizations, and refugees themselves as those cited 
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nearly seventy years ago. As the next chapter will discuss, many of the camps established 
for Palestinians during this initial period remain permanent fixtures within Jordan. The 
question of why camps have persisted despite the fact that they were never considered an 
effective solution, then, is extremely important to discussions of solutions today.  
The map below illustrates the waves of refugee movement analyzed above. As it 
shows, Palestinians entered the East Bank of Transjordan from multiple points along the 
border. They also fled to Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, as well as within the land of Israel 
and Palestine.  
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Figure 5.2 Palestinian Refugees Displaced from Urban and Rural Areas. Source: 
―Palestinian Refugees‘ Migration Routes During Nakba in 1948,‖ Palestine 
Remembered, (September 1, 2001), 
http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Maps/Story578.html.  
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Shortly after the last wave of Palestinian displacement, the Arab-Israeli war of 
1948 came to a close. Israel signed armistice agreements with Egypt in February, 
Lebanon in March, Jordan in April, and Syria in July of 1949.
45
 Within a year, Israel took 
a decisive step to address the fate of Palestinian refugees through the passage of the 
Absentee Property Law of 1950. The law designated all lands abandoned by Palestinians 
as ―absentee‖ territory, and transferred its ownership over to the state. Furthermore, the 
law gave the Israeli government the right to expel any persons on absentee land that the 
government did not believe had a right to occupy it, demolish buildings and discontinue 
construction projects, and void any transfers of land made by absentees that occurred 
after April 1
st
, 1948.
46
 In effect, this law dispossessed all Palestinians who wished to 
return home of the legal right to their lands.  
The Absentee Property Law severely limited the solutions available to displaced 
Palestinians.  Return to their country of origin, referred to today as ―repatriation‖, was an 
entirely unavailable option. Mechanisms for third country resettlement had not yet been 
established. This left Palestinians with little choice but to remain in the country to which 
they had fled. As the remainder of the chapter will discuss, determining the rights and 
treatment of Palestinian refugees in host states would prove to be a challenging process.  
Although methods of addressing crises and formulating solutions have certainly 
evolved over time, the natural tendency of countries to avoid including refugees within 
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their national state systems seems to have been present since the beginning of modern 
refugee crises. Even Transjordan was not wholly exempt from this philosophy. Still, its 
government showed from the outset that it would adhere to a much more favorable policy 
towards refugees than Syria, Iraq, and other major recipients of Palestinians. The 
remainder of the chapter will detail how Jordan proved to be the exception among its 
Arab neighbors in the degree with which it facilitated Palestinian integration. Examining 
why this was the case is crucial to understanding how Jordan has historically addressed 
refugee solutions, and the extent to which its current policy is influenced by past choices. 
The conclusions reached will aim to shed light on how solutions which more effectively 
align with the incentives of states, organizations, and refugees themselves can be formed.  
 
IV. Furthering Solutions: Jordan’s Responses from 1950-1993 
 From 1947-1949, the Arab states were far more occupied with fighting the war 
with Israel than addressing the more politically difficult byproduct of its refugees. When 
the war ended, however, the refugee problem could no longer be ignored. Consideration 
of long term solutions, legal distinctions and political rights proved to be a difficult task. 
It became clear that the political environment, realities of limited aid, and popular 
opinion within states like Jordan shaped solutions to an enormous extent, just as they do 
today. This section will consider how Jordan addressed refugees after the cessation of the 
1948 War, and how conditions changed following the Six-Day War of 1967.  
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Reconciling Solutions and Politics  
 In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 194 
regarding the status of Palestinian refugees. The resolution became a foundational 
statement to which all Arab nations turned for guidance on how the plight of the refugees 
was to be resolved in the coming years. Although the resolution upheld the partition plan 
contained in Resolution 181, it also established the United Nations Conciliation 
Commission and addressed issues of Palestinian displacement .The clauses concerning 
refugees read as follows:  
RESOLVES that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace 
with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, 
and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to 
return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of 
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or 
authorities responsible; 
 
INSTRUCTS the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, 
resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the 
payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the 
United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the 
appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.
47
 
  
 Arab states interpreted this resolution as affirming the right of any refugee to 
return to their homeland, if they desired to do so. They also believed it entitled refugees 
to compensation for the loss of property they may have suffered. As would become clear, 
Israel refused to acknowledge either of these rights in the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict. In fact, it continues to deny them today. The second clause of the resolution gave 
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the Conciliation Commission the task of facilitating ―repatriation, resettlement and 
economic and social rehabilitation and the payment of compensation‖—in other words, 
finding solutions—for the refugees.48  
 In 1949, many Arab states viewed repatriation as the most desirable solution. An 
Arab League Resolution in March 1949 confirmed as much, stating that the ―lasting and 
just solution of the problem…would be repatriation.‖49 Jordan, however, was less 
staunchly opposed than its neighbors: with other economic and territorial goals in mind, it 
agreed in July of 1949 to resettle some 200,000 Palestinians.
50
 The British financial aid 
accompanying this resettlement was evidently too appealing for the state and its 
underdeveloped economy to ignore. Jordan also expressed doubts that repatriation was a 
viable solution in the first place, particularly because most of the property from which 
Palestinians fled remained under Israeli control.
51
 From the start, then, Jordan 
demonstrated its willingness to put both practicality and its own national interests and 
ahead of what it believed to be symbolic advances of justice.  
 Towards the end of 1949, a number of organizations emerged and dissolved 
before the UNGA founded the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
52
 The Arab states specifically insisted that ―United 
Nations‖ be included in the title of the organization. Given that many Western states 
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leading the United Nations (e.g., the United States and Great Britain) backed Israel in the 
recent war, they sought to ensure that the international community felt responsible for 
contributing to the creation of the refugee crisis. 
53
 The desire of the Arab states to 
generate international involvement in the crisis was not motivated solely by the need for 
financial resources. Rather, they also sought justice—whether the Western states were 
fully aware of this notion or not. The United Nations fulfilled their request. Under 
UNRWA, a far more organized relief and aid system developed. UNRWA and its partner 
volunteer organizations oversaw the distribution of supplies to the refugees on the 
ground, while host governments like Jordan took a backseat role in facilitating camp 
safety and the transportation of goods.
54
  
A survey published in 1949 shows that the majority of Palestinians were indeed 
dependent on UNRWA for shelter and aid.
55
 About 60 percent of refugees, or 430,000 
individuals, lived in camps operated by UNRWA. Another 250,000 refugees, or 35 
percent, held varied occupations, lived in towns or cities, and registered for the free 
refugee rations. Only 4 percent of Palestinians received no UN refugee supplies.
56
 Such 
high levels of dependence did not necessarily sit well with the Palestinians. Those in 
Jordan, in particular, resented the fact that they were essentially governed by the Bedouin 
and the British—the former they thought to be inferior, and the latter they perceived as 
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the enemy. The territorial ambitions of the Jordanian government likewise did not go 
unnoticed. In the words of Plascov, many quickly recognized and resented ―the purpose 
[the] machinery was serving.‖57  
 In the years following the creation of UNRWA, preserving the right of return 
proved to be a challenging undertaking for Jordan. In 1949, Jordan had extended a form 
of temporary citizenship to all Palestinians living within its territory.  Distinct from other 
Jordanian citizens, these Palestinian ―refugee-citizens‖ held a temporary citizen status 
that allowed them to eventually assert their right of return.
58
 Jordan thus faced a difficult 
question: to what extent should it rely upon UNRWA aid and development schemes if the 
majority of Palestinian refugees were pseudo-citizens? Western influences in the UN and 
other aid organizations pushed for resettlement-based activities, which promoted 
economic and social integration, rather than simply relief services. Yet many Arab 
states—including Jordan—held strongly to the notion that such activities diminished their 
bargaining power with Israel for the right of refugee return, and refused to comply. They 
largely rejected proposals to depopulate the camps and promote socioeconomic 
development.
59
 In this limbo, the camps were soon rendered seemingly permanent 
fixtures.   
 Still, the Arab states acknowledged that the Palestinians deserved basic human 
rights, including those of adequate education, employment, residency and free movement. 
As a result, the Arab States passed the Casablanca Protocol in 1965 asserting standards to 
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ensure these rights were protected.
60
 The Protocol, however, made an exception that 
states could allow Palestinians to retain their nationality in order to preserve their right of 
return. What's more, few states actually complied by the standards the Protocol set forth. 
Jordan proved an exception on both of these fronts.  
Nearly a decade prior, Jordan had made the decisive choice to extend formal 
citizenship to all Palestinian refugees. The Jordanian Nationality Law of 1954 granted 
Jordanian nationality to Palestinians who arrived as a result of the 1948 crisis.
61
 The law 
allowed Palestinians to access public services like education and employment on equal 
terms as native Jordanians. No other state chose to resolve the Palestinians‘ refugee status 
so quickly or definitively. More than any other policy, the Jordanian Nationality Law set 
a remarkable precedent in Jordan by introducing the integration of Palestinian refugees.   
The Jordanian government took care to coordinate the procurement of funds 
required to meet refugees‘ particular needs. Spending per refugee in Jordan—through 
U.S., UNRWA and Jordanian contributions—was considerably and consistently higher 
than that of any other Arab state.
62
 The incentives Jordan possessed to integrate 
Palestinians in Jordanian society allowed more beneficial avenues for livelihood and 
societal participation to be opened to the refugees quite soon after their arrival. By the 
1960s, Palestinians had been granted citizenship, rights to public services and social 
protection systems, and equal opportunities in most areas of economic life within Jordan. 
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Perhaps most importantly, they were also allowed to retain their official status as refugees 
under international law.  
  
The Six-Day War and its Aftermath 
 Tensions residing from the 1948 war culminated in another round of fighting in 
June of 1967. Hostilities largely originated from the 1956 conflict between Egypt and 
Israel over the latter‘s access to the Straight of Tiran.63 In an effort to force Egypt to 
reopen the Straight to Israeli shipping, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula in 1956. 
Although its first effort was unsuccessful, Israel claimed in 1967 that Egypt‘s 
continuation of the blockade would constitute sufficient cause for war. Egypt, in 
response, stated that the Straight would be closed to Israeli vessels, and deployed troops 
to its border.
64
 Israel‘s subsequent airstrikes caught Egypt by surprise. Egypt called upon 
Syria and Jordan to invade Israel, both of whom complied. In less than six days, as the 
name suggests, Israel captured the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan 
and the Golan Heights from Syria, in what became known as the Six-Day War. The 
legacy of the war confirmed Israel‘s regional supremacy and growing influence among 
the Western powers, at the detriment of the disorganized Arab leaders.
65
  
 After the Six Day War, more than fifty percent of the refugees displaced from the 
1948 conflict resided in territories under Israeli control. Israel‘s conquests drove about 
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80,000 individuals from the West Bank into the East Bank of Jordan.
66
 This outmigration 
included both refugees from 1948 and Palestinians native to the West Bank. For context, 
in June of 1966, UNRWA reported a total of 1,317,759 Palestinian refugees: of this 
figure, about 706,000 resided in Jordan.
67
 Roughly 487,000 refugees registered with 
UNRWA lived in the West Bank. Clearly, 80,000 Palestinians was a significant addition 
to the Jordanian refugee population. This new wave of refugees, arriving in Jordan nearly 
two decades after the initial displacements of 1948, further complicated the political 
situation of refugees in Jordan. Indeed, an entirely new set of policies regarding their 
legal standing emerged.  
 The initial problem posed by this influx of Palestinians was that they were not 
included in any definition of ―refugee‖ under international law. According to the 
UNRWA definition, a Palestinian refugee is an individual whose ―normal place of 
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both 
home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict‖.68 Refugee status was 
extended to descendants of those who fled from the conflict as well. In effect, the 
UNRWA definition was exclusive to the 1948 war; it did not extend to new conflicts that 
might arise.  The way UNRWA applied this definition differed substantially from how 
the UNHCR defined refugee status. Under the UNHCR Convention mandate and 
Protocol, refugee status is not passed on to descendants of refugees or exclusive to 
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displacement resulting from a particular conflict. The unique definition set forth by 
UNRWA continues to have extremely important repercussions today: by including the 
descendants of Palestinian refugees from 1948, the population of Palestinian refugees 
now numbers upwards of 5.4 million.
69
   
Those who fled as a result of the 1967 war were subsequently called ―displaced 
persons‖, and existed outside the realm of international refugee law. Because Palestinian 
refugees had been historically included exclusively in the UNRWA mandate, it made 
little sense to categorize those displaced in 1967 under the protection of the UNHCR. As 
a result, less than a month after the Palestinians‘ displacement, the United Nations 
General Assembly passed a resolution endorsing the efforts of UNRWA to provide 
humanitarian assistance ―on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure‖ to 
displaced persons. This effectively expanded the mandate of UNRWA to cover the 1967 
refugees.
70
 UNRWA coordinated with the Red Cross committees, the United Nations 
Children‘s Fund, and other voluntary organizations to provide aid to the displaced, just as 
they had for the refugees of 1948.
71
  
 UNRWA and the UN member states responded to the crisis of 1967 by acting 
quickly to expand the boundaries of international law. Their decisive action shows 
definitive organizational development as compared to the initial disarray of the late 
1940s. Jordan, likewise, proved better prepared to respond efficiently and effectively to 
the crisis. From the outset, Jordan made it clear that Palestinians in the West Bank were 
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to retain their Jordanian citizenship.
72
 Simultaneously, the government approved the 
establishment of six camps for the displaced. All six of these camps continue to provide 
protection and assistance to refugees today.  
Broadly speaking, the ways in which UNRWA and the Jordanian government 
responded to the 1967 displacement were similar to their responses following the 1948 
crisis. Yet the political developments within the Palestinian territories over the next few 
decades —especially in the West Bank—revealed that the Six-Day War would change a 
great deal about the relationship between native Jordanians and Palestinians. Although 
the policy of extending citizenship to West Bankers persisted for two decades, relations 
between the Jordanian government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
became increasingly tense. The PLO was founded in 1964 with the ideological basis of 
restoring the Palestinian homeland, and claims to be the sole representative of the people 
of Palestine.
73
  
Some factions within the PLO called for an overthrow of the Hashemite 
monarchy in 1970, leading to the violent ―Black September‖ clashes between the 
Jordanian military, the fedayeen of the PLO, and Syrian forces in a number of Jordanian 
cities. Although peace was reached quickly, tension with the PLO persisted, particularly 
with the outbreak of the first intifada (Palestinian ―uprising‖) of 1987 in Israel and 
Palestine.
74
 As a result, King Hussein severed all administrative and legal ties to the West 
Bank in 1988. Importantly, this decision included a revocation of citizenship from West 
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Bankers through an amendment of the Citizenship Law—demonstrating that Jordan was 
just as willing to take back the rights it had granted to Palestinians some twenty years 
prior when its security and stability were at stake.
75
  
 
The Right of Return 
 The Black September conflict did not permanently alienate Palestinians in Jordan. 
Jordan, more so than other states, remained hopeful that an Israeli-Palestinian peace 
would eventually manifest itself and feature plans for refugee compensation or 
repatriation. In the early years following the 1948 war, this was largely due to the 
political motivations King Abdullah possessed in seeking territorial control over the 
Palestinian territory of Transjordan and beyond. Abdullah believed that Palestinian 
integration was an important step towards his dream of a ―Greater Syria‖—though these 
aspirations would never come to fruition.
76
 Years later, when the peace negotiations of 
the 1990s commenced, Jordanian officials began to fear that the refugee issue would be 
excluded. Taking the refugee issue off the table implied that Jordan would be forced to 
bear the immense costs of integration indefinitely.  
Since then, the Jordanian government has more vocally supported the continued 
right of return of the refugees. The government has claimed to represent the large 
population of Palestinians in their country in advocating for their eventual compensation 
and continued status as refugees.
77
  As the next chapter will discuss, however, a just 
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peace that appeases the demands of Arab states and Palestinian refugees seems 
increasingly unrealistic in the current geopolitical climate.  
The persistence of refugee camps in Jordan has also complicated discussions of 
the right of return. As the following chapter will discuss, conditions within Palestinian 
refugee camps are significantly worse than those observed in the rest of Jordanian 
society. Yet many believe that abolishing these camps could compromise the right of 
return. Over the years, Jordan and UNRWA have developed the Palestinian refugee 
camps to provide greater access to water, electricity, and sustainable infrastructure.
78
 The 
normalization and increasing permanence of these camps has led to increasing integration 
of the encamped refugees into Jordanian society, while preserving—at least in part—the 
semblance of the right of return.  
Still, nationalist sentiments among the Jordanian people proclaiming the necessity 
of placing ―Jordan first‖ in the realm of refugee issues have become increasingly 
prevalent. The government, at the turn of the century, made it very clear that it would no 
longer accept any future waves of Palestinian refugees.
79
 Although over seventy years 
had passed since the 1948 displacements, the legacy of the Palestinian refugee crisis 
remained poignant. Yet this proclamation has not prevented the government from 
permitting other nationalities of refugees to enter—especially Syrians and Iraqis. The 
government‘s proclamation that its borders would be closed to refugees seems to have 
been a statement of deterrence more so than an actual policy. The following chapters will 
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assess the linkage between the legacy of the Palestinian crisis and future refugee policy in 
more detail.  
   
V. Conclusion 
The goal of initial solutions in Jordan was twofold: to meet refugees‘ needs, and 
to preserve their right of return. The dual responses Jordan pursued of establishing camps 
and permitting Palestinians‘ inclusion in Jordanian society demonstrated its commitment 
to achieving these ends. In addition, the Jordanian government offered forth a number of 
auxiliary decisions which deserve emphasis. Throughout multiple displacements, Jordan 
consistently maintained open borders and allowed all Palestinian refugees to seek asylum. 
It never forcibly repatriated Palestinians or coerced their onward migration—which, as 
Chapter 7 will discuss, would emerge as a trend in the Iraqi crisis. Jordan accepted 
international monetary aid and allowed other states, humanitarian organizations, and 
NGOs to help refugees within their borders.  
Jordan pursued its policy decisions regarding Palestinian refugees amidst a 
complicated backdrop of the Arab states‘ collective interests. Although it certainly 
considered the positions other states took on the refugee question, Jordan chose to 
privilege its own agenda and depart from the policies of its neighbors. The government‘s 
political interests ultimately served as the most powerful force influencing the formation 
of policy. Although public opinion within Jordan may have constrained policy, it did not 
exclusively drive its formation. Palestinians became an integral facet of Jordanian society 
under Jordan‘s initial refugee policies.  
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From a contemporary standpoint, Jordan‘s treatment of Palestinian refugees in the 
twentieth century was remarkable. Refugees were provided with emergency aid from 
organizations like UNRWA and the Red Cross, granted citizenship and employment 
rights by the government, and given opportunities to establish new lives in Jordan. In 
other words, the most important issue of providing refugees with sustainable livelihoods 
was adequately addressed. However, none of these initial responses were viewed as a true 
solution to the refugee issue. The Introduction chapter spoke about the different 
definitions of ―solution‖ offered in refugee studies literature. Following the traditional 
definition, a solution is the acquisition or re-acquisition of citizenship within a host, 
resettlement, or origin country. This definition implies that the majority of Palestinians in 
Jordan should no longer be considered refugees, as they have been given citizenship. 
Nevertheless, many Palestinians disagree with this implication: in their eyes, the only 
thing comprising a real solution would be the ability to return home.  
The analysis of initial solutions to Palestinian displacement thus ends with a 
contradiction. Although Palestinians enjoy both citizenship and decent standards of living 
in Jordan, many nevertheless choose to symbolically maintain their refugee status. Such 
circumstances render the Palestinian crisis a truly unique case that requires equally 
unique solutions.  
The next chapter will delve further into the question of how Palestinians live in 
Jordan today. It will analyze how effective the solution of integration has been for both 
Palestinians and Jordanians. In doing so, it will analyze the Palestinians‘ standards of 
livelihood compared to non-Palestinian Jordanians and the laws which regulate their 
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rights and citizenship. Lastly, it will examine the question of how a ―durable solution‖ is 
defined when addressing the question of Palestinian refugees.  
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Palestinian Refugees: Part II                      6                   
 
I. Introduction 
 The last chapter analyzed the ways in which Jordan historically addressed the 
inflows of Palestinian refugees. It describes the delicate balancing act Jordan played in 
allowing Palestinians to seek refuge in their land, preserving their right to return to their 
homelands, and permitting them to live as Jordanian citizens in the interim. The analysis 
emphasized that Jordan did not have an obligation to extend these rights to Palestinians; 
indeed, its Arab neighbors chose to limit the availability of entry and citizenship. Yet the 
Jordanian government believed it was within their political interests to not only welcome 
Palestinians, but also ensure that they were given the opportunity to live as people of 
Jordan instead of mere guests. This story was not universal: some Palestinians chose to 
remain in camps, and lived quite different lives than their Jordanian and non-encamped 
Palestinian counterparts. Political motivations and exceptions aside, Jordan‘s broad 
allowance for Palestinian integration alludes to a notion of humanitarian responsibility 
towards refugees that would permeate its policy for years to come.  
Although many of the policies formulated during this time continue to define 
Palestinian refugee policy today, the realities that different groups of Palestinians living 
in Jordan face have changed significantly. Integration has proven to be a permanent 
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solution for a large proportion of Palestinians in Jordan who hold citizenship. Still, as 
stated above, integration has not been an even process. The lives of Palestinians who 
remain in camps continue to be shaped by poorer standards of living and prolonged aid 
dependence, resulting in only partial integration. This chapter will analyze how both the 
integration and camp models have affect the livelihoods of Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
today. It will compare these models to the policies implemented for doubly-displaced 
Palestinian-Syrian refugees, and attempt to offer an explanation of why this latter group 
of refugees differs fundamentally from those which preceded it. Lastly, it will suggest 
how a permanent solution to the Palestinian refugee problem may manifest itself in the 
future.  
To assess how effective integration has been for Palestinians in Jordan, this 
chapter will analyze the solution from the standpoint of both the refugees and the host 
country. Scholars who analyze the effects of refugee integration generally draw their 
conclusions from studies of livelihood, living standards, laws and regulation, opinion 
polls, and other descriptive measures of refugees‘ lives and effects on the host 
community.
1
 Mirroring this method, the following analysis of refugee livelihood will 
focus principally on the areas of employment, healthcare, education, microfinance and 
income. It will seek to capture to what extent the Palestinian refugees have become 
similar to native Jordanians in common standards of livelihood.  
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Another important aspect of the analysis will examine how the Jordanian 
government and people have experienced tension as a result of Palestinian integration.  
Analyzing the effects of integration on the host state is an integral aspect of the broader 
question of refugee solutions for a number of reasons. For one, states have increasingly 
proven to be far more nationalistic in their migration and citizenship policies as of late, in 
forming restrictive policies on a national level rather than deferring to international 
refugee law and organizational recommendations. Jordan has not been exempt from this 
practice. Given this reality, it is necessary to assess the effects of Jordan‘s decision to 
adopt a traditional solution recommended by international law and integrate Palestinians. 
Moreover, integration‘s effects on the state offer insight as to what conditions may be 
necessary for the solution of integration to be successful in other crises.  
As Chapter Two explained, the reality that individual states are always one of the 
primary determinants of refugee policy is thus unavoidable. Together, the two levels of 
the following analysis will allow for conclusion as to what extent Palestinian integration 
represents a unique case in refugee studies; and what lessons, in turn, can be extrapolated 
to be generally applicable for other refugee crises today.  
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II. Assessing Integration: Refugees’ Standards of Livelihood  
 More than seventy years after the initial displacement of 1947, Palestinians now 
make up roughly 43 percent of the population of Jordan.
2
 Many are either formerly 
refugees themselves or had family members that were refugees. Others still retain their 
refugee status, living in camps without Jordanian citizenship and relying on aid from 
UNRWA and other international and national organizations. Because refugee status is 
transferred to the children of Palestinian refugees, the number of refugees in these camps 
has not declined with time. In many instances, three generations of refugees remain in 
these camps. This serves as a stark reminder of the continuing failure to fully resolve the 
Palestinian refugee problem for both Jordanians and Palestinians alike. Encamped 
refugees experience far lower standards of living in all aspects than the non-encamped 
Palestinians and native Jordanians.  
For those living outside of camps, integration appears to have been relatively 
successful: the levels of political participation, income, employment, and education of 
Palestinians as compared to native Jordanians show only slight differences. Indeed, many 
would say that today Palestinians are Jordanian, in both their citizenship and their 
personal identity.  
 The analysis below will assess these two ―solutions‖ for Palestinian refugees: 
integration, and encampment. The most recent data to be gathered on the subject comes 
                                                 
2
 Victoria Kelberer, ―Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and Refugee Policy in Jordan,‖ Middle East 
Policy Journal, (6 Dec. 2017), onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.bc.edu//doi/10.1111/mepo.12313/full.  
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from an extensive UNRWA-FAFO Report published in 2013. This study is supplemented 
with data from UNRWA‘s website on Jordan and more recent analytical sources. 
Standards of livelihoods experienced by Palestinians living both within and outside of 
camps will be compared to native Jordanians. Oftentimes, conditions for Jordanians 
themselves can tell a rather pessimistic story about the average quality of life in Jordan. 
This should serve as a reminder that Jordan is a poor country which experiences difficulty 
in supporting its own people—let alone refugees.  
 
Distinguishing Camp and Non-Camp Refugees 
Roughly 300,000 Palestinians live in urban and rural camps in Jordan today. The 
remainder lives outside of camps, mainly in large urban centers such as Amman. There 
are ten officially recognized Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan: Amman New Camp, 
Baqa‘a Camp, Husn Camp, Irbid Camp, Jabal el-Hussein Camp, Jerash Camp, Souf 
Camp, Marka Camp, Talbieh Camp, and Zarqa.
3
 Four of these camps were established 
after the initial displacements of 1948, and the remainder after that of 1967. In addition, 
there are three camps established by the Jordanian government, outside the influence of 
UNRWA.
4
 The map below shows the location of these camps:  
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 Figure 6.1. Location of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan. Source: ―Where We 
Work: Jordan,‖ UNRWA, https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan.  
 
Many of these camps are located in or near cities. They essentially function as 
neighborhoods in which only refugees live, given the longevity of their development. The 
Amman New Camp, for example, was established by UNRWA in 1955 and contained 
1,400 temporary shelters. Over time, the growing population forced the construction of 
thousands of new shelters and the transition of existing shelters into more permanent 
homes. The camp has turned into a small, overcrowded urban center, pictured below:  
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Figure 6.2. Amman New Camp. Photo by Nidal Ammouri, UNRWA, ―Amman New 
Camp,‖ https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan/amman-new-camp.  
 
Citizenship and Political Participation  
The majority of Palestinian refugees have been granted formal Jordanian 
citizenship through the 1954 nationality law, both inside and outside of the camps.
5
 
Possessing the same civil and political rights as native Jordanian citizens, these refugees 
have full access to the labor market and public resources. Nearly 96 percent of refugees 
outside of camps and 85 percent within camps hold citizenship. Those who do not are 
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often from the Gaza strip region and possess a two-year passport instead.
6
 Large 
disparities exist between camps regarding citizenship: in the Jerash camp, only 6 percent 
of Palestinian refugees are citizens. This figure rises only slightly to 24 percent in the 
Hitteen camp (also known as the Marka camp).
7
 Both are far below the national average, 
largely due to their large populations of ex-Gazans.  
Whether refugees possess citizenship or not is highly significant. Those who do 
not are barred from a number of rights entitled to Jordanians, such as that of working in 
the public sector, owning land, receiving poverty support from the Jordanian National 
Aid Fund, and having access to state or national healthcare.
8
  The chart below illustrates 
the huge disparities found between refugees living outside of camps and those in certain 
camps like Jerash and Hitteen, highlighted above.  
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Table 6.1 Palestinian Refugees Holding Jordanian Citizenship  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes and Zhang, ―Progress, Challenges and Diversity.‖  
 
Economic Well-Being 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, integration did not occur immediately 
following the influx of displaced Palestinians into Jordan in 1948 and 1967. Initially, 
Palestinians were largely isolated from the Jordanian labor market and dependent on 
external aid. Today, however, Palestinian refugees have been widely integrated into 
various positions of employment within Jordan. The ability to work links rather directly 
to the health, medical insurance, education, and location of residence of the refugees
9
. 
While there seems to be little difference in the labor force participation rate between 
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refugees living within camps compared to those living outside them, the latter group 
tends to hold higher-paying positions that require more education.  
The participation rates of both groups, as well as their unemployment rates, have 
lately moved in sync with national levels.
10
 In general, refugee women are employed in 
far fewer numbers than men, despite the fact that they tend to hold higher levels of 
education. This is likely due to the persistence of a male breadwinner ideology in Arabic 
states, in addition to the fact that the necessity of parental child care tends to fall with the 
mother.  
Still, the employment of Palestinian refugees largely mirrors that of non-refugee 
Jordanians in every sector other than that of the public.
11
 While Palestinian refugees who 
do not hold Jordanian citizenship are in fact prevented from holding public employment, 
they account for such a small portion of the refugee population that other factors 
necessarily drive this result as well. Preferential treatment and discrimination in hiring 
non-Palestinians into public sector jobs likely plays a large role in this trend.
12
  This trend 
is not unimportant: public sector employment has traditionally been much more desirable 
in Jordan. Public sector jobs are characterized by shorter working hours, higher wages, 
better job security, and guaranteed medical insurance.
13
 There are clear disadvantages to 
being relegated to the private sector.   
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Table 6.2 Types of Employment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes and Zhang, ―Progress, Challenges and Diversity.‖ 
 
Assessing the reported levels of income, poverty and inequality for Palestinian 
refugees reveals that a significant difference exists between those living within camps 
and those without.  Additional factors such as household size, education, employment, 
and Jordanian nationality affect these levels as well.
14
 While only one in ten refugees 
within camps possess any sort of official monetary savings, this number doubles on 
average for refugees living outside of camps. When compared to the levels of savings and 
wealth of non-refugee Jordanians, though, those of Palestinian refugees living outside 
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camps look quite comparable.
15
 Similar figures confirm that Palestinian refugees do not 
differ significantly from non-refugees when they live outside of camps.  
 
Table 6.3 Palestinians Living Under Absolute Poverty Lines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes and Zhang, ―Progress, Challenges and Diversity.‖ 
 
It is also important to note that the distribution of income and wealth outside of 
camps is more skewed than within camps, indicating that these levels vary widely with 
location of residence in Jordan. Palestinians living in Amman, for example, tend to be 
wealthier and hold higher-paying jobs than those in the Irbid or Zarqa governorates.
16
 
Although these figures are promising for the majority of Palestinians who do not live in 
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camps, those who remain there continue to suffer the inequality of a lower economic 
status as a result.  
 
Table 6.4 Palestinian Annual Household Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes and Zhang, ―Progress, Challenges and Diversity.‖ 
 
Like native Jordanians, the majority of Palestinians also have access to 
microfinance services. Within Jordan, the microfinance industry is large and highly 
profitable. Palestinians can take out loans to support their education, business ventures, 
and housing payments through a number of different operators, including UNRWA.
17
  In 
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addition to loans, some Palestinians rely on aid from a variety of other sources to support 
themselves. The table below shows that refugees inside camps rely on aid to a much 
greater degree than those outside of camps:  
Table 6.5 Sources of Aid for Refugee Households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes and Zhang, ―Progress, Challenges and Diversity.‖  
 
Health and Health Insurance 
The health conditions and level of insurance refugees possess varies widely 
among a range of factors including encampment status, income, and education. Although 
UNRWA does not provide refugees with healthcare, it offers free health services and 
large subsidies or discounts to those seeking medical aid both within and outside of 
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camps. As of December 2016, UNRWA had established twenty-five primary health 
facilities in Jordan which had over 1,613,789 patient visits per year.
18
 This figure 
represents roughly 56 percent of the registered Palestinian refugees within Jordan. The 
fraction of refugees who hold official health insurance through national services actually 
varies quite little with a refugee‘s location inside or outside of camps, and has shown 
significant improvement in the past few decades.
19
  
Still, some areas fare far worse than others. Within the Jerash camp—which 
possesses the highest poverty rate among camps, of 52.7 percent—a total of 88 percent of 
refugees possess no health insurance coverage at all.
20
 Moreover, though many of the 
temporary housing structures in camps have been replaced by concrete shelters, roofs 
which are still made of asbestos sheets or zinc have frequently been known to cause 
disease.
21
 Again, however, the severity of this occurrence varies widely between camps: 
five out of ten official refugee camps actually report lower statistics of chronic health 
problems than refugees living in the Irbid or Zarqa governorates.
22
 Like many other 
aspects of their reality, refugees‘ health is largely tied to the monetary resources and 
employment they hold.  
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Table 6.6 Palestinian Refugees Health Insurance Coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes and Zhang, ―Progress, Challenges and Diversity.‖  
 
Education 
One of the areas in which Palestinian refugees have experienced the most 
encouraging progress is education. UNRWA runs 171 schools in Jordan, enrolling over 
122,194 Palestinian students.
23
 Within camps, the UNRWA remains the largest provider 
of schooling, with 9 out of 10 children in camps enrolled in a school operated by the 
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organization.
24
 Children outside of the camps are generally enrolled in schools 
administered by the Jordanian government, with a small percentage in private schools. 
Since 1999, each subsequent age quintile of refugees has improved in every education 
bracket, from ―not completed any schooling‖ to ―university‖.25 The average number of 
refugees in camps who have not completed any schooling, for example, has dropped from 
57 percent to only 16 percent. The proportion of those who completed basic schooling 
rose from 17 percent to 39 percent.
26
 A number of other international organizations and 
NGOs, such as UNESCO, have partnered with UNRWA to aid in educational 
development.
27
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Table 6.7 Educational Attainment of Palestinian Refugees  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes and Zhang, ―Progress, Challenges and Diversity.‖ 
 
Level of education holds a very important impact on the job refugees can acquire, 
especially due to the fact that the modern labor market places increasing value on higher 
levels of schooling. As expected, studies show that there is a strong positive correlation 
between a refugee‘s education level and the monetary return they receive in their place of 
employment.
28
 While progress remains to be made—especially in closing the gap 
between education levels within and outside of camps—the steady improvement over the 
past few decades provides hope for even more equitable schooling opportunities in the 
future.  
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Palestinian Public Opinion  
 Assessing the opinion of Palestinians in Jordan may provide insight as to whether 
the differences in livelihoods described above are perceived as significant. In the NEP 
survey in 2005, Palestinian identified the main problems they face in Jordan to be 
discrimination (26 percent), employment (19 percent), aid and services (14 percent), 
poverty (12 percent), loss of homeland/longing for return (12 percent), and housing and 
environment (6 percent).
29
 The fact that the problem identified by the most respondents 
was ―discrimination‖ suggests at least some Palestinians continue to feel they are treated 
differently than other social groups in Jordan.  
Other than the right of return, it is difficult to say whether the remainder of 
problems Palestinians identified is unique to their nationality group. Many reflect the 
generally poor economic climate in Jordan experienced by all. Jordanians also identify 
economic problems, such as employment, poverty, and housing, as some of the most 
important challenges they face as well.
30
 Still, as the above analysis demonstrated, 
legitimate differences in levels of economic wellbeing between Jordanians and 
Palestinians do persist.  
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Table 6.8 Identification of Main Problems Palestinians Face in Jordan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes and Zhang, ―Progress, Challenges and Diversity.‖  
  
With regards to the topic of the right of return, Palestinian public opinion holds 
interesting implications. The general consensus among Palestinians, residing both in 
Palestine and abroad, is that the right of return represents a sacred hope which is unlikely 
to ever manifest itself in reality. The right of return, on principle, represents the 
preservation of their identity as a nation and recognition of what they are owed under 
international law. Practically, however, most Palestinians in Jordan have lived their 
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whole lives abroad. The current laws which prevent their return are unlikely to change for 
the better in the near future.
31
 As a result, Palestinians are not willing to give up their 
status as refugees, even though they view integration as the most realistic outcome of 
their plight. Chapter 10 will provide a more in depth analysis of Palestinian opinion on 
the right of return and similar issues.  
 
The Legacy of Integration  
 Looking at the data, it seems that Palestinians residing outside of camps are quite 
similar to native Jordanians. Still, this does not mean that differences between the two 
groups do not manifest themselves in ways which are less easily observable. Scholars and 
policymakers who study the ethnic makeup of Jordan note that a divide continues to exist 
between ―East Bankers‖ and ―West Bankers‖, referring to the place of origin of 
Jordanians and Palestinians, respectively. Over time, this divide has been accentuated by 
contentious political and economic issues which privilege one group over the other.  
 In recent times, both the Arab Spring and the economic reforms that followed 
increased tension between the East Bankers and West Bankers in Jordan. The early 
protests in Jordan in 2011 specifically addressed the economic gap between East Bankers 
and Jordanians of Palestinian origin—the latter of which having fared much better in the 
economic turmoil following 2008.
32
 They moreover complained that the government had 
wrongfully conferred citizenship upon certain Palestinians, such as those who were 
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relatives or friends of Queen Rania. The Queen herself is of Palestinian origin, and has 
historically faced criticism from the East Bankers for expressing political support for 
Palestinian refugees.
33
 Dissent arose within the Jordanian Islamist movement as well. 
Although it was previously dominated by Palestinians, the movement increasingly 
featured Jordanian voices calling for reforms benefitting their own interests.  
 Jordanians of Palestinian origin did not participate in the Arab Spring protests to 
the same extent as their East Bank counterparts. However, a rising tide of opposition to 
the discrimination Palestinians faced in the public sphere in Jordan emanated from 
scholars, activists, academics, and the like. They called for equal rights with East Bank 
Jordanians, specifically highlighting the inequality faced in the public and military 
sectors since the 1970s. Their demands culminated in a letter sent to the King titled the 
―National Initiative for Equal Citizenship‖, which called for an end to the various forms 
of discrimination experienced by the Palestinians.
34
  
 The Palestinians‘ decision to advocate for equal rights apart from the broader 
protest movements against the government reflects careful consideration of the 
government‘s potential counter-response. Palestinians feared that joining the protest 
movement could prompt the government to systematically push them further towards 
inequality, as it had clearly demonstrated its willingness to do with the displaced Iraqis a 
few years prior. Although the discrimination Palestinians faced was certainly just cause 
for unrest, it was still preferable to living without citizenship or employment rights. Fear, 
                                                 
33
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together with the mounting antagonism from disgruntled East Bankers, forced 
Palestinians to tread carefully when seeking equality.  
 Recent changes in economic policy in Jordan have actually proven to benefit the 
majority of Palestinians forced into private sector work. In 2012, Jordan signed a Stand-
By Agreement with the International Monetary Fund.
35
 A significant effect of the 
agreement was an increase in the cost of living, through decreasing government spending, 
which was not offset by higher wage or increased job creation. Again, in 2016, further 
IMF reforms sought to reduce public debt, stimulate job creation and alter labor market 
policies. The result was a severe increase in privatization—meaning less government jobs 
for Jordanians, and more for Palestinians. Indeed, the International Labor Organization 
finds that nearly 70 percent of all jobs created within the past decade in Jordan have been 
in the private sector.
36
 Protests originating from public sector workers arise frequently as 
a result. Given the pre-existing labor divisions along ethnic lines, much of the anger 
expressed by protestors is aimed towards Palestinians.  
 Ethnic clashes between Jordanians and Palestinians continue to manifest 
themselves in a number of ways today. Most notably, talk of a Jordanian solution to the 
Palestinian refugee problem—in the form of an alternative homeland for Palestinian, a 
confederation with the Palestinian territories, or a variety of other scenarios—has stirred 
unrest in both groups. East Bankers resist the potential ―Palestinianization‖ of Jordan, and 
Palestinians resist the idea of a solution which fails to respect their fundamental 
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parameters for peace. Although nearly seventy years have passed since Palestinians first 
arrived in Jordan, their legal status remains a pertinent question in the foreseeable future.    
 
V. Solutions for the Doubly-Displaced: What Makes Palestinian-Syrians Different?   
 The analysis above clearly demonstrates that integration has not been an even 
process for all Palestinians. Despite integration‘s relative success, differences still persist 
between various groups of Palestinians depending on when they arrived in Jordan and 
where they live today. The treatment of Palestinian refugees from Syria who arrived in 
Jordan during the Syrian refugee crisis indubitably confirms this reality. Jordan upheld a 
vastly different set of policies towards this particular subset of refugees than both other 
Syrians and the Palestinians who arrived many years prior. In doing so, it illustrated just 
how relevant the Palestinian refugee question and the effects of integration continue to 
be. Jordan‘s targeted policies towards Palestinian-Syrian refugees underscore that 
international law and national identity can and do affect policy, depending wholly on the 
particulars of the situation. It appears that no singular factor determines refugee policy in 
Jordan.  
A significant number of Palestinian refugees in Syria were displaced to Jordan in 
the wake of the Syrian crisis. These Palestinians, registered as refugees with UNRWA 
and living in Syria, began entering Jordan in 2011 when the conflict drew near to its 
northern border.
37
 Initially, Jordan allowed the entry of a few thousand Palestinian-Syrian 
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refugees under the same procedures that it admitted other Syrian refugees. Chapter 8 will 
discuss these procedures in greater detail.
38
 Beginning in April of 2012, however, Jordan 
began severely restricting Palestinian-Syrian entry and subjecting them to involuntary 
refoulement, or the process of returning refugees to the border of Syria
39
.  
Jordan, largely motivated by political fear of the potential security threats 
Palestinian-Syrian refugees presented, made this policy of refoulement explicit in 2013. 
The government even went so far as to refuse entry to refugees that held Jordanian 
identification papers or citizenship.
40
  Over a hundred cases of individuals and families 
that entered Jordan being forcibly removed by Jordanian authorities have been reported 
since 2013.
41
 Issues of illegal imprisonment, harassment, and detention have occurred as 
well.  
Refoulement has explicitly been declared illegal under international law through 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and is regarded as one of the 
most dangerous practices outlawed in the Convention.
42
 Although Jordan is not party to 
the Convention, Article 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) it formed with 
the UNHCR in 1998 affirms that the right of non-refoulement will be respected.
43
 The 
MOU, however, holds no binding legal requirements for compliance. Thus, Jordan 
cannot face formal persecution for its non-refoulement policy.  
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Still, non-refoulement is also outlined in the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC)—all to which Jordan is a signatory44. The discriminatory 
treatment towards Palestinian-Syrian refugees within the country violates a number of 
international obligations to which Jordan is privy as well, such as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
45
. Despite 
the encouragement Jordan faces from UNRWA and other international organizations to 
stop this practice, the government has largely failed to comply.  
As of 2017, almost 50 percent of the 560,000 Palestinian refugees within Syria 
were forced to flee as a result of the civil war. Upwards of 16,000 Palestinian-Syrians 
entered Jordan.
46
 Humanitarian need among these refugees is extremely high, with nearly 
85 percent requiring assistance from the UNRWA.
47
 Even though these refugees came 
from Syria, their legal status as Palestinian refugees means that they fall under the 
jurisdiction of UNRWA instead of the UNCHR. Although they have access to common 
UNRWA services, such as education and healthcare, a lack of funding has prevented 
many from receiving the benefits they require.  
The difference in donor support received by UNHCR and UNRWA has led to a 
substantial source of unequal treatment between Syrian refugees and Palestinian-Syrian 
refugees. While the UNHCR draws in a great deal of international funding from various 
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states and organizations, UNRWA constantly remains in deficit. It has been unable to 
offer the same treatment to doubly-displaced Syrian-Palestinian refugees as a result. 
Refugees were crowded into camps that already far exceeded capacity; UNRWA schools 
were forced to stop admitting Palestinian-Syrian refugees; and still other refugees were 
necessarily denied shelter and forced to sleep on the streets.
48
 In this case, it seems 
apparent that the separate designation of Palestinian refugees under the UNRWA has a 
detrimental effect on their well-being. Such realities have led many Palestinian-Syrian 
refugees to enter Jordan illegally.
49
 The majority of these irregular refugees do not seek 
aid through the UNRWA, for fear of being returned to Syria. They suffer from the burden 
of supporting themselves independently as a result.  
The recent treatment of doubly-displaced Palestinian refugees holds concerning 
implications for the future of Palestinian refugee policy in Jordan. For one, Jordan‘s 
recent policy decisions make clear that Palestinians are fundamentally different than 
other groups of refugees, such as Syrians. Although the UNHCR has, in the past, chosen 
to extend their mandate over those who do not possess official refugee status, such a 
decision has not manifested itself in this situation. This is very likely due to the political 
importance refugee status holds for Palestinians. As such, their categorization under 
UNRWA is unlikely to be challenged by the UNCHR, despite the clear discrepancies in 
aid that have emerged as a result.  
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In some respects, Jordan‘s refusal to accept Palestinian-Syrian refugees seems 
counterintuitive.  Palestinians, as described above, have largely experienced positive 
integration into Jordanian society and presently comprise a significant proportion of its 
population. In comparison, Syrians have only limited historic migration into Jordan, and 
comprised a small percentage of its population prior to the recent crisis. Why, then, did 
the government choose to extend protection to the Syrians and not the Palestinian-
Syrians?  
Chapter 8 will provide greater context with which to examine this question. Still, 
a few initial explanations can be offered. The first concerns the finances of refugee aid in 
each crisis, discussed above. While the UNHCR conducted major global appeals to 
increase donor support for the Syrian crisis, UNRWA made no such effort. Palestinians, 
unlike Syrians, are largely perceived to be a refugee story of the past. Refugee crises 
typically experience sizeable donations at the outset, and increasingly significant budget 
cuts in subsequent years. In the case of the Palestinians, nearly seventy years of exile and 
political tensions have rendered donations increasingly sparse. More recent, drastic 
refugee crises that pose large scale loss of life and security concerns feature far more 
prominently on donor states‘ agendas. The incentives for states to fund prolonged refugee 
situations like that of the Palestinians are simply insufficient.  
A second explanation ties into the right of return rationale expressed in the 
previous chapter. Jordan‘s reluctance to accept more refugees appears to align with its 
policy intentions expressed in the 1990s—namely, that it would prioritize a political 
solution which includes the resettlement of Palestinian refugees, and would not continue 
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to accept refugees in the future. The ongoing responsibility of caring for encamped 
refugees likely contributes to their attitude as well. Finally, the realization of the failures 
of the peace processes of the 1990s means that the question of refugee return still holds 
great importance in future negotiations. Given these considerations, Jordan‘s policy 
towards Palestinian-Syrian refugees seems to align predictably with its practical and 
political interests.  
 
VI. Beyond Integration: Solving the Palestinian Refugee Status Question 
Over time, a plethora of factors have steered Palestinian refugee policy in Jordan. 
Following the initial displacement of 1948, Jordan welcomed Palestinians into their 
society as a means of advancing their state-building ambitions, expanding their territory, 
and increasing their access to foreign aid. Such incentives persisted in the wake of the 
1967 crisis. In the following decades, tensions between the Jordanian and Palestinians 
governments rendered the former wary of its welcoming integration policies. The 
government emphasized that no new Palestinian refugees would be resettled or integrated 
in Jordan. It proved true to its word in the aftermath of the arrival of doubly-displaced 
Palestinians from the Syrian crisis. The Jordanian government possessed neither the 
funding nor the political support necessary to justify extending protection to yet another 
group of Palestinian refugees.  
Recent years have shown that the government‘s willingness to wield integration 
as a feasible refugee solution is unlikely to continue in the future. Even though 
integration has generally proven to be an effective solution for Palestinians living in 
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Jordan outside of camps, it has fundamentally changed the nature of Jordanian society in 
a way that the government cannot justify for other refugee groups. Still, the issue of 
whether Palestinians who remain in camps will experience greater equality with 
Palestinians outside camps and Jordanians remains pertinent. Palestinian refugee status 
also continues to be an important, undetermined issue facing Jordan, UNRWA, and the 
broader international community. This section will analyze the prospects for a legal-
political resolution to refugee status for Palestinians in the future.  
 
The Future of UNRWA 
The future of Palestinian refugee status is highly dependent on further peace 
negotiations and resolution of final status issues in the Arab-Israeli conflicts. How 
policymakers choose to include UNRWA in the resolution of the Palestinian refugee 
issue will hold important implications for Palestinians in Jordan. In recent years, 
UNRWA has experienced catastrophic budget cuts from major donors—like the United 
States—which hold the potential to cripple the continuation of its aid and services. 
Although some donor states no longer support its intentions, UNRWA clearly continues 
to hold ongoing importance for refugees in countries such as Jordan. Terminating its 
mandate would leave a sizeable population of Palestinians, in Jordan and elsewhere, 
deprived of basic necessities and crucial protections.  
 Furthermore, the existence of UNRWA as the international refugee organization 
for Palestinian refugees remains particularly important. Jalal Al Husseini and Riccardo 
Bocco draw upon the Near East Project Survey conducted in 2005 by Geneva University 
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and the University of Louvainla-Neuve, in coordination with UNRWA, to show that 
UNRWA also serves a symbolic role in the eyes of refugees.
50
 In total, 76 percent of 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan responded that the main advantage of registration with 
UNRWA was ―proof of refugee status‖, while only 18 percent said ―access to services‖. 
Only 6 percent reported no advantage to registering as a refugee.
51
 When Palestinians 
outside of camps are compared to those within, the figures change only modestly: 78 
percent of non-camp refugees responded with ―proof of refugee status‖, while 16 percent 
said ―access to services‖. These statistics compare to 68 percent and 26 percent, 
respectively, for camp refugees.  
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Table 6.9 Main Advantage of Registration with UNRWA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Jalal Al Husseini and Riccardo Bocco, ―Dynamics of 
humanitarian aid, local and regional politics,‖ in Palestinian Refugees: Identity, space 
and place in the Levant (Routledge: 2010), 137.  
 
 
 The survey results imply more than one truth about Palestinians in Jordan. Most 
obviously, it shows that UNRWA is no longer the prominent supplier of aid and services 
to Palestinian refugees. The Jordanian government now fills that role, due both to the lack 
of funding experienced by UNRWA and the initiatives taken by the government to 
administrate camp activities. Secondly, the survey shows that while Palestinians may not 
want to live like refugees, they still desire to retain their refugee status for political 
reasons. The feasibility of granting the right of return to over 6 million Palestinians today 
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may appear bleak, but their protracted state of limbo could still serve as a powerful 
bargaining tool in future negotiations between Palestine and Israel.
52
 
 
Resolving Palestinian Refugee Status  
Howard Adelman writes that the question of a durable solution to the Palestinian 
refugee crisis has a double meaning. He points out that a ―solution‖ to a refugee crisis 
may not mean the end of refugee status, but rather the implementation of a long-term 
response to refugeehood. In this sense, ―durable solutions‖ have been implemented for 
the Palestinian refugees for quite some time. Still, many retain their legal refugee status. 
Quoting a statement made in 1983 by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Adelman states: ―A genuinely durable solution to a refugee problem means 
integration of the refugee into society: either reintegration in the country of origin after 
voluntary repatriation, or reintegration in the country of first asylum or country of 
resettlement.‖53 The question of when Palestinian refugees who have indeed integrated 
into Jordanian society should consider their problem ―resolved‖ is difficult to answer.  
 Refugee scholars suggest a number of mechanisms through which the legal aspect 
of refugee status can be resolved. First, until further peace negotiations address the issue 
of refugee status, they believe it is integral that UNRWA continues to fulfill the terms of 
its mandate. Leila Hilal argues that Palestinians should then be given a ―menu of 
permanent destination choices‖.54 In other words, Palestinians should be allowed to 
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choose between various countries of resettlement, including numerous locations within 
Israel and Palestine. Hilal highlights that the freedom to move is one of the most intrinsic 
rights states must uphold when hosting refugees. Any international agreement formed in 
regards to the Palestinian refugee issue must respect that right and provide refugees the 
mobility they are due. This suggestion sounds quite similar to the mobility solutions 
praised by Long and Gottwald discussed at length in Chapter 2. Allowing Palestinians to 
decide for themselves whether to resettle, return or remain where they currently reside 
appears a particularly apt solution for the current situation.  
 
VII. Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrates, first and foremost, that Jordanian policy has allowed 
integration to become a successful solution. Unsurprisingly, the integration model in 
Jordan vastly outweighs the camp model. Policymakers, aid workers, and scholars alike 
agree that camps are not a viable long-term solution. Yet the inequality observed within 
the Palestinian refugee camps does demonstrate that policy decisions regarding refugee 
crises can have repercussions that manifest themselves even decades after they are made. 
Once Jordan constructed its camps, it was politically difficult to reverse the decision; but 
by allowing them to persist, they allowed for inequality to persist and develop as well.  
As Chapter 2 discussed, most scholars view integration as a difficult solution. 
Case studies generally reveal that integration is rarely successful, in that either the 
refugees or the host communities experience adverse effects prompting outmigration, 
violence, or instability. Palestinians in Jordan have proven to be an exception. Over time, 
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multiple domestic and international factors have incentivized Jordan to integrate 
Palestinians into society. Palestinians, despite longing for return, found they could 
establish successful lives in a country that possessed much of the same language, 
religion, and culture. To be sure, the Palestinians‘ presence has certainly played a role in 
the economic troubles, political instability, foreign aid dependence, and other domestic 
issues Jordan has faced over the years. Regardless, Palestinian integration should be 
heralded as one of the few success stories of integration as a durable solution.  
The Palestinian case represents a unique combination of variables that modern 
refugee crises are unlikely to replicate. Still, the lessons which can be learned from 
Jordan‘s responses to their protracted displacement hold remarkable implications for 
other refugee crises observed today. Repatriation, impossible for Palestinians, is 
increasingly difficult to implement as a solution to crises due to the persistence of 
instability and prolonged conflict in origin countries. Third-country resettlement is 
likewise a lengthy, unpredictable process from which far fewer refugees benefit than the 
suggested quotas imply that they could. With that, local integration may deserve further 
consideration as durable solution. The case of Palestinians in Jordan demonstrates that 
the alignment of proper incentives for the host government, proper aid from international 
organizations, and socio-cultural similarities between the populations can create an 
effective environment for local integration to develop as a durable refugee solution.  
The next chapter will analyze the case of the Iraqi refugees in Jordan.  It will walk 
through a brief history of the wars in Iraq that led to two instances of displacement: the 
first following the First Gulf War in the 1990s, and the second during the Iraq War 
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beginning in 2003. After, it will consider the initial responses Jordan put forth to address 
the inflows of Iraqis. Finally, it will consider the implementation of durable solutions and 
the status of displaced Iraqis in Jordan today. Throughout, the narrative of the Iraqi crisis 
will clearly diverge from than that of the Palestinians in a number of ways.  
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Iraqi Refugees                                                       7                
 
I. Introduction 
 The last chapter described the ways in which solutions for Palestinians in Jordan 
have evolved with time and outlined the prospects for a final, durable solution yet to 
come. It determined that integration has, by and large, been effective in raising most 
Palestinians‘ livelihood to nearly equivalent to those of non-Palestinian Jordanians. Still, 
Chapter 6 highlighted the political difficulties in resolving the plight of encamped 
refugees, and acknowledged a number of areas where inequality persists for Palestinians. 
In conclusion, it suggested that policymakers should pursue mobility-based solutions in 
the ongoing resolution of Palestinian refugeehood amidst the broader Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process.   
 In light of those conclusions, this chapter will analyze the solutions pursued for 
Iraqis displaced in Jordan. It was clear from the outset of the Iraqi displacement crisis that 
the ways in which Jordan responded were significantly impacted by the Palestinian 
refugee crisis. The integration of Palestinians, considered the refugees in Jordan, 
fundamentally changed the society, economy, and culture of the state. Addressing their 
protection and livelihood needs required a great deal of precious resources and time from 
the government. The lives of everyday citizens were likewise affected by such changes, 
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and none were ignorant of the significant burden Jordan bore in accepting Palestinians as 
refugees. With the onset of war in Iraq, Jordanians feared the implications that a refugee 
crisis would have on their national stability; on cultural, economic and political levels. 
Simply put, Jordan could not afford another Palestine.  
 Against this backdrop, the policies that Jordan pursued towards displaced Iraqis in 
the years to follow are often referred to as ―semi-protectionist‖.  Compared to other the 
other Arab states, Jordan proved to be one of the most generous states in their acceptance 
of Iraqis. Its policies generally allowed Iraqis to enter, but largely refused to provide them 
with legal recognition or protection. Compared to its previous record with Palestinians, 
however, Jordan appeared to have turned its make-shift refugee policy completely on its 
head. Repatriation was preferred, integration was off the table, and resettlement or 
onward migration was ultimately the solutions to which they resorted. As this chapter 
will detail, it was primarily political and economic factors that motivated Jordan‘s 
refugee policy towards Iraqis—though ―security‖ is perhaps the most oft-cited. With 
regards to these factors, the Iraqi case is indeed quite similar to that of the Palestinians.  
 This chapter will provide a short overview of the crises in Iraq, the Gulf War of 
1991 and Iraq War of 2003, that prompted the two major waves of Iraqi displacement 
into Jordan. It will then analyze the initial responses and policies pursued by Jordan, the 
UNHCR, and the international community in addressing their displacement. Next, it will 
turn to the durable refugee solutions, and offer data, opinions, and analysis to explain 
why each were or were not pursued in Jordan. Lastly, this chapter will consider how the 
international community, including both states and non-governmental or civil society 
  
 
184 
 
organizations, responded to the crisis, and the implications this held for Jordan‘s own 
policy. Ultimately, we see that Jordan‘s consistent refusal to extend the ―refugee‖ regime 
to the Iraqis can be explained by a number of political, economic and diplomatic factors 
that incentivized and constrained the state to act in its own national interest.  
 
II. Historical Overview of the Displacement 
As is true with nearly every refugee crisis, the circumstances which prompted 
displacement can affect the nature of solutions a great deal. The Iraqi case is no 
exception. Both the instability created by the Gulf War of 1991 and the widespread 
violence following the invasion in 2003 created conditions within Iraq that eventually 
caused millions to be displaced from their homes. In a number of ways, the facts of Iraqi 
displacement represent a more ―typical‖ refugee crisis than that of the Palestinians. 
Although both groups faced persecution and general violence, the Iraqis that fled were 
not a homogenous socio-ethnic group being driven from their land. No laws prevent their 
return, but the ongoing instability and security concerns in the region render the 
undertaking unlikely. Many protracted refugee crises today experience similar conditions 
of state-wide instability, violence, or persecution that persist for lengthy periods 
following the initial flight of refugees.  
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The First Displacement: the 1991 Gulf War  
A number of migration trends linked Iraq and Jordan before the outbreak of the 
modern conflicts observed today. After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, Iraqis 
fled to the surrounding Arab states—including Jordan. During the Ba‘thist regime of the 
1960s-80s and the Iraq-Iran war in 1979, Jordan was again a destination country for 
many of the displaced. Their migration, not sizeable enough to have much effect, was 
accepted with little fanfare. The first significant migration into Jordan began after the 
onset of the Gulf War from 1990-1991. Over 1 million Iraqis were displaced from their 
home in the span of just two months.
1
  
The causes of their displacement can be traced back to the Iran-Iraq War. 
Although the war ended in a ceasefire in July of 1988, lasting tension between the states 
involved remained.
2
 Following the war, Kuwait demanded repayment of the billions of 
dollars it contributed to Iraq in its war efforts. Iraq accused its monarchy of collaborating 
with the United States, and insisted that Kuwait was pandering to the Western powers in 
attempting to keep oil prices low. Saddam Hussein‘s plan to rectify the issue resulted in 
Iraq‘s invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August of 1990.3 Almost immediately, the 
United Nations and Western powers condemned the invasion and organized devastating 
military attacks to force Iraq‘s withdraw. The attacks persisted until March, when Iraq 
agreed to numerous UN resolutions regarding the abolition of all laws regarding the 
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annexation of Kuwait, payment for war damages, and more. A ceasefire was declared on 
April 3
rd
, 1991, with the passage of UN Resolution 687.
4
 
Estimates of the Iraqi death toll as a direct result of attacks in the war range from 
30,000-100,000. The harsh sanctions the United Nations imposed on Iraq following the 
invasion were also said to have caused the death of several hundred thousand Iraqis, by 
triggering widespread malnutrition and poor health care.
5
 Billions of dollars of industrial, 
transportation, and communications infrastructure were destroyed as well. As a result, 
much of Iraq‘s upper and middle class chose to leave, migrating to Jordan, Syria, and 
other neighboring countries.  
Displaced Iraqis traveled primarily by road, as the 1991 United Nations embargo 
forbid travel via plane or ship.
6
 The destination of those who fled was largely dependent 
on their socio-ethnic background. Kurds and Shiites, for example, generally fled to Iran. 
Iran, a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, liberally granted 
asylum to a large number of Iraqis during this era. Some chose to eventually repatriate 
back to Iraq, but many integrated into Iranian society and remain there today.
7
 In 
contrast, Turkey had signed the 1951 Convention but not the 1967 Protocol. This 
effectively limited its legal recognition and protection of refugees to those of European 
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origin, excluding Iraqis and especially Kurds. The remainder of the Arab states, except 
for Jordan and Syria, closed their borders to displaced Iraqis after 1991.   
The first wave of refugees from Iraq to arrive in Jordan that March was generally 
comprised of third-country nationals, including Sudanese, Somalians, Malians, and 
Eritraeans. About 360,000 of the 1 million individuals were Jordanian nationals, who had 
previously migrated to Iraq for purposes of employment but retained their Jordanian 
citizenship. As citizens, they were welcomed back into Jordan and allowed to re-integrate 
into society. A large percentage of individuals in this category were Palestinians.
8
  
Such a scenario should sound familiar to that of the doubly-displaced Palestinian-
Syrians, discussed in Chapter 6. As shown, Jordan had overwhelmingly denied 
Palestinian-Syrians the protection and aid offered to other Syrians who enter its borders. 
In the 1990s, however, Jordan appeared to treat the Palestinians displaced from Iraq more 
favorably than the Iraqis themselves. The crucial difference, it seemed, was the fact that 
many had retained their Jordanian citizenship while in Iraq and were likely sending back 
remittances to family or businesses in Jordan. As working citizens, Palestinians from Iraq 
had intrinsic economic value to Jordan. Palestinian Syrians instead represented a 
perpetuation of the narrative of the dependent, stateless Palestinian refugees who would 
remain in an intractable limbo for the foreseeable future.  
Later in 1991, another uprising against the regime in Iraq was violently 
suppressed, driving another wave of Shiite Iraqis into Jordan.
9
 This represented the last 
major flow into Jordan, as the following years saw more sporadic migration through one 
                                                 
8
 Chatelard, ―Incentives to Transit.‖ 
9
 Ibid.  
  
 
188 
 
open border point between the two states. Many of those who fled to Jordan included 
secular political oppositionists and ethnic minorities who feared going to Iran.
10
 Whether 
or not they were to be considered ―refugees‖ under the 1951 Convention and Protocol 
definition was unclear. Officially, the UNHCR only considers persecutions committed by 
state actors to be valid, and excludes those suffering from non-state violence, civil war, 
and ethnic strife.
11
 Many of the Iraqis entering Jordan fell into the latter category, outside 
the formal definition. Still others fled for more general reasons of economic hardship and 
discrimination.
 12
 They, too, would not have been considered a refugee under the 
guidelines which existed at the time and that persist today.  
Still, some states have made exceptions to the international legal definition of a 
refugee. Largely responding to political motives, states have chosen to expand the 
definition‘s reach to those facing persecution or violent threats more generally. Jordan 
has not been one of those states. Indeed, none of the Iraqis who moved into Jordan in 
1991 were considered by the government to be refugees. The vast majority of Iraqis that 
arrived in Jordan in the 1990s either did not apply for or were denied refugee status with 
the UNHCR. While the UNCHR and Jordan did not sign the Memorandum of 
Understanding until 1998, the UNHCR did operate within Jordan from 1991 onward. It 
processed asylum claims and offered monthly assistance, education and medical care to 
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the limited number of Iraqis approved as Convention refugees.
13
 Aside from these small-
scale operations, the UNHCR did not have an active presence in Jordan at the time.  
 
 
The Second Displacement: The Iraq War  
The second, more significant influx of Iraqis into Jordan arrived in the wake of 
the Iraq War of 2003. After the attacks of September 11
th
, 2001, U.S. policy towards Iraq 
underwent a significant shift. The Bush administration pushed to invade the state on the 
beliefs that the Iraqi regime possessed weapons of mass destruction, supported terrorism, 
and brutalized its own people. Despite the fact that most other states opposed occupation, 
the United States and Great Britain acted without United Nations Security Council 
authorization and invaded Iraq on March 20
th
, 2003.
14
 When they discovered no weapons 
of mass destruction or connections between Saddam and Al Qaeda, support for the war 
waned even further. Soon after, the Ba‘athist government collapsed. The power vacuum 
that resulted—paired with a lengthy foreign occupation—facilitated widespread sectarian 
violence between Sunnis and Shias.
15
 The ongoing conflict peaked during the years of 
2004 to 2007, coinciding with the height of Iraqi outmigration. U.S. troops remained in 
Iraq until 2011.
16
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An estimated 7,000- 20,000 Iraqi soldiers died as a result of the initial invasion 
from March to May of 2003. Another 19,000 insurgents were killed by the end of 2007, 
and estimates of civilian casualties range from 78,000 to nearly half a million.
17
 In 
addition to loss of life, the Iraq War had a devastating effect on the stability and safety of 
the state. Terrorism and insurgency increased, economic deprivation abounded, religious 
and cultural divisions turned violent, and nearly all felt the traumatic effects of war-
related violence.
18
 Over 4 million Iraqis were displaced from their homes, either 
remaining within the state as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or fleeing to 
neighboring states. Such conditions placed the state in one of the most serious 
humanitarian crises observed in recent years. To make matters worse, bombings 
destroyed the Baghdad offices of the UNHCR and International Committee of the Red 
Cross in 2003.
19
 Foreign aid agencies were thus prevented from addressing the enormous 
need demonstrated in Iraq for years.  
By the end of the crisis, nearly five million Iraqis had been displaced from their 
homes and fled both within Iraq and to neighboring countries. The majority of Iraqis in 
Jordan today, about 77 percent, arrived between 2003 and 2007. Flows of Iraqis during 
this time tended to move in tandem with increases in violence in Iraq. The most notable 
outflow occurred after the bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra, in February of 
2006. The bombing precipitated a decline into further conflict and criminality in the 
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region, causing displacement rates to increase dramatically. As a result, most of the Iraqis 
in Jordan arrived between 2006 and 2007.
20
  
The violence, instability and structural damage to the country that resulted from 
the war persist in many aspects of society today. Scholars estimate that it will take 
decades for the state to fully recover and restore its infrastructure, government, and 
society to stability.
21
 The fact that the majority of those who fled the state came from the 
middle class is also problematic, representing on a detrimental scale what migration 
experts term a ―brain drain‖. Iraqi development will be slow-going until a professional 
middle class reemerges. Although the political intricacies of Iraq differ greatly from those 
of Palestine, the case of the former still represents an incredibly contentious conflict 
whose repercussion continue to be felt by the international community in a variety of 
ways.  
 
III. Jordan’s Initial Responses and Early Solutions 
The displacement crisis of the 1990s marks the beginning of the analysis of this 
chapter. Unlike the smaller waves of Iraqis which arrived in Jordan before the 1990s, the 
larger flows following the Gulf War prompted the Jordanian government to begin 
responding in a more coherent and predictable fashion. Jordan‘s policies towards Iraqis 
solidified after 2003, as political pressures and fear of a more serious security crisis 
increased. After the outbreak of both the 1990s crisis and that of 2003, Jordan claimed it 
would not allow any Iraqis to pass through its borders. In reality, most Iraqis that sought 
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entry were accepted. Once in Jordan, however, the government‘s policies made it very 
clear that it would be difficult to sustain a long term stay. The UNHCR and NGOs were 
given only limited access to aid the displaced, and often irregular migration onward 
resulted.  
As the previous section detailed, the first group of displaced persons to arrive in 
Jordan were third-country nationals living in Iraq. Many of them were Jordanian, and 
thus faced little trouble entering the country. The following years saw Iranian Kurds and 
Iraqi nationals begin to enter as well.
22
 Official estimates of how many individuals 
entered are difficult to come by. A UNHCR working paper guessed about 1 million had 
entered Jordan from 1991-1996, but this included many who had only briefly stayed 
before departing onward. Jordanian media accounts cite anywhere from 50,000-180,000 
individuals, and NGOs cited around 300,000.
23
  
Given the transitory nature of their migration and relatively fluid border between 
the countries, it can only be decisively said that few who entered Jordan that were not 
upper-middle class stayed very long. Indeed, by 2002, only 30,000 Iraqis had obtained 
long-term residency permits. Most individuals were given short term visas at the border 
that lasted for two weeks, which could be extended up to three months and renewed once. 
These visas did not include the right to work; nor were their renewals often approved. As 
a result, many Iraqis entered legally and then became illegal when their visas expired.
24
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Jordan‘s policy of distributing these short term visas upon entry stayed relatively 
consistent through the beginning of the 2003 crisis. Although those who overstayed their 
visas could have been subject to overstay fines or deportation, the Jordanian government 
did little by way of enforcing these punishments.
25
 The Memorandum of Understanding 
with the UNHCR, which specified that resettlement must occur within six months of 
entry, was likewise largely ignored. In November of 2005, however, its attitude shifted 
dramatically when Iraqi nationals bombed three hotels in Amman, leaving 60 people 
dead.
26
 Al-Qaeda eventually claimed responsibility for the attacks. As a result, Jordanians 
became extremely concerned with the possibility of further terrorist attacks by Iraqis 
within their borders.  
In the aftermath of the attacks, Jordan tightened its border security significantly 
and increased enforcement of overstay penalties. Iraqis became subject to deportation and 
involuntary repatriation at much higher rates.
27
 Involuntary repatriation, or refoulement, 
has been oft-cited as one of the most egregious violations of rights condemned by 
international refugee law. Jordanian officials do not advertise that refoulement occurred, 
but reports from NGOs and the UNHCR show that it indeed persisted for years following 
the 2005 attacks.  After 2006, Jordanian officials also prohibited single men between the 
ages of 17 and 35 from entering on grounds of increased security as well.
28
 Illegal entry 
and forged documentation resultantly increased. To address this development, Jordan 
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began calling for entry applicants to possess a new passport called the ―G-series‖, which 
was much more costly and difficult to obtain. 
Since the policy change of 2006, only Iraqis that have large investments in Jordan 
or deposit upwards of $150,000 in a Jordanian bank can enter the country with ease. Even 
UN officials with formal invitations have found it difficult to cross the border.
29
 Save for 
the select few who were granted official refugee status by the UNHCR, Iraqis were 
largely barred from entering Jordan. Jordan, however, refused to call the situation a 
refugee crisis. A Jordanian official stated that the Iraqis did not constitute a refugee 
problem, but rather one of ―illegal immigration, no different from what the United States 
faces with Mexicans‖.30  This narrative is all too familiar, heard today from many 
Western states experiencing irregular immigration. Quite obviously, Mexicans entering 
America differ fundamentally from Iraqis entering Jordan. Yet the Jordanian government, 
seeking to retain its sovereignty over Iraqi migration, attempted to avoid at all costs the 
politicized label and implications accompanying the term ―refugee‖.  
 
Justifying Selective Adherence 
Both the lack of domestic refugee law and selective adherence to international 
refugee law in Jordan severely hindered the successful search for solutions for the Iraqis. 
As Chapter 3 detailed, Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 UNHCR Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Nor does it process any 
domestic laws on the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. Only brief references are 
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given to refugees in the Constitution and the 1973 Law concerning Residency and 
Foreigners‘ Affairs, and there is no legal adjudication process in Jordan for the settlement 
of asylum claims.
31
  
 Given the geographical limitations of the 1951 Convention, it is understandable 
that the Arab states felt it unnecessary to sign the document immediately following its 
introduction. After the 1967 Protocol lifted these restrictions, however, Jordan and its 
neighbors did not then seek to ratify its principles, even though migration was a 
prominent feature of the region. Dallal Stevens, in his analysis of the legal status of Iraqis 
in Jordan, identifies two explanations for Jordan‘s continued failure to ratify the 
Convention and its Protocol today. First, he points out the political sensitivities 
accompanying the transferal of refugee status.
32
 The definition of a refugee under 
international law very clearly limits application of the status to those who have been 
persecuted by the government of their country of origin.
33
 As the next section will 
explain, this puts Jordan in a very difficult situation by overtly requiring the government 
to recognize the actions of the Iraqi government as persecution in order for refugee status 
to be granted.
34
  
 The second explanation cited is the issue of the Palestinians. Stevens notes that 
during the early 2000s in Jordan, the term ―refugee‖ was largely synonymous with 
―Palestinian‖.35  The political implications of expanding the term to other groups and 
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nationalities created serious push back from both the government and the people of 
Jordan. Many within Jordan believed that refugee status would encourage Iraqis to stay in 
Jordan permanently and thus occupy jobs, utilize resources, and rely on government aid 
that deprived Jordanian nationals of the same. The experience of the Palestinians, in 
which integration proved the only logical option, made Jordan wary of creating a similar 
situation of dependency with the Iraqis.
36
 Paired with the fact that a large influx from an 
unstable origin could pose a security threat to society, the empathy Jordanians expressed 
towards the Iraqis was low.   
Opinion in Jordan regarding the situation in Iraq generally favored neutrality. 
While some Iraqi oppositionist groups existed, they were largely eradicated after 1999 
when King Abdullah II assumed the throne.
37
 Opposition press was strictly prohibited in 
Amman. The Arab Association of Human Rights, one of two humans rights‘ organization 
registered in Jordan at the time, had an executive board which largely supported the Iraqi 
regime.
38
 Furthermore, the domestic economy played a large role in determining 
Jordanian opinion regarding Iraq as well. Given that Jordan imported a great deal of Iraqi 
oil at low cost, jeopardizing their strategic relationship could have had detrimental effects 
on the Jordanian economy. Lastly, Iraqi businessmen are quite active in Jordan, bringing 
attractive investment opportunities and financial capital. Given these realities, Jordan was 
placed in a precarious position of maintaining a border which was open enough to 
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maintain good diplomatic and economic relations but limited enough to prevent major 
inflows of displaced Iraqis. 
 
Establishing the Temporary Protection Regime  
 Jordan has consistently possessed a very open policy with regards to migration for 
Arab nationals who sought to work, study, and invest within its borders.
39
 While some 
Iraqi elites and businessmen fell into this category—and could thus access residency and 
work permits with far more ease—the Jordanian labor market was already highly 
saturated as it was.
40
 Given the political baggage and fears of long term residency 
previously discussed, Jordan‘s semi-protectionist policy seems predictable. This policy 
began to take shape after the 1991 Gulf War and solidified with the displacement crisis 
that began in 2003. In other words, the Jordanian government maintained a relatively 
continuous stance on Iraqi displacement, despite the minor ways in which it strengthened 
its resolve against their presence. 
Identifying Jordan‘s reluctance to extend protection, the UNHCR responded. In 
2003, the Jordanian government and the UNHCR signed a Letter of Understanding to 
establish a UNHCR center to provide temporary protection to Iraqis at the border 
between Iraq and Jordan.
41
 The UNHCR envisioned this Temporary Protection Regime 
(TPR) extending nationally, and achieving three goals: 1) protecting Iraqis from 
refoulement; 2) relieving the UNHCR of the duty of processing asylum claims, with 
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which they were overburdened; 3) enabling Iraqis to have access to integral national 
services.
42
Although the government did accept the construction of the temporary 
protection Center at the border, it fully rejected the UNHCR‘s national plan in April of 
2005.
43
 Not only would the TPR have essentially enabled Iraqis to be treated like 
refugees, but it also contradicted the MOU signed between Jordan and the UNHCR just 
five years prior.
44
 The MOU, as Chapter 3 stated, established standards for addressing 
refugee crisis agreed upon by the Jordanian government and the UNHCR. Jordan often 
chooses to overlook the text of the MOU; yet in this instance, it relied upon its 
international validity to justify restricting UNHCR activity. In doing so, it provided an 
interesting example of how the government wields its agreements to fit its political 
interests.  
Given the Jordanian government‘s reluctance to cooperate, the TPR that the 
UNHCR attempted to implement did very little by way of extending protection. The 
UNHCR attempted to distribute ―asylum seeker‖ cards to Iraqis affirming their presence 
in Jordan and protecting them from deportation. These cards, however, did not establish 
official refugee status.
45
 As of 2006, only 17,000 individuals had been given such cards—
a rather insignificant proportion of the estimated population there at the time. What's 
more, Jordan generally ignored the validity of the asylum seeker cards, except to inform 
the UNHCR that a card holder had been detained.
46
 Even the process of adjudicating 
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refugee and asylum claims laid forth in the MOU was hardly operational at the time. The 
UNHCR, both lacking resources and fearing that Iraqis would be deported if they did not 
meet the specific criteria under the refugee definition, had largely stopped processing 
asylum seeker claims by 2006. Indeed, in 2005, only 22 individuals were registered as 
refugees with the organization.
47
 
 
 
III. Non-Governmental and International Responses 
By 2006, roughly one million Iraqis were displaced between Jordan and Syria.
48
 
Human Rights Watch termed Iraqis in Jordan ―de facto refugees‖, a characterization 
generally accepted by the international community. It defines a de facto refugee as one 
who has fled violence or persecution and are in need of international protection, but has 
not registered asylum claims or been officially recognized as a refugee by the 
Government of Jordan or the UNHCR.
49
 Both those who fled during the Saddam Hussein 
era of the 1990s and the more recent war are included in their definition of de facto 
refugees.
50
 The government also referred to the Iraqis as ―guests‖, affirming their 
temporary place in Jordan.  
According to a UNCHR-FAFO Report, by May of 2007, only 12.8 percent of 
Iraqis residing in Jordan possessed citizenship. This figure included Iraqis already living 
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in Jordan from earlier displacements. The percentage of Iraqis displaced from the Iraq 
War who gained citizenship before 2007 was likely incredibly small.
51
 Compare this 
figure to those cited for Palestinian citizenship in the previous chapter: 96 percent of 
Palestinian refugees outside of camps hold citizenship, and 85 percent of those within 
camps. The Jerash camp cited 6 percent of its residents held citizenship; and the Hitteen 
camp, 14 percent. The Iraqi percentage thus resembles these camps closely, but is very 
far from the national averages for Palestinians both within and outside of camps.  
A few other trends characterized the displaced Iraqi population. Women tended to 
be slightly overrepresented among the Iraqis in Jordan, particularly in the middle of the 
age spectrum. This was likely due to the fact that the Jordanian government perceived 
adult men as more of a security threat than women, especially after 2006.
52
 Men were 
also more likely to have been imprisoned or lost their lives as a result of the conflict in 
Iraq. The majority of Iraqis in Jordan were Muslim, with 68 percent Sunni and 17 percent 
Shia. They tended to be well-educated and slightly older than the native Jordanian 
population.
53
 Although the Iraqi population was not too dissimilar from Jordanians on 
paper, the policies the government pursued towards them ensured that they lived and 
operated in very different spheres than the native population.  
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 The displacement of Iraqis following the Iraq War represented the first major 
refugee crisis in Jordan to which modern NGOs and civil society organizations 
responded. In the 1990s, very few organizations were given the ability to respond to the 
crisis. Only select Christian organizations that had a long-standing presence in Jordan, 
such as Caritas, were allowed to offer aid or services to displaced Iraqis.
54
 The following 
decade saw the government open up more opportunities for non-governmental 
involvement, leading to a proliferation of aid organizations. Initially, very little 
coordination between different aid organizations existed.
55
 The small window in which 
NGOs could operate was overcrowded and disorganized, which some scholars believe 
actually had a detrimental effect on the deliverance of aid.
56
 After the height of the crisis 
passed, NGOs improved their ability to act cohesively in providing services such as 
education, resettlement assistance, and social integration to Iraqis remaining in Jordan. 
Today, the Jordanian government cedes a great deal of responsibility to NGOs and 
international organizations to address specific aspects of refugee and migrant aid and 
protection.
57
  
The role which the international community played in the Iraqi displacement 
crises in Jordan changed a great deal over time. In the 1990s, Jordan attempted to 
mitigate all effects of the crisis so as to not attract international attention. It refused to 
seek aid from other states or international organizations. When Western governments 
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offered aid packages, Jordan rejected them on the principle that they held the potential to 
prolong Iraqis‘ stays. Jordan‘s rejection was also based on the grounds that it was hardly 
fair for non-Jordanians to be entitled to foreign aid while Jordanians themselves were 
excluded. Indeed, when the European Commission attempted to send aid to the Iraqis, 
Jordan responded that it would only accept assistance earmarked for Palestinian refugees 
or the poor populations of Jordanians in the rural south.
58
 
Jordan attempted to maintain this policy following the displacement of 2003-
2007. Given the difficulties in supporting high numbers of displaced persons, however, it 
reluctantly began to accept limited international aid. The United States and other 
countries, international organizations, and the like began funding programs and providing 
aid packages to Jordan.
59
 This aid did not always reach its intended destination. 
Neighboring states and aid organizations noted that there was very little accountability in 
how the government used the aid provided, and others complained of the fact that only 
half the aid actually went to Iraqis. The remainder was earmarked for poor and vulnerable 
Jordanian nationals, as the government wished.
60
 
This criticism of internationally funded programs also called into question the 
kind of aid which was being provided. Throughout the crisis, NGO workers suggested 
that what Jordan truly lacked was infrastructure. They pointed out that it may be more 
beneficial in the long term to invest in the construction of hospitals and schools instead of 
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loosely providing monetary donations.
61
 Jordan, with its growing population and 
overcrowded cities, would certainly have benefited in the long term from such 
institutions. Yet the temporary nature of the aid is unsurprising. Given the government‘s 
reluctance to associate any aspect of Iraqi displacement in Jordan with permanence, such 
undertakings would have been rejected with certainty.  
 
The Role of the United States 
 The United States, whom many believed responsible for the instability following 
the invasion of 2003, offered very little aid in the initial aftermath of the crisis. Its 
reluctance to offer monetary aid or opportunities for resettlement troubled the Jordanian 
government for more than one reason. Aside from the fact that the United States had far 
more resources and geographical capacity to host Iraqis than Jordan, they were also 
perceived as being largely responsible for instigating the displacement in the first place.
62
 
The Jordanian government, though itself reluctant to accept aid, would very likely have 
endorsed a resettlement plan with the United States that supported their efforts to reduce 
the number of Iraqis staying in Jordan. As the latter section on resettlement will discuss, 
no such plan ever came to fruition. Indeed, none of the Western powers demonstrated 
significant willingness to take initiative in Jordan to rectify the situation.  
Although the narrative of Iraqi displacement in Jordan is commonly negative, it is 
often considered one of the more positive experiences among the neighboring Arab 
states. Only Jordan and Syria have allowed Iraqis to enter their borders in significant 
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quantities.
63
 Iraqis who flee to Lebanon are unequivocally denied refugee status, 
regularly detained and often forcibly repatriated.
64
 Yemen and Egypt likewise attempt to 
restrict their entry. Nowhere in the Middle East are Iraqis formally documented or 
protected.
65
 Thus, though the following analysis may be critical, it should be considered 
in light of the fact that Iraqis in other areas may not be granted even the limited set of 
rights and protections available to Iraqis in Jordan. 
The following three sections will address how Jordan, the UNHCR, and the 
broader NGO and international community have addressed the durable refugee solutions 
of repatriation, local integration, and resettlement.  
 
IV. Repatriation  
 Given the highly politicized nature of the Iraqi displacement crisis, the Jordanian 
government placed a large emphasis on return. Their rhetoric and statements in the media 
revealed as much: Stevens quotes a Jordanian official as stating, ―The solution is in Iraq. 
We refuse to accept that the solution will be outside Iraq. They [the Iraqis] are not happy 
anywhere else. Everything we do towards Iraqis is temporary, simply to make their lives 
easier. We cannot make it [Jordan] a natural place to stay…‖.66 In other words, the 
official believed both that Iraqis only desired repatriation and that Jordan was entirely 
unwilling and unable to host them in the long term. Indeed, the temporary nature of the 
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visas, denial of the right to work, and failure to provide substantial aid brought this policy 
into reality.  
 
Refugee Insights on Repatriation  
 A report created by the UNHCR and Norwegian Research Institute ―FAFO‖, cited 
extensively below, contains important data on the opinions of Iraqis on the prospects of 
repatriation at different points in time after their displacement to Jordan.  As of May 
2007, 40.8 percent of Iraqis in Jordan responded affirmatively when asked if they had 
plans to return to Iraq.
67
 On the other hand, 57.9 percent reported that they did not have 
plans to return. Only 1.4 percent said that they were unsure about returning.
68
 Of those 
wishing to return, more than 95 percent stated that they would not return until the 
―security situation allowed for it‖. Interestingly, Iraqis desiring return were more likely to 
have higher levels of resources, education and economic well-being, and arrived in 2006-
2007 as opposed to earlier.
69
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Table 7.1 Repatriation as a Desired Solution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Dalen and Pedersen, ―Iraqi Refugees,‖ (UNHCR and FAFO). 
 
 
While not the majority, a still sizeable proportion of the Iraqi population in Jordan 
desired return in 2007. As the time passed and the crisis of violence and insecurity in Iraq 
continued, this proportion dropped precipitously. According to my interviews of Iraqis 
and NGO aid workers in Amman, today the desire to return to Iraq is virtually non-
existent.
70
 Iraqis, acknowledging the destruction and insecurity that ravaged their 
homeland for so many years, say that ―there is no Iraq anymore‖.71 They believe that the 
war has destroyed social cohesion and the sense of society they used to experience there 
beyond repair.
72
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The observed decline in desire to repatriate among Iraqis sets them apart from 
many Palestinians. Chapter 6 showed that repatriation and the concept of the right of 
return is fundamental to the idea of a durable solution for Palestinians. The same does not 
hold true, however, for the Iraqis. Even though countries that host and resettle Iraqi 
refugees, including Jordan, prefer repatriation as the durable solution, it cannot be 
considered a worthy option if the Iraqis themselves do not view it as such.  
Ultimately, Jordan does hold sovereignty over the fate of Iraqis within its borders. 
Failing to respect the right of non-refoulement, as Jordan has known on occasion to do, 
can lead to strong normative condemnations from international and non-governmental 
organizations and other states. Even so, these condemnations have only, at best, deterred 
states like Jordan from violating the rights of displaced persons in this manner. Without 
any legal obligation to follow the dictates of international refugee law, Jordan remains 
free to choose which aspects of the law deserve to be upheld in light of the political, 
economic, and security considerations at play. In the case of the Iraqis, this clearly holds 
true.  
 
V. Local Integration  
 Repatriation, then, is an unviable or unwanted option for the vast majority of Iraqi 
displaced from 2003-2007. As the previous sections detailed, some Iraqis subsequently 
chose to remain in Jordan. Only a small minority of these refugees possessed official 
―refugee‖ status and were registered with the UNCHR. Many others were granted a 
temporary visa from the Jordanian government upon initial entry, which they overstayed. 
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Still more had entered Jordan through irregular channels. Regardless of how they entered, 
nearly all Iraqis who chose to remain in Jordan faced very difficult prospects. Many 
settled in urban centers like Amman and Zarqa.
73
 Unlike Palestinian refugees, displaced 
Iraqis were never given the option of living in camps—the Jordanian government 
staunchly refused to consider the possibility of their construction. Given the questionable 
utility of the Palestinian camps, such a position may have been for the best. Still, with no 
formal relief or aid mechanism, accessing basic necessities and protection from the 
government was challenging for many Iraqis in the early years of their displacement.  
After the Amman bombings of 2006, increasing restrictions imposed by 
government policies made this reality especially poignant. By this time, many of the 
savings on which Iraqi households depended had begun to run low, as well. Although 
small efforts of coordination between the government, UNHCR, and NGOs for the 
provisions of aid eventually emerged, the Jordanian government explicitly avoided local 
integration. This section will detail how the livelihood of Iraqis staying in Jordan suffered 
as a result, both in the short term and the long term. 
 Much of the scholarship on displaced Iraqis in Jordan in the 1990s focuses on 
how Iraqis differed from Palestinians and the governments‘ policies which followed. 
After the 2003 crisis, however, scholars began to look more closely at the lives of Iraqis 
who remained in Jordan. Following the height of the displacement in 2003-2007, 
estimates of how many Iraqis resided in Jordan revealed serious discrepancies. The 
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government‘s reluctance to recognize the high number of asylum seekers and the 
irregular entrance of ―de facto‖ refugees largely contributed to the variation in estimates 
produced. Moreover, many of the Iraqis entering Jordan did so en route to a third country 
or planned to return shortly to Iraq, and only stayed for a short while before departing 
onward.
74
  
As a result, in 2007 the government requested that FAFO and the UNHCR 
conduct a survey to gain a more accurate picture of the numbers and characteristics of 
Iraqis residing in Jordan.
75
 The organizations agreed to do so, and put together a report 
called ―Iraqis in Jordan: their Numbers and Characteristics‖. The data they gathered was 
based on immigration statistics from the Jordanian government‘s Department of 
Statistics, numbers of phone subscribers from national providers and household surveys 
of Iraqis and non-Iraqis performed in May of 2007.
76
  
The Report found that between 400,000-500,000 Iraqis resided in Jordan as of 
May, 2007. This figure was far lower than the government‘s estimate of 750,000 to 1 
million Iraqis, which was almost certainly inflated to increase international aid, attention, 
and responsibility for the crisis.
77
 The survey moreover revealed that the height of the 
entry was 2004-2005, and varied predictably with the levels of violence and insecurity in 
Iraq.
78
 This statistic confirmed that Iraqis were seeking asylum in Jordan because they 
faced imminent threats to their lives, and were moving out of necessity rather than desire 
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to increase their economic or non-necessary opportunities. The other aspects of the 
survey, which included data regarding Iraqi employment in Jordan, education, personal 
satisfaction, legal status, income, health care, and more, will be analyzed in further detail 
below.  
 
Employment and Income 
One of the most difficult barriers to integration that Iraqis face is employment. 
Jordan has consistently denied work permits to Iraqis without citizenship. Such permits 
are strictly necessary to entering the workforce, and employers who are caught 
employing individuals without valid permits are prosecuted. Despite the fact that many 
accounts show Iraqis in Jordan to be a highly educated group, the refusal of the Jordanian 
government to grant them work permits severely hindered their ability to enter the work 
force—especially in fields similar to those they occupied in Iraq. The data reveal that 
46.7 percent of those who were not seeking work did so because they could not find work 
without a permit.
79
 The next largest category of respondents, comprising 18.6 percent, 
reported that they ―could not find a suitable job‖. The remaining respondents cited 
reasons such as ―do not know how to look for work‖, ―thinks there are no jobs‖, and 
―tired of looking for work‖.  
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Table 7.2 Reasons Iraqi Refugees Do not Seek Work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Dalen and Pedersen, ―Iraqi Refugees,‖ (UNHCR and FAFO).  
 
In 2007, nearly 70 percent of the Iraqi population in Jordan was of working age, 
which is 15 years old. Only 30 percent of this figure, however, actually participated in the 
formal work force. Women of working age fared especially poorly, with a participation 
rate of only 15 percent.
80
 The majority of both men and women who are in the labor force 
(60 and 70 percent, respectively) reported that they are employed by someone else, while 
the remainder are self-employed or employers themselves.  
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Given that only a small proportion of Iraqis are employed, the majority have an 
income sustained by personal savings or transfer payments. Roughly 42 percent receive 
transfer payments from within Iraq, rendering them quite vulnerable to changes in the 
situation there that could alter their funds.
81
 The middle class is cited as the most 
dependent on these transfers, as the lower class does not have as much access to them and 
the upper class can generally rely more on employment or personal savings.  
 
Table 7.3 Income Sources for Iraqi Households  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Kristin Dalen and Jon Pedersen, ―Iraqi Refugees,‖ (UNHCR 
and FAFO).  
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Education 
 Accessing public education has been a particularly difficult aspect of life in 
Jordan for families and the young population of Iraqis. Until 1998, Iraqi children were 
not permitted to attend Jordanian schools unless their parents had valid residency permits. 
A Royal Decree issued in 2007 permitted all children to attend regardless of their legal 
status. This policy change came about in large part due to the efforts of local and 
international NGOs, as well as the UNHCR, who all lobbied for the inclusion of Iraqi 
children in schools.
82
 Despite the policy change, however, enrollment remained low.
83
 
NGOs cite that Iraqi families still feared deportation by sending their children to 
government schools. Other families explained that they did not want their child to be 
discriminated against or harassed, or that they needed their child to work to earn money 
for the family.
84
 Children also face difficulty adjusting to the fact that the education 
system in Jordan often differed from what they experienced in Iraq.  
 A more promising reason for the low enrollment in public schools is the fact that 
many Iraqi households possessed the savings to send their children to private schools. In 
total, 78 percent of Iraqi children aged 6-17 were enrolled in both public and private 
schools in 2007; this compares to 93 percent of Jordanian children of the same age.
85
 Of 
this population of Iraqi children attending school, however, about three out of every four 
attended a private school. The remaining 25 percent attended public school. In contrast, 
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only 20 percent of Jordanian children attend private schools; the other 80 percent attend 
public schools.   
 
Table 7.4 Iraqi Enrollment by School Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Kristin Dalen and Jon Pedersen, ―Iraqi Refugees,‖ (UNHCR 
and FAFO).  
 
 
The costs for attending private schools are enormous compared to those of 
attending government schools. As of May 2007, the average Iraqi child in a private 
school paid 1613 JD per school year—more than four times the average cost at 
governmental schools, which was 383 JD. Although many Iraqi households possessed the 
savings to fund the expense of private schools after their initial displacement, concern 
grew that they might attempt to enroll their children in public schooling as their savings 
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depleted. Indeed, private school enrollment rates for the fall 2007 school year were 
notably lower than those of the previous year.
86
  
The majority of displaced Iraqis in Jordan were fortunate to be able to send their 
children to private schools when government policies prevented them from enrolling in 
the public school system. As savings deplete and public schools become more accessible, 
however, Iraqis have been forced to switch to public enrollment. Most Iraqis seemed to 
cope fairly well with the initial lack of access to public education, but there remained a 
sizeable minority which was not enrolled (22 percent) that should not be discounted. 
Moreover, many Iraqi households report that the difficulty their children encounter in 
finding employment in Jordan after completing their education has been a significant 
challenge.
87
 Aid workers and scholars studying this particular issue fear of a ―lost 
generation‖ of Iraqi youth, who either do not receive education, receive a partial 
education, or whose education does not allow them to sustain themselves 
independently.
88
 Such a phenomenon is unfortunately observable in many situations of 
protracted displacement and crisis. 
 
Health and Healthcare 
Displaced Iraqis in Jordan likewise have very limited access to public healthcare. 
As a result, only 13 percent possess valid health insurance—private or public. The 
remaining 87 percent live uninsured. The percentage of uninsured varies predictably with 
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levels of wealth: only 3.9 percent of the lowest wealth quintile of Iraqis possesses health 
insurance, whereas 19.7 percent of the highest wealth quintile is insured. Regardless of 
whether they are insured, the vast majority—more than 90 percent—of Iraqis seek 
medical treatment at private rather than public hospitals.  
 
Table 7.5 Health Insurance Coverage by Income Level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Kristin Dalen and Jon Pedersen, ―Iraqi Refugees,‖ (UNHCR 
and FAFO).  
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Opinions about Livelihood 
 When asked about their main reason for staying in Jordan, about half of the 
respondents reported it to be ―security‖ (50.2 percent).89 Another 38.1 percent cited 
―family reunion‖. The remaining percentages were very small and distributed between 
reasons such as work, education, political reasons, medical treatment, investment, transit, 
and more. These figures confirm that the vast majority of Iraqis stayed in Jordan out of 
necessity, attempting to guarantee either their safety or the unity of their families. 
Clearly, potentially attractive aspects of integration like employment, education, 
investment, healthcare, and more were almost entirely nonexistent from the cited list of 
reasons. This further affirms our conclusions about the poor quality of livelihood 
opportunities and extremely limited legal avenues of integration at the time.   
 Measures of life satisfaction show that household wealth was a strong predictor of 
Iraqi‘s satisfaction in Jordan. In the highest wealth quintile, only 10.3 percent reported 
feeling dissatisfied with the lives, while 45.3 and 44.4 percent reported feeling content 
and satisfied, respectively. The lowest wealth quintile, in contrast, featured 50.4 of 
respondents feeling dissatisfied. Only 7.1 percent responded that they felt satisfied, and 
the remainder reported being content.
90
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Table 7.6 Life Satisfaction among Iraqi Refugees by Wealth Quintile  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Kristin Dalen and Jon Pedersen, ―Iraqi Refugees,‖ (UNHCR 
and FAFO).  
 
 
Measures of socio-psychological wellbeing among Iraqis are also telling of their 
mental health. A large body of sociological literature has analyzed the effects of the war 
and displacement on Iraqis, both within and outside of Iraq.
91
 In Jordan, employees at 
NGOs and hospitals report very high levels of psychological problems among the Iraqis 
with which they interact. Reports of domestic violence are also prevalent. High levels of 
anxiety likely stem from fear of deportation and illegal status, lack of employment or 
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illegal work, and dependence on external sources of income.
92
 Few social workers are 
available in Jordan, and many of these illnesses thus go untreated.
93
 
 Such difficulties are compounded by the fact that Iraqis often possess a very 
different culture than Jordanians. Many are Shiite, while the overwhelming majority of 
Jordanians are Sunni. Because of this, Iraqis have often been denied places of worship in 
Jordan and forced to practice their religion in private.
94
 The refugees at the Jesuit 
Refugees Services—many of whom were Iraqi—spoke extensively of the difficulties they 
faced in Jordan in adapting to the different cultural practices. Many felt isolated in 
Jordanian society, and interacted only with fellow Iraqis or refugees of other nationalities. 
 
VI. Resettlement  
 From the period of 1996-2003, Iraqis‘ asylum application rates were very high 
and acceptance rates very low. Indeed, in March 2003, the UNHCR recorded only 940 
Iraqi refugees—a miniscule percentage of any estimate of total refugee numbers. Denied 
formal resettlement, many Iraqis still viewed onward migration as more desirable than 
staying in a country where they possessed few rights and no legal status. Their prospects 
on this front were dim regardless of where they moved, but other states certainly offered 
greater opportunities in the realm of employment and informal avenues of income.
95
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As of 2002, over 250,000 Iraqis had requested asylum in Western countries. By 
2012, however, less than 4 percent of all Iraqis had successfully resettled in third 
countries.
96
 Many chose instead to reach their final destination through irregular 
channels, given the incredible difficulty they faced in receiving approval for resettlement. 
Jordan, Turkey and Syria were three of the most common transit countries for asylum 
seekers.
97
  
 
Refugee Views on Resettlement  
According to the UNHCR-FAFO report, as of May 2007, roughly one in every 
five Iraqis had concrete plans to emigrate to a third country. Given how limited formal 
resettlement opportunities through the UNHCR were at the point, many of these 
resettlement plans were likely formed through familial connections, broader community 
networks, or independent means. An even higher percentage, about one third, of all Iraqis 
expressed a general desire to resettle in a third country at the time.
98
 A disproportionate 
amount of poorer and non-Muslim Iraqis, including Palestinian refugees and Iranian 
Kurds, were represented in this figure. This seems to confirm that lower levels of wealth 
and ability to integrate socially in Jordan decreased the effectiveness of temporary or 
permanent integration.  
The role of information about resettlement and migration processes more 
generally may have contributed to initially low numbers of resettlement. Data from the 
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UNHCR-FAFO Report shows the expected time which Iraqis perceive it would take to 
emigrate to a third country. Nearly half, at 49.1 percent, reported that they did not know 
how long emigration would take.
99
 Another 18 percent said they believed it would be less 
than 3 months, but 13.5 percent reported believing it would take more than a year. 
Roughly 10 percent each responded with 3-6 months and 7-12 months.
100
  
Clearly, there was very little consensus on how onward migration from Jordan 
realistically occurred. The government, the UNHCR and the international community‘s 
failure to establish a functioning mechanism for resettlement early on in the displacement 
crisis clearly had effects on the ability of the displaced to seek livelihoods elsewhere 
through official channels. This serves as a clear explanation for why so many Iraqis chose 
to migrate onward through their own means, rather than through resettlement.  
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Table 7.7 Iraqi Perception of Length of Emigration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Dalen and Pedersen, ―Iraqi Refugees,‖ (UNHCR and FAFO).   
 
The United States and United Kingdom were very hesitant to accept resettled 
refugees during the first years of the war. From 2003-2006, the United States accepted 
only twelve UNHCR refugees from Jordan, while the United Kingdom accepted none.
101
 
Today, most Iraqis tend to express a tendency to be resettled in Europe, largely because 
of existing migrant networks located there. However, most find their asylum claims 
granted more easily in the United States and Canada.
102
 Once again, this shows that what 
refugees want and the choices they are given are often disconnected. In resettlement 
countries, Iraqis face a number of significant challenges upon their arrival. Many states—
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especially the United States—possess only short-term, culture-based resettlement 
programs within each province or state. By and large, resettled Iraqis report that these 
programs do very little to actually facilitate their long-term integration into society.
103
  
Refugees cite language as the biggest factor in preventing effective resettlement. 
Few Iraqis, especially those in the lower or middle class, arrive in Jordan with English 
language skills. The fact that many countries do not accept the education or experience 
Iraqis hold as sufficient qualifications for equivalent jobs in resettlement states also poses 
a significant barrier to resettlement. In Germany, for example, an Iraqi with a background 
in psychology would have to undergo years of German psychological education and 
language training in order to hold the same position he or she held in Iraq.
104
 Such 
barriers make it nearly impossible for many resettled Iraqis to find jobs that support 
themselves and their families.   
The case of the Iraqis also serves to highlight how the limited Convention 
definition of a refugee negatively affects migratory flows. Following the Iraq War in 
2003, many Iraqis feared that the circumstances of their displacement would not qualify 
them for refugee status. They instead chose to turn to irregular pathways in order to reach 
third countries. As a result, the West saw a sharp increase in the number of Iraqis arriving 
irregularly and then filing asylum claims. Many of the displaced had friends, family or 
community networks established in the West who had already received asylum. Instead 
of undergoing lengthy resettlement processes, then, most Iraqis from Jordan believed 
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their best option was to pursue asylum on their own terms.
105
 Given the high levels of 
irregular migration observed during the Iraqi crisis, limiting resettlement proved to be 
quite problematic.  
 Such a trend was not lost on the Western powers. In response, many chose to 
target the source of the movement itself. The early 2000s saw many states, including 
Australia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, send officials to Jordan to control the 
departure of potentially irregular migrants.
106
 This initiative, ultimately more symbolic 
than effective, demonstrated the lengths that states were willing to go to prevent 
resettlement—which was ultimately the only solution that guaranteed Iraqis with any 
opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. The UNHCR, limited as it was in its operational 
capacity, did little to stop these efforts from being taken. None of its member states were 
willing to speak for the rights of the Iraqi refugees.  
 
VII. Iraqis in Jordan Today 
 After 2007, improvements in the security situation in Iraq and Jordanian border 
closures prompted a decline in Iraqi displacement to Jordan. Still, hundreds of thousands 
of Iraqis remained in Jordan. Other countries in the region, including Syria and Lebanon, 
possessed sizeable populations of displaced Iraqis as well.
107
 As a result, the UNHCR 
decided in 2007 to extend ―prima facie‖ refugee status to Iraqis displaced from southern 
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and central Iraq. Prima facie status declares that all individuals belonging to a certain 
nationality identified as subjects of a particular crisis can attain refugee status without 
undergoing a refugee status determination process.
108
 The UNHCR explains the concept 
as follows:  
[s]ituations have […] arisen in which entire groups have been displaced under 
circumstances indicating that members of the group could be considered 
individually as refugees. In such situations the need to provide assistance is often 
extremely urgent and it may not be possible for purely practical reasons to carry 
out an individual determination of refugee status for each member of the group. 
Recourse has therefore been had to so-called ―group determination‖ of refugee 
status, whereby each member of the group is regarded prima facie (i.e. in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary) as a refugee.
109
 
 
The UNHCR justified its provision of prima facie status to the Iraqis on the 
grounds that many were fleeing human rights violations or general violence and did not 
possess an ―internal flight alternative‖ in the high-target areas. Moreover, it stated that 
return for any of the Iraqis from these areas would very likely result in serious difficulties 
due to persistence of unstable and hostile conditions.
110
 Prima facie status would allow 
the UNHCR to more efficiently deliver aid and protection, rather than spend valuable 
time and resources sorting through refugee status applications. To receive approval for 
prima facie status, displaced Iraqis had to attend registration interviews at UNHCR 
regional offices to confirm their place of origin and degree of vulnerability. The process 
was much quicker and easier than the previous system, and many Iraqis benefited from 
being able to access UNHCR services.  
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The provision of prima facie status lasted until 2012. Not surprisingly, revocation 
of the status coincided with the outbreak of crisis in Syria. The UNHCR simply did not 
have the financial resources or personnel to sustain its focus on the Iraqis given the 
situation with the Syrians.
111
 This was compounded by the fact that donor aid goes first 
and foremost to the most recent crisis, and Syrians received much more aid than the 
Iraqis. In 2013, for example, the UNHCR aided about 28,500 of the estimated 450,000 
Iraqis in Jordan. This figure represents only 6 percent of the population. In comparison, 
nearly one hundred percent of Syrian refugees seeking aid received coverage from the 
UNHCR.
112
 The next chapter will look more closely at why Syrians, as opposed to Iraqis, 
received much greater support from the Jordanian government, the UNHCR, NGOs and 
private businesses in Jordan.   
 The revocation of prima facie status would have been rather insignificant if not 
for the new wave of Iraqis who entered Jordan in 2014. When ISIS rapidly occupied large 
parts of Iraq, including Mosul, thousands of Iraqi Christians fled into Jordan in a fashion 
that was much more sudden and less organized than their arrivals in 2003-2007.
113
 
Surprisingly, Jordan let them in. Through the Jordanian people already feared the 
growing weight of the Syrian refugee crisis, the government decided that it was both 
―humanitarian and strategic‖ to accept the new refugees. Hasan Abu Hanieh, a Jordanian 
political analyst, explained that the government sought a careful balance between 
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protecting against Islamist militants and keeping its bonds with the West strong. He 
states, ―The government can show the world that Jordan has a policy that seeks to protect 
minorities, unlike its neighbors.‖114 
 The newly-arrived Iraqis faced some of the same limitations as the former group. 
Denied the right to work, many were implicitly encouraged to move onwards or file for 
resettlement. By the end of 2017, the UNHCR found that only 34,000 Iraqis were 
registered as refugees in Jordan. Of these, 16,300 received UNHCR assistance. These 
figures included refugees who had fled to Iraq in the prior decade but retained their 
refugee status. In comparison, the Jordanian government had estimated that 400,000 
Iraqis (including those who did not register with the UNHCR) resided in Jordan in 
2015.
115
 The decline in Iraqis was likely due a combination of resettlement, onward 
migration, and repatriation. It is estimated that roughly half of the one million Iraqis 
displaced from the ISIS attacks in 2014 have returned to their homes.
116
 Civil society 
organizations and NGOs have played a large role in ensuring safe return. 
 Today, the UNHCR continues to provide limited cash assistance for the most 
vulnerable Iraqis in Jordan, which includes the elderly, the poor, and women.
117
 The 
Jordanian government‘s acceptance of NGO activity also allows Iraqis to access more 
regularized and formal aid through their services. Organizations like Caritas, a Catholic 
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NGO based in Amman, have played a crucial role in aiding the Iraqi Christians after 
2014.
118
 Likewise, some previous policy restrictions have become looser in recent years. 
In 2011, for example, a General Pardon Law cancelled all the overstay fines for Iraqis 
who remained in Jordan after their legal visa stays had elapsed.
119
 In effect, this policy 
shift indicated that Jordan would no longer prosecute Iraqis for overstaying their visas or 
forcibly deport them back to Iraq for doing so. Other than these changes, little action has 
been taken by the government to acknowledge the situation of displaced Iraqis within 
Jordan today.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that Jordan‘s policies towards Iraqis create an 
environment that constrains the feasibility and effectiveness of durable solutions. Jordan, 
acting to preserve political unity and stability, preferred to encourage onward migration 
and create unsustainable conditions rather than acknowledge the existence of a refugee 
crisis. It showed that it would only abide by the principles of international refugee law 
which it sees fit, meaning that many rights and protections have been cast aside. Until 
recently, Jordan largely denied the aid offered to the displaced Iraqis by NGOs, the 
UNHCR, and other states. In doing so, it refused to legitimize its status as a refugee-
hosting state, and called into question the role of states like the United States whose 
actions initiate crises that they later fail to address. The decision to do so effectively 
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forced the UNHCR and other Western powers, at least to some degree, to assume greater 
responsibility in alleviating the burden felt by displaced Iraqis.  
Stepping back, a number of important characteristics of the Iraqi case deserve 
emphasis. The Iraqi refugee crisis was instigated by war and generalized violence, as are 
many ―typical‖ refugee crises in modern times. Over time, the persistence of conflict 
within Iraq has caused displaced Iraqis to fall into protracted status—again, archetypal of 
crises today. Most of the Iraqis who left Iraq were not the poorest members of society, 
but belonged rather to the middle and upper classes. This economic predisposition would 
affect their reception in host countries a great deal, especially in Jordan. In the 1990s, the 
Jordanian government pursued a laissez-faire approach towards the low numbers of Iraqis 
arriving at their borders. There was no official government recognition of their arrival; 
very limited UNHCR aid and activity by NGOs; and little enforcement of laws and 
regulations regarding their stay.  
The course of this narrative changed markedly after 2003. With the onset of the 
Iraq War, Iraqis arrived in Jordan in higher numbers and with less homogenous 
backgrounds. The government slowly allowed the UNHCR, NGOs and international aid 
to play small roles in aiding Iraqis. Their initial impact was quite minimal. Although 
Jordan attempted to maintain its laissez-faire policy of allowing Iraqi entry and self-
settlement, it began to implement restrictions and heighten its security after the Amman 
bombings of 2006. Jordan‘s responses to the Iraqi crisis were largely economic and 
political in nature, moving in tandem with refugee flows and conditions within its own 
society and economy.  
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The government‘s decision to withhold refugee status from the large majority of 
Iraqis made the question of durable solution quite difficult to address. Although Jordan 
adopted the stance that the only acceptable solution was Iraqi return, the lack of safety 
and sustainable conditions within Iraq rendered this option largely unattainable. 
Likewise, both lack of refugee status and the unwillingness of donor states to host Iraqis 
made formal resettlement through the UNCHR quite limited. Strongly resistant to the 
idea of another semi-permanent population occupying its jobs and crowding its cities, 
Jordan instead chose to deviate from its past policy and withhold rights and privileges 
from the displaced Iraqis.  
Thus, the norms of pursuing durable solutions and respecting refugee rights have 
not proven to hold up against the government‘s agenda and public opinion in Jordan 
during or after the Iraqi refugee crisis. The government effectively created an 
environment in which none of the durable solutions were available to Iraqis. On one 
hand, this allowed Jordan to evade many of the economic and socio-political 
repercussions supporting another refugee crisis would have imposed: on the other hand, it 
violated a number of international laws and deprived Iraqis of various human rights.   
Yet Jordan‘s actions were necessarily affected by the choices made by other 
states, as well. If the U.S. had chosen to accept a more reasonable proportion of displaced 
Iraqis, perhaps Jordan would have been more willing to accommodate those that 
remained. If states involved in the Iraq War had sought to end the conflict and pursue re-
development more quickly, repatriation may have also become a more available option. 
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Constrained thus, to what extent should Jordan be held accountable for failing to abide by 
international refugee law in its policy decisions?    
The issue is not whether Jordan disagrees with the validity and principles of 
international refugee law; rather, it is the reality that it lacks the political and economic 
capacity to comply with a regime that both developing and developed states have failed 
to respect as a legitimate source of binding international law. Jordan already ascribes to 
the ideology of the UNHCR, but it cannot realistically abide by its rules if it receives 
insufficient aid, is given no guarantee of compliance from other states in the regime, and 
lacks the political capacity to institute reform. The dual role Jordan plays in the 
international refugee system, as both a reluctant host and an innovator of refugee policy, 
will be explored further in the following case study on Syrian refugees. 
The next chapter will turn to the case study of Syrian refugees in Jordan. In many 
ways, Syrians present the most complex case considered. As the most recent crisis, it 
features a plethora of actors both within and outside of Jordan. The UNHCR plays a 
much more impactful role, as do NGOs and other international organizations. New 
actors, such as private businesses and corporations, have also featured prominently in the 
discussion of innovative solutions for Syrians, in Jordan and in resettlement countries. 
Chapter 8 will follow a similar format as the previous two case studies, providing first a 
historical overview of the crisis and displacement, discussing initial responses and early 
solutions, and analyzing how the durable solutions were pursued. Chapter 9 will turn to 
newer types of solutions that have been put forth and tested in recent years.  
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Syrian Refugees: Part I                              8                    
 
I. Introduction 
 This chapter will introduce the last case study of refugees in Jordan. The Syrian 
refugee crisis is the largest ongoing displacement crisis in the world today. In fact, the 
next largest crisis in recent history occurred following World War II, spurring the 
formation of the UNHCR and international refugee law.
1
 Since the onset of the Syrian 
crisis in 2011, over 5 million Syrians have fled the violence and persecution of the civil 
war and entered neighboring countries. Jordan has consistently allowed Syrians to seek 
asylum within its borders. Today, it hosts one of the largest shares of Syrians relative to 
the size of its population, second only to Lebanon.
2
  
Studying how Jordan responded to the Syrian refugee crisis provides a 
particularly informative example of the direction refugee policy heads in the years to 
come. The government‘s willingness to implement the UNHCR‘s durable solutions more 
effectively, allow for new, innovative solutions to be tested, and cooperate with NGOs, 
the UNHCR, private businesses, and a host of other actors on both a domestic and 
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international scale makes the Syrian case fundamentally different than those of the past. 
Analyzing its success in doing so is necessary to understanding how similar policy 
responses could be applied to future refugee flows. 
 Chapter 7 demonstrated the extent to which the international community 
abandoned displaced Iraqis. Most nations in the region chose to close their borders and 
ignore the question of ―refugees‖ entirely. Others, like Jordan, decided to permit selective 
entry but deprive the displaced of education, employment, healthcare, and other basic 
services enabling livelihood. The UNHCR played only a minor role in providing 
assistance, and NGOs were limited in their reach until the latter years of the crisis. With 
such policies, Jordan hoped that third countries with more resources would be forced to 
bear a greater share of the responsibility for Iraqis—particularly through their 
resettlement or onward migration. In reality, the unwillingness of other states to concede 
to this plan and the lack of coordination between international actors to facilitate 
movement meant that much of the Iraqis‘ migration occurred through unorganized or 
irregular channels. Durable solutions, as a result, largely failed to materialize.  
The case of the Iraqis differed greatly from that of the Palestinians. So, too, does 
the Syrian case differ in many ways from both preceding crises. The Syrian refugee crisis 
is one of the first major refugee crises in recent years in which Western countries have 
played the role of host countries—at least for a short while. Though the Middle Eastern 
countries still accepted the largest shares of asylum seekers by a wide margin, European 
states also experienced the arrival of Syrians on their shores. It is not coincidental that the 
Syrian refugee crisis is also the first modern refugee crisis in which the Western world 
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has cared deeply about its resolution. Such a statement is hardly biased; indeed, the fact 
that response to the crisis changed dramatically when Europe began to feel its effects is 
indisputable. The West gained a sense of urgency and anxiety when refugees began to 
seek asylum within their own countries, rather than those of a ―typical‖ host country. 
International conferences, resettlement schemes, employment opportunities, and large 
scale donation efforts began to take shape. The UNCHR partnered with various other UN 
agencies, NGOs, and even private businesses to form comprehensive plans of action. 
And, importantly, host governments like Jordan largely welcomed the presence of these 
actors and the solutions they proposed.  
Prior to addressing these solutions, this chapter will offer a brief overview of the 
civil war in Syria that perpetuated the crisis. It will then assess how host governments and 
international organizations responded to major displacement and refugee flows across 
borders. It will consider how the traditional durable solutions have been implemented in 
Jordan, and analyze the conditions and factors at play within Jordan motivating its policy 
formulations. Chapter 9 will continue this analysis by highlighting the various non-
traditional solutions pursued in response to the Syrian crisis. Given the larger role of the 
international community in the Syrian crisis, it will consider various programs and 
solutions mechanisms implemented on a broader level, and how they have affected 
Syrians in Jordan. In measuring their success, Chapter 9 will seek to highlight how policy 
responses should be preserved, adjusted, and complemented in the future.  
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II. Historical Overview 
The crisis in Syria was preceded by the outbreak of uprisings calling for increased 
democracy throughout the Middle East termed the Arab Spring. Early in 2011, the Syrian 
people began to engage in anti-government protests.
3
 These protests were quickly met 
with violence from the government, which deployed security forces and opened fire on 
peaceful demonstrators. As a result, the civilian demonstrators began to arm themselves 
against the government troops and military forces. Demonstrations that began in 
Damascus and Der‘a spread to other areas, including Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. As 
violence executed towards civilians escalated, Western countries began to insert 
themselves into the rising conflict. The United States, for example, imposed sanctions on 
the Assad regime for human rights abuses, while Sweden restricted arms trade with Syria. 
Regardless, another attack carried out in Hama soon left hundreds of protestors dead. The 
EU, U.S., Britain, France, and Germany responded with a demand that Bashar al-Assad, 
the President of Syria, resign.
4
  
The call for Assad‘s resignation quickly sparked responses from other major 
players in the region; namely, Russia and Iran. Syria quickly became the site of a number 
of proxy wars.
5
 Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah supported the regime, while the United 
States, Turkey and the Gulf States backed the rebels.
6
 The latter group openly supplied 
arms and funds to the opposition groups within Syria. The Arab League, too, approved 
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sanctions against Syria to pressure the government to end its civilian attacks, to no avail. 
As the death toll rose, the conflict devolved into a civil war that pitted the government 
and ―shadow militias‖ against protestors, who were often supported by the Free Syrian 
Army and various armed groups. Islamists, extremists and jihadists from numerous 
countries soon engaged in both sides of the war as well.
7
  
 The Syrian civil war sparked a wide range of contentious debates throughout the 
international community regarding matters of human rights violations, the use of 
chemical weapons, the role of non-state actors and extremist groups, and much more. 
Still, at the beginning of the war, King Abdullah II was reluctant to speak out against 
Assad‘s actions in Jordan. Much like during the Iraqi war, the government mostly 
remained silent on the political issues unfolding when handling the displacement crisis. 
Jordan and Syria were close trading partners prior to 2011, despite uneasy relations 
between their governments. The border between the two countries was relatively porous, 
and Syrians were not required to hold a visa to enter Jordan.
8
 The civil war devastated the 
business and trade between the two states. Moreover, as the next section will detail, the 
refugee crisis accompanying the violence fundamentally changed the nature of migration 
across the shared border as well.  
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III. Initial Responses and Early Solutions  
Initially, Syrians who chose to flee from the violence in their region remained 
within the borders of Syria. Many experienced the recent Iraqi displacement crisis and 
understood the legacy of the Palestinian refugee problem. As a result, they feared the 
implications of moving outside the legal safety of their country. Leaving could jeopardize 
prospects of return in the future, and it was entirely uncertain whether Syria‘s 
neighboring states would accept asylum seekers.
9
 Given this reality, the number of 
Syrians displaced outside of the country remained low throughout 2011. As violence 
against civilians proliferated in 2012, however, desperation drove thousands into the 
neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.
10
 The refugee crisis had begun.   
 
The Early Years: 2011-2014 
As was the case at the beginning of the Iraqi crisis, initial estimates of the 
displaced were imprecise. The rapidly changing circumstances in Syria made it difficult 
to discern the facts on the ground. As a result, the reports of displacement were highly 
influenced by the incentives of those offering them forth. Policymakers, scholars, and 
human rights and aid organizations, hoping that the gravity of the situation would urge 
states to take action, offered a high number of displaced both within and outside of Syria. 
The Syrian government insisted on a much lower estimate, in an effort to maintain the 
narrative that ―terrorists‖ were attacking the state.11 Retrospective counts estimate that 
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around 50,000 Syrians had fled the state and 250,000 were internally displaced by the end 
of the first year of the war.
12
 At this point, the crisis was not perceived to be a ―refugee‖ 
crisis. Rather, international organizations and states opposing the Syrian government 
labeled it a humanitarian emergency. Calling the displacement of the Syrians a ―refugee 
crisis‖ would have had far greater political implications than the Arab states—especially 
Jordan—wanted to acknowledge at the time.   
 The events of 2012 changed the narrative of host states entirely. A series of 
attacks in Idlib beginning in February drove between 10,000 and 20,000 Syrians into 
Turkey. The Turkish government responded by immediately establishing a camp near the 
border to host new arrivals. Jordan, too, allowed about 10,000 to 15,000 Syrians to cross 
its border throughout 2012. The majority of the displaced arriving in Jordan came from 
Der‘a, a region close to its northern border.13 By the end of the year, it was estimated that 
over 300,000 Syrians had fled to neighboring countries—making the reality of a refugee 
crisis increasingly difficult to ignore.
14
 
Up until the end of 2012, Jordan had reacted much as it had to the recent Iraqi 
displacement: it allowed for Syrian entry, but did very little to facilitate their acquisition 
of Jordanian services or livelihoods after the fact. In 2012, Jordan faced its own troubles 
of poor economic growth and political unrest. This instability ensured that the 
government would prefer to avoid taking an active stance on yet another refugee 
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population. Given the size and rapidity with which the Syrians arrived, however, Jordan 
had little choice but to react.  
Within a year, the overwhelming realities of the crisis forced Jordan to abandon 
its laissez-faire approach. Practically, it feared the potential effects self-settlement of that 
magnitude could have on the demographics and stability within the country. It very likely 
also recognized that its strategy in addressing the Iraqi crisis—refusing to set up camps or 
organize an official response to the crisis—did not play out as it hoped. Furthermore, 
some scholars believe Jordan was driven primarily by a ―rent-seeking‖ ideology, in 
which it anticipated that hosting refugees would be rewarded by large donations and aid 
packages from other states and organizations.
15
 Still others suggest that the overwhelming 
need demonstrated by the Syrians who fled prompted a response of generosity from the 
Jordanian people, who seemed to initially support greater refugee aid.  
All these factors and more likely contributed to the fact that Jordan‘s initial 
response was substantially different from that of earlier crisis. In early 2012, it turned to 
the UNHCR. The Jordanian government asked the UNHCR to approve the construction 
of a camp between Mafraq and the northern border to house all incoming Syrian 
refugees. The UNHCR obliged, and the Za‘atari camp opened within a few months.16 
After the UNHCR commenced its operations, Syrians could only enter Jordan through 
official border checkpoints, where they were then transferred to refugee camps. At the 
camps, they registered for official refugee status with the UNHCR and received asylum 
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certificates.
17
 The figures below illustrate the rapid development of the Za‘atari camp 
from 2011 to 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Za‘atari Camp, September 2nd, 2011. Source: ―Inside Zaatari: One of the 
World‘s Largest Refugee Camps,‖ (ABC News: June 2014) 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-10/inside-zaatari-one-of-worlds-largest-refugee-
camps/5506792.  
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Figure 8.2 Za‘atari Camp, April 6th, 2014. Source: ―Inside Zaatari: One of the World‘s 
Largest Refugee Camps,‖ (ABC News: June 2014) https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-
06-10/inside-zaatari-one-of-worlds-largest-refugee-camps/5506792.  
 
 
 What began as a stretch of desert with a smattering of tents set up by refugees 
crossing the northern border eventually turned into the fourth largest city in Jordan. The 
camp, roughly 5.3 square kilometers in area, became incredibly densely populated as 
refugees continued to arrive. At its peak, Za‘atari hosted 150,000 Syrians: in total, over 
461,701 refugees have passed through the camp.
18
 As the next chapter will discuss, 
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Za‘atari transformed from a temporary structure for shelter to a semi-developed urban 
center with electricity, entrepreneurship, schools, hospitals, and more.  
Not all Syrians who sought entry into Jordan were admitted. In particular, border 
control officers frequently denied entry to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees residing in Syria, 
unmarried men of fighting age, and individuals without legal documents. By forcing their 
return to Syria, Jordan clearly violated the principle of non-refoulement—a fact that was 
not lost on the international community, which voiced loud criticisms of the practice.
19
 
Initially, the numbers of Iraqi and Palestinians moving outside of Syria remained low. 
Anticipating their difficulty in gaining asylum in other countries, who continued to 
recognize the political baggage accompanying their status as protracted refugees, they 
often chose to keep a low profile.
20
 As the conflict progressed, however, many resorted to 
flight. Some who were denied official entry in Jordan entered through illegal channels 
regardless, while others were forced to remain subject to the ongoing violence in Syria.
21
  
The government‘s harsh emphasis on preventing refugees from prior crises to 
enter demonstrates just how salient those crises remained to the people of Jordan. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, the years following 2012 saw tensions between the Palestinians 
and Jordanians rise as a result of changes in Jordan‘s economic policies. Not 
coincidentally, in 2012 the UNHCR also chose to strip the Iraqis of their prima facie 
refugee status in order to both divert more resources to the Syrian crisis and discourage 
more Iraqis from seeking asylum easily in Jordan. The government‘s decision to disallow 
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Palestinian and Iraqi refugees was clearly a calculated attempt to reassure Jordanians that 
those past crises remained in the past. In doing so, it exemplified some semblance of 
control over refugee movement and appeared to support only the most desperate of 
refugee populations.  
 For Syrians granted asylum, life in UNHCR camps proved difficult. The decision 
to establish camps in Jordan reflected only what Jordan and the UNHCR—not the 
refugees—believed would allow for the easiest management of the crisis. Initially, 
Syrians who entered Jordan were very mobile, moving between regions and cities as they 
connected with familial networks and attempted to find housing. Few were pleased by the 
proposition of being placed in a camp and isolated from the remainder of society. Indeed, 
refugees could not leave the camps unless a Jordanian relative aged thirty five or older 
was approved as their ―guarantor.‖22  Refugees who were ―bailed out‖ were issued a 
Ministry of the Interior service card, giving them access to a variety of public services 
like healthcare and education. This practice continued until 2015, when the government 
introduced an ―urban verification exercise‖ that required refugees to re-register as such 
and obtain new biometric Ministry of the Interior service cards.
23
 The updated policy 
allowed Jordan to monitor refugee movement with greater precision, which was 
important for the allocation of aid. On a more practical level, such regulations meant that 
the majority of refugees in camps were forced to remain there indefinitely. 
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By 2015, Jordan had three established camps: Za‘atari, Azraq, and Emirati.24 The 
government‘s willingness to allow for camps in spite of the legacy of Palestinian refugee 
camps and its refusal to do so for the Iraqis seems counterintuitive. Faced with the choice 
of allowing hundreds of thousands of refugees to enter its cities or constructing camps 
that had the potential to become permanent fixtures, the government chose the latter. In 
doing so, it seems to have attempted to avoid the immediate shock to both its society and 
its markets which would occur if it permitted self-settlement. The choice of camps also 
placed much more responsibility on the UNHCR to handle the displaced and their 
allocations of aid, rather than the government directly. Jordan knew the possible 
ramifications establishing camps could have in the future; yet the circumstances 
somehow rendered them a necessary—and hopefully, a temporary—solution.  
Jordan‘s choice to pursue camps succeeded only in part. Given the poor 
conditions which persisted within refugee camps, many Syrians chose to forego the 
system and settle in urban centers, like Amman. By 2014, nearly 70 percent of Syrians 
lived in cities, leaving only 30 percent in camps.
25
 As a result, overcrowding in urban 
areas where refugees had a distinct impact on the Jordanian economy and society. The 
next section will address this impact in greater detail.    
The other major host states of Syrian refugees each pursued rather opposite 
policies in regards to camps. Nearly all Syrians in Turkey lived in one of the 26 
established refugee camps. In Lebanon, the government strictly forbade the establishment 
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of camps.
26
 Syrians fled to Turkey and Lebanon after 2011 in even greater numbers than 
those which arrived in Jordan, and both countries struggled to respond in ways that 
satisfied their own people while providing refugees with protection. Like Jordan, 
Lebanon had never signed the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Though Turkey was 
a signatory to the 1951 Convention, its failure to ratify the 1967 Protocol meant that its 
refugee policy under international law was limited to European refugees.
27
  
Moreover, the UNHCR did not give Syrians the same prima facie refugee status it 
had provided to the Iraqis. Rather, the UNHCR gave them temporary protection status in 
Jordan, which is equivalent to that of an asylum seeker.
28
 Temporary protection status 
implied that all Syrians were eligible to receive aid, but had to register with the UNHCR 
through a Refugee Status Determination to be called a formal refugee.
29
 In effect, this 
meant that Syrians‘ treatment in their country of first asylum was highly dependent on 
that states‘ domestic refugee policy.  
 
The “Migration Crisis” of 2015 
 By the beginning of 2015, the Syrian crisis had displaced nearly 8 million 
individuals. The first eight months of 2015 proved to be a turning point in the conflict, as 
significant ISIS advances and Russian airstrikes drove millions more to flee.
30
 Many of 
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these refugees, as opposed to those in prior waves, consisted of middle class 
professionals that had remained in Syria to ensure that their towns or regions continued to 
function amidst the instability. Their departure marked an even more substantial decline 
into anarchy within Syria. More relevant to the refugee issue, however, was the fact that 
their middle-class status allowed them the financial means to migrate beyond the 
resource-poor countries which neighbored Syria. Refugees began to pay for passage to 
the European shores or traveled over land through Turkey, via the land bridge connected 
by the Balkans.
31
 Refugees arrived on the shores of Italy and Greece in mass numbers, 
overwhelming immigration control and policymakers who had never faced such an influx 
in recent times. Many died along the way from the perilous journey, both on land and at 
sea. Although it is difficult to obtain accurate figures, most estimate the death toll for 
Syrians to be in the thousands.
32
 A photo that surfaced of a young toddler, Alan Kurdi, 
made headlines across the globe. 
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Figure 8.3 The Death of Alan Kurdi. Source: ―The Death of Alan Kurdi‖, Wikipedia 
(2019), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Alan_Kurdi. 
 
  
For a short while, the Syrian crisis dominated the political agenda throughout 
Europe. Lacking experience with migration flows that originate outside of Europe, the 
governments initially responded with panicked decisions rather than coherent policy.
33
 
The European border system, characterized by the Schengen Area, allowed for free 
movement between the states in the Area and required all those seeking asylum to 
register with their country of first arrival. The latter policy, called the Dublin Regulation, 
was intended to prevent ―asylum shopping‖—a practice in which asylum seekers filed for 
asylum in multiple states to increase their odds of approval. It furthermore called upon 
non-border-states to provide aid and accept asylum seekers if the border-states exceeded 
150 percent of their capacity. The practical result of this policy was that border-states 
                                                 
33
 Betts and Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World. 
  
248 
 
were incredibly overburdened by asylum seekers, and Northern states failed to uphold 
their promise of sharing responsibility in handling the crisis.     
Within just a few weeks, European border-states began to close their borders. It 
became impossible for refugees to seek asylum in the global North, and soon the only 
option for living in these countries became formal resettlement through the UNHCR.
34
 
Although Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon had already accepted millions of refugees and 
possessed far fewer resources to handle their influx, European states proved unwilling to 
do the same. For the first time, Europe experienced the realities of a modern refugee 
crisis—something with regards to which it had dictated international law and policy for 
so many years. And, on all accounts, its performance was an abject failure. The migration 
crisis provided Europe with a sliver of insight into what host states like Jordan in the 
Middle East had handled for decades. As Chapter 9 will discuss in greater detail, it was 
only then that it began to realize the policies regulating refugee movement were 
unsustainable without greater cooperation.  
Around this time, Jordan also began to tighten its borders in the name of security. 
Jordan closed its Jaber border crossing after it was attacked by Islamic militants towards 
the end of 2015. Likewise, a suicide attack against the Rukban army post in June 2016, 
reportedly carried out by members of ISIS, prompted the government to shut down both 
the Rukban and Hadalat border crossings as well.
35
 The Crisis Response Director at 
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Amnesty International, a prominent INGO which aids refugees in Jordan, said the 
following in regards to the border closures:  
The situation at the berm offers a grim snapshot of the consequences of the 
world‘s abject failure to share responsibility for the global refugee crisis. The 
knock on effect of this failure has seen many of Syria‘s neighbours close their 
borders to refugees. It‘s a desperate picture for people trapped at the berm, food is 
running out and disease is rife. In some cases people are suffering or even dying 
from preventable illnesses, simply because they are not allowed into Jordan and 
the authorities have blocked access for aid, medical treatment and a meaningful 
humanitarian response.
36
 
 
 
In other words, the border closures had a devastating effect on the immediate 
safety and livelihoods of Syrian refugees. Yet the Director points out that these closures 
resulted not from Jordan‘s negligence, but from other states‘ failures to adequately prop 
up Jordan in its efforts to offer aid and protection. Jordan was not immune to the security 
threats the border attacks posed; but it is unrealistic to expect that it should be. Although 
states have an obligation to protect refugees, they also have an obligation to protect their 
own citizens. It has held true throughout the Palestinian, Iraqi, and now Syrian crises that 
Jordan cannot justify allowing further migration when its citizens feel threats to their own 
security in addition to the ―normal‖ burdens of supporting refugees‘ aid and protection.  
 In 2017, the violence within Syria began to wind down. By then, more than half 
of Syria‘s population of 23 million had been displaced. Nearly 5 million individuals had 
left the state, and the other roughly 7 million remained internally displaced. At least 
650,000 were officially reported to be in Jordan.
37
 In 2018, none of the major host 
countries, including Jordan, experienced any new large-scale arrivals from Syria. Jordan 
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saw only a marginal rise in refugee registration, with 673,414 individuals reported by the 
UNHCR as of December, 2018. The number of unregistered refugees, however, is more 
telling of the reality of the situation: 1.38 million Syrians were estimated to be in Jordan, 
total, at the end of 2018.
38
 The discrepancy between this latter figure and the number of 
registered refugees indicates that more than half of Syrians in Jordan were living outside 
the protection of the UNHCR and official asylum system. As the next section will 
address, the large scale settlement of Syrians in urban centers had a significant impact on 
the Jordanian economy and society.  
 Jordan‘s initial responses to the Syrian crisis proved markedly different from 
those of the Iraqi crisis in the previous decade. The fact that Jordan chose to allow the 
UNHCR to operate within its borders and establish camps is incredibly significant. It had 
no obligation to do so and many legitimate reasons to justify shutting its borders to 
Syrian refugees. Instead, Jordan made a substantial effort to acquire the international aid 
and political support necessary to accommodate the Syrians.   
 When it became clear that temporary aid would not be sufficient for the expected 
longevity of the crisis, Jordan began to turn to the durable solutions. The following 
section will detail the availability of each of the solutions and effects they had on 
alleviating the crisis for Syrian refugees in Jordan. 
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IV. Repatriation   
The protracted instability in Syria made return a dangerous option throughout the 
entirety of the crisis.  By the end of 2018, very few regions remained unaffected by the 
violence, and much of the country‘s infrastructure and service provision systems had 
broken down completely.
39
 Still, many Syrian refugees desire eventual repatriation today. 
A UNHCR survey conducted in December 2018 found that 76 per cent of Syrians hoped 
to return one day. There is no telling, however when ―one day‖ will be.  
The most recent iteration of the UNHCR‘s survey on Syrian intent to return, 
released in March 2019, revealed that 85 percent of respondents stated that they do not 
have the intention to return in the next 12 months.
40
 The main reasons they cited as 
preventing their  return included physical risks; lack of availability of essential services, 
including access to education, livelihood and job opportunities; fear of conscription; and 
fear of punishment for having fled or refusing to fight.
41
 They also spoke of the legal 
obstacles they might face in reclaiming property or accessing civil status documentation. 
Given the level of devastation in Syria that persists, it will take years before the large-
scale development, rebuilding and restoration projects can be undertaken to enable return 
a viable option. Recent estimates put the price of reconstruction at around 400 billion US 
dollars.
42
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Table 8.1 Syrian Perceptions and Intentions for Repatriation  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from UNCHR, ―Syrian Refugees‘ Perceptions and Intentions on 
Return to Syria,‖ (March 2019), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68443.pdf.  
 
Unfortunately, repatriation has never been a safe or desirable solution. The 
current fragility in Syria furthermore suggests that it is unlikely to become one for quite 
some time. Thus far, the UNHCR has supported this position by formally excluding 
repatriation as a viable solution. As stated in its annual Protection Thresholds and 
Parameters for Refugee Return report, it holds that ―present conditions in Syria are not 
conducive for voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity‖.43  
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It is interesting to note that a small minority of roughly 42,728 refugees regardless 
chose to spontaneously return in 2018. ―Spontaneous return‖ implies repatriation that is 
self-organized or conducted with the help of the host government.
44
 Although the number 
of returnees is small in comparison to the total number of displaced Syrians, it is sizeable 
enough to indicate that some have unfortunately faced even worse conditions in host 
countries than those from which they fled.  
At times, the de facto policies of involuntary repatriation pursued by states like 
Lebanon and Jordan have encouraged spontaneous return as well. Although these states 
often face strong condemnation for doing so, little more can be done by the UNHCR or 
other states to hold them legally accountable. As emphasized in previous chapters, the 
Memorandum of Understanding Jordan signed with the UNHCR includes a clause 
recognizing the right to non-refoulement. It provides no recourse for action, however, 
when Jordan fails to comply.
45
  
While the UNHCR does not facilitate or promote repatriation at this point in time, 
it has already begun planning for when voluntary repatriation is possible.
46
  As the survey 
above illustrates, a significant proportion of Syrians continue to desire return when the 
conditions permit. Many host countries, including Jordan, would likewise embrace the 
opportunity for Syrians to return so as to avoid spiraling into a situation of prolonged 
dependence. Of course, Jordan and the UNHCR exercise very little control over the 
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conditions which make repatriation a safe and feasible option. Repatriation, hardly a 
―solution‖, has become a waiting game for Syrian refugees.   
 
 
V. Local Integration  
 The concept of local integration in the context of the Syrian crisis is slightly more 
nuanced than it was in the cases of Palestinians and Iraqis. The government clearly 
intended for long-term Palestinians integration into Jordanian society. It held no such 
intentions for the Iraqis, whose integration came predominantly from their ability to 
provide for themselves in the absence of aid. In the case of the Syrians, the UNHCR, 
NGOs, and the government have collaborated to establish a number of different 
initiatives to support the livelihoods of Syrians in Jordan. Some of these efforts are 
clearly meant to address immediate needs, such as those providing cash assistance or 
medical care. Others, however, such as those integrating Syrian children into schools or 
adults into new jobs, are less clear cut in terms of their intended longevity. In other 
words, Jordan has enabled Syrians to have access to many of the same opportunities as 
Jordanians—but it is entirely unclear whether it intends to sustain this policy in the long 
term, should their displacement become permanent.  
The fact that Jordan has extended public services and livelihood programs to 
Syrians despite the reality that they may very well perpetuate Syrians‘ stay surprised 
many international policymakers and scholars. What made Syrians so different than the 
displaced Iraqis that arrived just a few years prior? This section will attempt to explain 
the quality of life for Syrians remaining in Jordan today, and their similarity to native 
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Jordanians, by examining statistics related to their employment, health and healthcare, 
income, and education. The next chapter will discuss, in much greater detail, how other 
types of political and economic solutions facilitated the ―integration‖ of Syrians into 
Jordanian society.  
 
Employment 
 On nearly all counts of economic activity, Syrians have fared better than the Iraqis 
that arrived in the previous decade. Unlike Iraqis, the majority of Syrians was not upper-
middle class professionals, and thus posed much less of an economic threat to the 
Jordanian middle class. Shortly after the onset of the crisis, Jordan allowed Syrians 
holding a valid service card from the Ministry of Interior to apply for work permits. The 
application process, similar to that which non-nationals faced to obtain legal work in 
Jordan, was lengthy and expensive. Moreover, the difficulties in obtaining the MOI 
service cards necessary to apply for a permit ensured that the number of work permits 
issued remained low in the first few years.
47
 By 2015, the Syrian unemployment rate had 
reached 61 percent. Of those who were employed, only 10 percent actually held valid 
permits; the remainder worked informally.
48
 The main industries in which men worked 
were construction and agriculture, and women in home-based activities.
49
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The Jordanian government could have allowed this limited access to work permits 
to persist indefinitely. Instead, Jordan sought advice on how to integrate Syrians into its 
economy in a way that would benefit Jordanian companies and Syrian livelihoods. A 
number of significant economic programs and agreements, such as the Jordan Compact, 
resulted from its outreach. Due to a combination of these initiatives, the number of work 
permits gradually increased. As of December 2018, 123,573 work permits were issued to 
men and 5,581 were issued to women.
50
  This represents roughly 20 percent of the 
registered Syrian refugees living in Jordan at the time—but less than 10 percent of the 
total Syrian population. By 2018, the participation of Syrian males in the labor force 
ranged from 48 percent in Mafraq to as high as 65 percent in Amman. The higher end of 
this range is roughly equivalent to Jordanian males‘ participation, which stood at 63.49 in 
2018.
51
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Table 8.2 Syrian Labor Force Participation Rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Åge A. Tiltnes, Huafeng Zhang and Jon Pedersen, ―The 
Living Conditions of Syrian Refugees in Jordan,‖ FAFO and UNHCR, (April 2019), 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67914.  
 
The international community became quite interested in the effect of Syrian labor 
force participation on the Jordanian economy. In 2016, the International Labor 
Organization released a study quantifying the impact of Syrian refugees‘ presence in 
Jordan on a number of different domestic economic conditions. It argued first that there 
was no evidence the arrival of Syrians actually had a negative impact on the national 
unemployment rate.
52
 The ILO report then points to the fact that Syrians are actually 
more economically active (meaning that they participate in more consumer transactions) 
than native Jordanians, at a rate of 48.5 percent to 36.5 percent. Moreover, small and 
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medium sized businesses in Jordan have observed higher profits from the lower wages 
accepted by Syrian workers. Syrians also boost the economy by opening their own firms 
and shops, creating new goods, services and avenues for employment.
53
  
Still, many Jordanian claimed that the inflow of self-settled Syrians impacted a 
number of aspects of life that the ILO report might have failed to observe. Two common 
claims held that Syrians‘ willingness to work for lower wages reduced options for low-
skill employment and their overcrowding in urban centers drove up rent prices.
54
 After 
2015, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the narrative that Syrians had no 
negative impact on the economy. Today, policymakers and scholars recognize the huge 
financial burden spending on Syrian refugees has placed on the government‘s budget for 
social services, and the Jordanian people feel the effects of high rent prices and 
unemployment caused by the saturation of markets in urban areas. While Syrians have 
gained much greater access to work than the Iraqis, allowing them to do so has 
undoubtedly come at a cost to Jordanians.  
 
Income 
 Analyzing Syrians‘ predominant sources of income reveals they are highly 
dependent on institutional transfers—far more so than Iraqi refugees. Given that Syrians 
often possessed fewer savings and were of lower economic status when arriving in 
Jordan, this difference seems logical. It moreover reflects the reality that Syrians simply 
had greater access to institutional transfers as well. In addition, Syrians demonstrated 
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high levels of dependence on wage income.
55
 Again, given that they were employed in 
greater proportions than Iraqis, this too is an expected result.  
 
Table 8.3 Income Sources Identified by Syrian Refugees  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Åge A. Tiltnes, Huafeng Zhang and Jon Pedersen, ―The 
Living Conditions of Syrian Refugees in Jordan,‖ FAFO and UNHCR, (April 2019), 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67914. 
 
Education 
Only two years after the arrival of Syrian refugees, Jordan decided to allow Syrian 
children to attend public schools free of charge. Like access to work permits, education 
remains dependent on possession of a valid asylum seeker certificate and Ministry of the 
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Interior service card. This policy has allowed for more than 62 percent of the over 
330,000 Syrian refugee children registered in Jordan to be enrolled in formal education.
56
  
The quality of education that they receive, however, is often much lower than that 
of native Jordanians. In my interviews in Amman, NGO workers cited that the influx of 
Syrian refugees in 2012 caused a jump in class size from 45 to 60 students in each class.
57
 
This shock angered native Jordanians and placed immense stress on school systems, 
which struggled to adapt. In response, the Ministry of Education allowed some schools to 
take on second shifts in order to reduce class size. These second shifts were generally 
taught by less qualified teachers.
58
 As a result, a divide between Syrian and Jordanian 
children persists.   
Unlike Iraqi children, the vast majority of Syrians are enrolled in the public 
school system. This is likely due to a combination of the availability of free public 
schooling and the fact that Syrian families tend to have lower savings upon which to 
draw. Their enrollment by school type is compared to that of the Iraqis below:  
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Table 8.4 Iraqi Enrollment by School Type  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from Chapter 7; Data adapted from Dalen and Pedersen, ―Iraqi 
Refugees: Their Numbers and Characteristics,‖ (UNHCR and FAFO: 2008). 
 
 
Table 8.5 Syrian Enrollment by School Type  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes, Zhang and Pedersen, ―The Living Conditions of 
Syrian Refugees in Jordan,‖ FAFO and UNHCR, (April 2019), 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67914. 
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The most recent enrollment data from the UNHCR- FAFO Report reveals that 
children‘s likelihood of attending school decreases precipitously with age. Nearly 100 
percent of Syrian children aged 6-11 are enrolled in school—an incredibly impressive 
statistic. This figure remains above 70 percent until the age of 15, when it drops to only 
39 percent. At this age, it is likely that many Syrian children choose to work informally 
or in their homes to provide for their families instead of attending school.
59
 The divide 
between Syrian and Jordanian children is also perpetuated within schools, driven by high 
reported levels of bullying, discrimination, and school violence.
60
 Only 8 percent of 
Syrians refugees aged 18-24 attend university amidst these challenges.   
 Comparable statistics for Jordanians reveal that enrollment levels are very similar 
for young children. Primary school enrollment is nearly 100 percent, and secondary 
school level enrollment is 65 percent. At the tertiary level, however, 31.7 percent of 
Jordanians attend college or university, representing a marked increase from that of 
Syrians.
61
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Table 8.6 School Enrollment for Syrian Refugee Children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Tiltnes, Zhang and Pedersen, ―The Living Conditions of 
Syrian Refugees in Jordan,‖ FAFO and UNHCR, (April 2019), 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67914. 
 
 
Despite the formal availability of free public education for Syrian refugees, issues 
of inadequate infrastructure and insufficient support in other areas have prevented Syrian 
children from sharing an equal footing with other children in Jordan. The UNHCR and 
other monitoring institutions recognize this shortcoming, and often place education at the 
top of their protection agendas. They continue to call for more effective educational 
systems that do not impair refugee children‘s ability to advance in the future.62  
The Jordanian government, too, has recognized its inability to deliver quality 
education single-handedly. Early on in the crisis, it invited NGOs and the United Nations 
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International Children‘s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to fill some of the gaps its education 
policy creates.  These organizations provide free education, usually funded through UN 
grants, and often include elements of English language education and cultural 
integration.
63
 By partnering with NGOs and UN organizations, the Jordanian government 
has been able to offset the responsibility placed on public schools and allow for new 
avenues for educational opportunities. The following chapter will discuss these initiatives 
in greater detail. Although education remains a work in progress for Syrian refugee 
children, it is a promising project that both the Jordanian government and other 
organizations have shown serious interest in addressing effectively.   
 
Health and Healthcare  
Prior to 2014, Syrian refugees in Jordan were allowed to access public healthcare 
though the Ministry of Health facilities.
64
 Revisions to the Jordanian healthcare policy in 
2014, however, changed their ability to access healthcare drastically. Without a Ministry 
of the Interior service card, accessing healthcare became nearly impossible; with a card, it 
remained extremely difficult. The policy allowed those holding a service card to access 
public healthcare at the same rates as those paid by uninsured Jordanians. Often, access is 
limited to the district in which refugees were issued the service cards. Those without 
cards are not given access to public healthcare, and thus forced to pay the same rates as 
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foreigners at non-governmental or private facilities.
65
 These policies made even minor 
medical procedures extremely costly and difficult to obtain for many refugees.  
 Refugees suffering from chronic diseases fare quite poorly in Jordan. In 2016, 37 
percent of households with members suffering from chronic diseases were unable to 
access medical services at all.
66
 By 2019, this figure remains around 21 percent. In this 
situation, refugees often file for resettlement or choose to seek treatment aboard and 
return to Jordan, if possible. Nearly all refugees, regardless of their status as card-holders 
or possession of medical conditions, state that access to medical care has been one of the 
most problematic and difficult aspects of life in Jordan.
 67
 NGO workers lament that 
healthcare is one of the most integral policy areas deserving of improvement from the 
UNHCR and its partner organizations.  
Unlike Iraqi refugees, who rely predominantly on private healthcare providers, the 
majority of Syrians rely on public or NGO-funded care. These figures, reflecting data 
from 2019, clearly emphasize the need to continue increasing aid and preserving the 
ability of existing NGO and public providers to accommodate Syrian refugees.  
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Table 8.7 Source of Healthcare for Refugees with Chronic Health Failure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Åge A. Tiltnes, Huafeng Zhang and Jon Pedersen, ―The 
Living Conditions of Syrian Refugees in Jordan,‖ FAFO and UNHCR, (April 2019), 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67914. 
 
The data discussed in this section underscore the reality that the livelihoods 
Syrians refugees‘ experience in Jordan would not be possible without the aid of UN 
organizations and NGOs. These organizations played a crucial role in relieving the 
burden placed on the government of absorbing the costs associated with hosting refugees. 
While inequality still persists between Syrians and Jordanians in a number of areas, the 
cooperation between the government and organizations in Jordan to address these issues 
represents a significant step forward from the situation of the Iraqi refugees. The next 
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chapter will discuss how the government, NGOs and UN organizations attempted to 
alleviate the effects of integration through alternative solutions.  
 
VI. Resettlement  
 Compared to the other durable solutions, resettlement depends most directly on 
the asylum policies of other states in the international community. The principal way in 
which Jordan exercises control over the outcome of resettlement is through its 
relationship with the UNHCR. The high level of cooperation between the Jordanian 
government and the UNHCR which developed throughout the Syrian crisis cannot be 
overemphasized: when one considers the fact that the UNHCR only began operating in 
Jordan a decade prior, the escalation of its operations is highly significant.  
As is typically the case, resettlement has allowed only a miniscule percentage of 
the total population of Syrian refugees to move out of Jordan. The height of resettlement 
from Jordan occurred in 2016, during which roughly 21,000 refugees received 
resettlement approval—which made Jordan the number one country of resettlement 
departures in the world.
68
 This figure is comprised almost entirely of Syrian refugees, but 
contains some Iraqi and African refugees as well. Still, it accounts for less than 5 percent 
of the total population of Syrians in Jordan.  
After 2016, a number of important asylum states—such as the United States—
dramatically reduced the number of refugees they resettled. Their decision had a very 
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tangible impact on resettlement figures: in 2017, only 4,989 refugees in Jordan received 
resettlement. Since then, resettlement figures remain low. The table below details the ten 
states with the highest numbers of resettled Syrians, aggregated from 2013 to 2018.  
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Table 8.8 Number of Syrians Resettled by Host Country  
Host Country Number of Syrians 
Resettled* 
Percentage Share of Total 
Resettled 
Canada 76,530 29.48% 
United States of America 65,032 25.06% 
Germany 48,417 18.65% 
United Kingdom 20,000 7.71% 
France 16,975 6.54% 
Australia 16,192 6.24% 
Brazil 12,298 4.74% 
Norway 9,700 3.74% 
Switzerland  8,200 3.16% 
Sweden 5,800 2.23% 
 
Source: Data adapted from UNHCR, ―Resettlement and Other Admission Pathways for 
Syrian Refugees‖ (May 1 2018), https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/protection/resettlement/573dc82d4/resettlement-other-admission-pathways-syrian-
refugees.html?query=resettlement.   
Note that the second column reflects cumulative numbers of resettled Syrian refugees 
from 2013-2018. The third column denotes the percentage of total resettled Syrians that 
each country hosts.  
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Given the limited availability of resettlement opportunities, the UNHCR restricts 
resettlement to those in the direst need. To be eligible, Syrians must demonstrate a level 
of vulnerability characterized by legal, physical protection, or medical needs; being a 
survivor of violence/torture; or belonging to ―at-risk‖ groups, such as those of women, 
children and adolescents, and the elderly.
69
 Such criterion prevents a significant 
proportion of Syrians from applying to be resettled in the first place. Still, in 2016, over 
76,556 individuals filed for resettlement or humanitarian admission through the 
UNHCR.
70
 This figure represented the peak of Syrian resettlement applications to date, 
coinciding with both the ISIS attacks in Syria that furthered displacement and the 
increasing regulations Syrians faced in accessing host countries like Jordan.  
Although the number of applicants far outweighed the number of resettled 
refugees in 2016, the resettlement of 21,000 Syrians must unfortunately be considered a 
favorable amount. By 2018, the total fraction of Syrian refugees resettled had fallen to 
just 0.5 percent. Roughly 10 percent of all Syrian refugees at the time were eligible for 
resettlement, making this figure appear even bleaker. As the next chapter explains, the 
trend of decreasing resettlement in third countries persists in spite of UNHCR efforts to 
increase responsibility sharing efforts and involve Western governments in new aid and 
protection efforts for refugees in other regions of the world. Unless the international 
community undergoes a significant policy shift, resettlement will continue to be an 
insignificant option for Syrian refugees.  
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VII. Conclusion  
Jordan‘s policy responses to the Syrian refugee crisis demonstrate a clear 
departure from those of the past crisis. Initially, the government chose to maintain open 
borders and took a laissez-faire approach to Syrian self-settlement—not unlike it had 
done in the decade prior. Soon after, though, the invitation it extended to the UNHCR to 
construct camps and begin large-scale aid projects within its borders altered the course of 
the crisis dramatically. NGOs and other international organizations became implementing 
partners for the UNHCR and Jordan, stepping into roles that the government was unable 
or unwilling to fill. The government clearly understood that pushing Syrians onward and 
hoping for resettlement would not be feasible options. Rather than attempt to force the 
crisis out, Jordan decided to invite aid in. Jordan‘s domestic policies became integrated 
into a broader international response scheme that attempted to both strengthen and move 
beyond the durable solutions of the past.  
Analyzing repatriation, local integration and resettlement revealed that a number 
of factors seriously constrained Jordan‘s ability to provide Syrians with solutions. The 
ongoing violence in Syria, Europe‘s failure to organize a safe response to Syrians seeking 
asylum, and the economic and socio-political repercussions hosting another refugee 
population held on Jordanians are among the most important of these constraints. At the 
same time, Jordan received a great deal of support in new areas. By partnering with the 
UNHCR and NGOs, the government observed an enormous increase in its organizational 
and monetary capacity to handle the refugee crisis. The figures measuring local 
integration confirm this to be true: Syrian refugees have achieved much higher levels of 
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employment, educational attainment, healthcare coverage, and income than the Iraqi 
refugees before them, and depend much more on the public and NGO sectors in doing so. 
It is important to keep in mind that Jordan was one of many countries that felt the 
impact of hosting Syrian refugees. The fact that Jordan did not endure the crisis alone 
played a crucial role in its formulation of responses. The Western states had turned an 
ambivalent eye to the Iraqi crisis just a few years prior: but at the height of the Syrian 
crisis, the whole world watched. For a brief moment, the international community 
seemed to care about refugees. The flurry of attention Jordan received as a result very 
likely encouraged its generous policies, supplying a nuance to the factors cited above 
which constrained and enabled its decisions.  
Substantive lessons from the Syrian refugee crisis can also be drawn from the 
non-traditional solutions various actors have pursued. Jordan, more so than other host 
countries like Lebanon or Turkey, has been particularly well-receptive to these solutions. 
Chapter 9 will assess how many of the mobility solutions, economic solutions, and legal-
political solutions discussed in Chapter 2 have affected Syrians in Jordan. Many remain 
ongoing projects whose full effects have yet to be assessed. Still, it will become clear that 
the fact that these solutions are being explored in the first place indicates that refugee 
stakeholders have acknowledged the need for more effective, timely solutions than those 
currently in place.  
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Syrian Refugees: Part II                                 9               
 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapter described how repatriation, local integration, and 
resettlement fell short of acting as truly durable solutions to the Syrian crisis in Jordan. If 
the international community had not sought to move beyond these solutions, the story of 
their displacement would have likely stopped there. Indeed, in the Iraqi case, a lack of 
durable solutions became the solution to their displacement; no real alternatives were 
offered on a significant scale. The Syrian crisis proved different. A combination of 
generosity, necessity, monetary desires, political will, and a host of other factors 
prompted both Jordan and the international community to pursue new paths to success for 
the displaced Syrians. Plans for new, ―alternative‖ solutions emerged, ranging from 
expanding access to labor migration visas to ratcheting-up responsibility mechanisms 
through the implementation of the Global Compact. This chapter will analyze the 
efficacy of some of the most important alternative solutions.  
The failure of the durable solutions to effectively address the needs of refugees 
and the host government is not unique to the Syrian crisis. Indeed, less than 2 percent of 
the world‘s refugees in 2015 received access to one of the durable solutions.1 What is 
unique about the Syrian crisis is the extent to which states, the UNHCR, and non-
                                                 
1
 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (Oxford 
University Press: 2016), Print.  
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governmental and private organizations have mobilized around the pursuit of alternative 
solutions. This is not to say that all new ―solutions‖ have actually been effective in 
solving the issues associated with displacement for refugees on a long-term basis. In fact, 
a common theme which arises across the mobility, economic, and political solutions 
analyzed in this chapter is that many possessed very positive intentions but experienced 
rather mediocre execution. The factors producing this shortcoming vary, but in most 
cases it seems that at least one of the actors involved in the solution is disconnected from 
the others in terms of their incentives, available resources, and ability to act.  
Alternative solutions should not be deemed failures if they do not immediately 
succeed. On the contrary, the fact that they are being offered as alternatives to the 
traditional routes at all should be applauded. There is a great deal to learn from which 
techniques have and have not been effective for future application of these alternative 
solutions—especially in Jordan. 
This chapter will proceed by first analyzing mobility-based solutions to the Syrian 
refugee crisis. It shows that while a number of different immigration pathways to third 
countries exist, few have been made more easily accessible to refugees to suit their 
particular needs. While little progress has been made to improve their usage thus far, they 
remain a promising option to develop in the future.  
In contrast, Jordan has had far more practical experience with economic solutions. 
The country has been a testing ground for a monumental international agreement called 
the Jordan Compact. The Compact encompasses a remarkable cooperation between the 
Government of Jordan, European and Jordanian businesses, and Syrian refugees, and 
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aims to expand the access of the latter group to employment opportunities in Jordan. 
Although the success of the Compact has been limited by a number of key oversights in 
the planning process, its conceptual foundation provides a valuable framework for future 
agreements.  
Lastly, political-legal solutions consist predominantly of new international and 
regional refugee response plans. The recent proliferation of such agreements—especially 
the Global Compact on Refugees—demonstrate the continued salience of international 
cooperation on refugee policy and the necessity of stronger mechanisms to incentivize 
compliance. Ultimately, the Syrian refugee crisis provided the stimulus for both Jordan 
and the international community to act upon the failures of the past solutions and adapt to 
the current reality of refugee displacement today by considering new strategies, 
partnerships, and initiatives in response.   
 
II. Mobility Solutions  
 Chapter 8 discussed the reality that UNHCR resettlement is an extremely limited 
solution for Syrian refugees. The trend of resettlement needs significantly outpacing 
opportunities persists, unfortunately, across all refugee crises for the past few decades. 
Within Jordan, the percentage of refugees resettled compared to those desiring 
resettlement and/or remaining in Jordan is particularly astute:  
 
 
 
  
276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Estimated Needs and Actual Departures, Syrian Refugees in Jordan. Source: 
Danish Refugee Council, ―Access to Resettlement and Complementary Pathways for 
Syrian Refugees,‖ Durable Solutions Platform (June 2018), 
https://drc.ngo/media/4676369/dsp-resettlement2.pdf. 
 
 
Policymakers at the state level, the UNHCR, and private firms recognized the gap 
between refugees who qualified and those who received UNHCR resettlement early on in 
the crisis. The migration crisis of 2015 observed in Europe, which featured thousands of 
asylum seekers migrating to Europe through both regular and irregular means, 
compounded these actors‘ interests in opening more legal channels of movement. They 
began to consider what the UNHCR terms ―alternative or complementary resettlement 
pathways‖. These pathways include labor migration, student work visas, family 
reunification migration, humanitarian visas and private scholarship programs. Typical 
―resettlement‖ or donor countries have employed these complementary pathways for 
Syrian refugees with varying degrees of success. Some have been utilized more 
effectively than others; student visas, for example, have been widespread and largely 
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successful. Other pathways must be made more easily accessible and adopted on a more 
universal basis to be called a success in the future. A graphic from an OECD Migration 
Policy paper provides an overview of targeted persons and programs available through 
alternative pathways.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Alternative Mobility Pathways. Source: OECD, ―Migration Policy Debates: 
Are there Alternative Pathways for Refugees?‖, (September 2016), 
https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-12.pdf.  
 
 
Labor Migration  
Labor migration, though infrequently discussed with regards to refugees, was 
actually one of the first solutions pursued by European countries for refugees in the 
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1920s. The Nansen Passport system gave refugees widespread access to labor markets in 
third countries. Although the economic troubles of the 1930s led to their decline, labor 
migration continues to hold potential for a viable resettlement system for refugees that 
receiving countries have serious incentives to adopt.
2
 In recent years, however, few 
countries have chosen to extend work permits to Syrians through labor migration 
systems. Scholars consider this fact a particularly overlooked aspect of resettlement, as 
many countries—especially in Europe—are in need of young workers to offset their 
aging populations.
3
 If holes in states‘ labor markets were to be properly identified, 
refugee labor migration could pose a boon to both receiving states and refugees seeking 
temporary or permanent livelihoods in third country.  
Labor migration channels often consist of points-based and skilled entry systems, 
to which Syrians apply on an individual basis. Work permits are generally granted 
through an employer in the country where the individual seeks work. Such systems are 
attractive to individuals with a wide range of skills and experience, enabling lower skilled 
workers to access legal employment and providing more experienced professionals the 
opportunity to continue their careers in a third country.
4
  
Patterns of migration often differ by state, as states are free to grant labor 
migration approval based on the particular demands of their economies and labor 
markets. Although existing labor migration channels are not often designed for refugees 
specifically, refugees are able to access them like any other migrants. The downside of 
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 Danish Refugee Council, ―Access to Resettlement and Complementary Pathways for Syrian Refugees.‖ 
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 ―Population Structure and Ageing‖, Eurostat, (February 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
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this, however, is that arriving in a third country via a labor migration program holds no 
guarantee of protection from refoulement or exploitation.
5
 In order for these programs to 
be a more effective alternative to resettlement, such protections must accompany 
refugees‘ migration.   
Incentivizing employers to recruit refugees directly may be a fruitful way to 
circumvent the difficulties in changing government policies. This idea has become 
increasingly relevant in recent years, particularly due to the efforts of NGOs like the Tent 
Partnership for Refugees. The Tent Partnership works with businesses to implement 
commitments to support refugees, particularly by hiring them and sponsoring their 
migration to a third country.
6
 Gideon Maltz, the Executive Director of Tent, noted at a 
conference in October 2018 that the businesses with which they worked viewed hiring 
refugees as beneficial to their brands; namely, because refugees made productive 
workers, large support for refugees existed among their consumers, and hiring refugees 
allowed them to expand their market access to new groups of consumers.
7
 
Other organizations, such as Talent Beyond Boundaries, initiates communication 
from the other direction. The NGO helps refugees contact businesses in countries of 
resettlement and facilitates their visa application process.
8
 In effect, refugees are given 
the opportunity to exploit their existing skill sets, and businesses gain employees with the 
specific qualifications they desire. Further examples of NGOs and non-profit 
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organizations facilitating labor migration abound. Despite the low levels of government 
resettlement through labor migration, such organizations have increasingly stepped up to 
fill the role on a small scale.  
 
Humanitarian Visas 
Humanitarian visas provide the most similar substitute to UNHCR resettlement 
processes. Individual states can grant humanitarian visas as an alternative ―protected 
entry procedure‖, in which asylum seekers can enter the visa granting country legally and 
apply for asylum once they arrive.
9
 Syrians holding humanitarian visas often enjoy an 
expedited asylum application process. The differences in acquiring resettlement status 
and humanitarian visas are significant, as the latter is applied for directly by the third 
country national at the consulate of the state in which asylum is sought. Pre-screening 
processes can then be conducted prior to the individual‘s departure, legalizing their 
journey and entry into the country of asylum.
10
 In effect, this often allows individuals to 
be reconnected with extended family or, at the very least, experience a much safer and 
quicker transition from the host to asylum country.  
A few states have extended humanitarian visas successfully, though their adoption 
has not been widespread. As of May 2018, France had issued 4,600 visas; Brazil, 9,298; 
and Switzerland, 4,700.
11
 Humanitarian admission programs, which are similar to 
humanitarian visas alongside resettlement schemes, have also been adopted by a number 
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of other countries like Austria, Germany and Ireland.
12
 Although the European Union 
considered an EU-wide humanitarian visa scheme in the wake of the migration crisis of 
2015, it failed to agree upon a formal system. As a result, most countries resorted back to 
traditional UNHCR resettlement.  
In contrast to humanitarian visa and admission programs, formal resettlement is 
handled indirectly through the UNHCR and can take more than two years to be 
finalized.
13
 Humanitarian visas would not replace the UNHCR resettlement program; 
rather, they are often discussed as an option which could be offered in parallel to the 
existing system. Humanitarian visa systems could have allowed European states to avoid 
the irregular mass immigration observed in 2015. Moreover, such systems could help 
host states like Jordan to shrink the gap between Syrians who desire resettlement and 
those to whom it is granted.  
Many scholars emphasize that visas could be a flexible tool to address future 
displacement crises more effectively.
14
  A similar option which has been implemented in 
a number of Western states, including Canada and Germany, are private sponsorship 
programs. As of May 2018, Germany had provided 23,572 private sponsorship visas.
15
 
Unlike humanitarian visas, which are government-sponsored, private sponsorship entails 
private businesses or individuals supporting the costs of resettlement and/or facilitating 
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general migration pathways.
16
 Such initiatives could work around states‘ reluctance to 
fund greater resettlement.   
For states like Jordan, whose problems stem largely from the sheer number of 
Syrians, such programs would have a significant positive impact. Given the difficulty in 
forcing states to meet their UNHCR resettlement quotas, however, it is unclear how 
humanitarian visas would be any more feasible an alternative than the more formalized 
resettlement process which already exists. So far, uptake of humanitarian visa systems 
has been limited and does not seem to be increasing significantly. Unless greater 
incentives to expand visa eligibility were provided, it seems unlikely that many states will 
choose to increase the number of visas they issue to Syrian refugees in the years to come.   
 
Student Visa Programs, Family Reunification, and More 
Many other opportunities to alternative pathways to resettlement exist alongside 
labor migration and humanitarian visas. Student visas, family reunification, and medical 
evacuation programs are among them. While many countries possess such programs for 
migrants in general, few are tailored specifically to refugees, meaning that Syrians have 
benefited only marginally from their use. Moreover, many face difficulties in producing 
documentation and meeting eligibility criteria for the programs.
17
 In recent years, the 
UNHCR has begun to facilitate access to alternative mobility pathways and report 
statistics on the number of Syrians successfully resettled through their usage. If the 
UNHCR were to adopt a more flexible system of resettlement, including systems of labor 
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migration, humanitarian visas, family reunification and the like, perhaps states would be 
more inclined to extend resettlement support to refugees based on the specific pathways 
most suited to their needs.   
 
III. Economic Solutions 
 
The Jordan Compact  
The Jordan Compact was undoubtedly the most notable new ―solution‖ that 
Jordan adopted in the wake of the Syrian crisis. The Compact, praised worldwide for 
facilitating an unprecedented partnership between businesses, governments, and refugees, 
represented a new policy model for refugees characterized by high levels of compromise 
and economic opportunity. The idea for the Compact originated in early 2015, when a 
government-sponsored think tank (―WANA‖) asked two professors from Oxford 
University to come to Jordan and advise how its refugee system could be improved.
18
 
The professors, Alexander Betts (cited extensively in Chapter 2) and Paul Collier, worked 
with WANA and UNHCR officials to formulate the initial idea of the compact: give 
Syrians the right to work in Jordan‘s under-employed economic zones, and the refugees, 
businesses, and government would be better off as a result. Better yet, if European 
businesses could be incentivized to invest in the zones and purchase their products, 
European markets would get a boost as well. It appeared to be a win-win for all parties 
involved. 
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The Government of Jordan quickly endorsed the idea. It was formally proposed at 
the London donors‘ conference on Syria and the region in February, 2016, where the 
King of Jordan, President of the World Bank, and David Cameron of the United 
Kingdom offered their support.
19
 At its core, the Compact represented the idea of 
economic development through refugee employment.
20
 The first part of the Compact 
stipulated that the Government of Jordan would extend work permits to 200,000 Syrian 
refugees over the next year. These refugees would work in Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs), which are governed by a more lenient set of laws and policies than the rest of the 
country so as to promote investment and trade. Jordan would also allow Syrians to 
formalize their existing businesses and register new companies in accordance with their 
existing regulations.  
Lastly, the government would provide for a specific percentage of Syrian 
involvement in municipal projects sponsored by donors in regions with a high ratio of 
non-Jordanian workers.
21
  In exchange, Jordan would receive around $2 billion USD in 
aid from European states, the World Bank, and other financial institutions. A number of 
European companies, including Petra Air and various garment manufacturers, pledged to 
invest in the zones as well.
22
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 A number of factors prompted the government to suggest these SEZs as areas that 
would benefit from refugee labor. Over the past few decades, Jordan has sought to 
increase its economic development through neoliberal and global policies that aim to 
increase Jordan‘s market orientation, reinforce free trade, minimize government 
intervention and curb high levels of public spending on social support. In lieu of these 
policies, a large proportion of the government‘s development budget has gone towards 
zonal developments.
23
 These zonal development projects, including SEZs, are intended to 
attract regional investments and have positive spillovers into the Jordanian economy. 
SEZs are widely used in other regions of the world—particularly Southeast Asia—as 
large manufacturing sites that bring in sizeable revenues for the states and companies 
involved.
24
 At the same time, however, human rights organizations often raise concerns 
about the lack of protection and harsh working conditions workers in these zones face.
25
  
One of Jordan‘s SEZs, the King Hussein bin Talal Development Area 
(KHBTDA), was located just ten miles from the Za‘atari refugee camp.26 Despite the fact 
that the government had invested over $1million into the project, it lacked both workers 
and business opportunities in early 2015.
27
 Betts and Collier saw the KHBTDA as a 
prime opportunity for Syrians living in Za‘atari to gain employment, and for the area to 
become profitable as a result. With its existing infrastructure, the KHBTDA could have 
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employed every worker at Za‘atari and only reach half of its full capacity.28 The 
provisions of the Compact specified that native Jordanians were to be employed in the 
SEZs as well. In order to accommodate for this expanding work force, the government 
agreed to develop five new SEZs and open six existing zones to Syrian and Jordanian 
workers.   
Prior to 2016, Jordan had been unwilling to acknowledge the Syrians in Jordan as 
yet another semi-permanent refugee population in their territory. Its ready support for the 
sizeable undertaking of the Compact thus seems a significant departure from its past 
policies, especially given that it has persistently shied away from foreign intervention in 
its domestic refugee affairs. Yet the Compact was framed not as a humanitarian aid offer, 
but as an opportunity for the government to ―[turn] the Syrian refugee crisis into a 
development opportunity‖.29 The report published by the Government following the 
conference clearly confirms that the government sought to gain economic growth, 
increased investment, and greater aid towards Jordan‘s public programs benefiting Syrian 
refugees from the agreement. Focusing on the opportunities the Compact presented for 
growth and stability, the Government also cited goals such as creating jobs for Jordanian 
and Syrian refugees, rebuilding Jordanian host communities and facilitating their 
resilience, and mobilizing sufficient grants and concessionary financing to support the 
Compact‘s ambitious agenda.30  
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The government anticipated that economic growth would be fostered by the 
changes in the Rules of Origin governing zonal development laws included in the 
Compact. The agreement lifted a number of stringent regulations for Jordanian businesses 
operating SEZs, which was supposed to make manufacturing more profitable, expand 
production levels, and lead to job creation. According to the terms of the agreement, 
factories in 18 zones were to employ Syrians in no less than 15 percent of their labor 
force. After three years, this figure was to increase to 25 percent.
31
 The architects of the 
Compact believed these to be realistic, attainable goals with which businesses would be 
willing and able to comply. Likewise, the government accepted the plan with enthusiasm. 
The specifications of the Compact sounded feasible to everyone involved in its 
articulation. What mattered in the end were ultimately those left out of the process: the 
Jordanian businesses, who were to operate in the SEZs as refugee employers. After the 
Compact was formally approved in 2016, Jordan quickly ran up against a number of 
obstacles in attempting to implement its provisions. For one, the SEZs had been under-
employed and under-invested for a reason: few Jordanian companies perceived them as 
profitable enterprises. The Jordan Compact did little to change this reality. By May 2017, 
less than ten companies had registered to export under the new Rules of Origin 
regulations, and only one had actually exported anything at all.
32
 In part, this was due to 
the fact that Europe possessed stringent standards requirements for imported products. 
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Jordanian companies often lacked both the proper knowledge of these requirements and 
the right connections with potential buyers in the EU to make sales in the first place.  
On top of this, none of the manufacturing facilities in the SEZs could match the 
productive efficacy of those in places such as India or China. Western companies, which 
had promised to support the Compact, had fallen flat and failed to provide SEZs with the 
investment necessary to match the success of their foreign counterparts.
33
 These crucial 
details proved to be a significant impediment to getting the Compact‘s plans off the 
ground.  
Perhaps even more important is the fact that very few Syrians and Jordanians 
actually wanted to work in the SEZs. They, too, were largely absent in drafting the 
Compact. Unfortunately, it showed. Jobs in the SEZs had long hours with little pay, and 
often were not located in easily accessible locations. For Syrians, the pay rarely covered 
the high costs of rent and out-of-pocket expenses they faced in supporting their families 
and livelihoods. Indeed, jobs in construction or the informal economy paid far better and 
proved much more convenient.
34
  
Moreover, the numerous garment-producing SEZs predominantly sought to 
employ women. Without access to public childcare, most Syrian women found it 
impossible to leave their role as caretakers in their families to occupy these jobs. Lastly, 
many Syrians feared that participating in the Compact would jeopardize their ability to 
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receive financial assistance from the UNHCR and be resettled in the future.
35
 Although 
the UNHCR provided assurance that funding would not be cut as a result, it did little to 
assuage the refugees‘ concerns.  
Jordanians, on the other hand, were increasingly well-educated and showed little 
desire to occupy low-paying positions in these zones. As a result, both the refugees and 
Jordanians that the government hoped they would employ ultimately did not see the offer 
for employment as beneficial. Jordanian companies saw little profit to be made by 
establishing operations within SEZs, and companies that already operated within them 
did not see the opportunity as advantageous on their end, either. Although the Jordanian 
government had assumed that Syrians were easily substitutable for the Southeast Asian 
migrant workers already employed, the companies disagreed: they viewed Syrians—
many of whom were not experienced in manufacturing work—as less productive and 
skilled than their current employees, who were used to the low wages and long hours.
36
 
In the end, the type of work the Compact offered was not actually desired by either party.  
The other aspects of the Compact, such as allowing refugees to formalize their 
businesses and seek employment in certain industries outside of zones, likewise saw little 
success. Refugees possessed few incentives to formalize their businesses and begin 
paying taxes, and employers had little reason to register informal Syrian employees with 
the government. The existing structure of the Jordanian economy rendered the proposed 
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changes difficult and costly to implement.
37
 By May of 2017, only 51,000 work permits 
were issued to Syrian refugees. While this number is not insignificant, it fell far below 
the target of 200,000 that the Compact initially set. The fact that Syrians in Jordan had 
gained increased access to permits at all represented a significant improvement from 
previous conditions, and appeared especially favorable when compared to neighboring 
countries like Lebanon.  
In the end, few of the Compact‘s anticipated outcomes materialized. On the 
conceptual level, it was an ingenious and highly successful display of global cooperation: 
on the practical level, its particulars largely failed to suit the realities on the ground. The 
Compact thus demonstrates the difficult truth that the process of formulating new refugee 
solutions must include all parties specifically involved in its implementation, not merely 
individuals or institutions which claim to represent them. Refugees, especially, must be 
given a voice in how global policies will shape their future.  
Chapter 2 posed the question of who the most important actors involved in 
refugee crises are. Each of the theoretical solutions answered the question differently: 
mobility solutions tended to favor the refugees, political-legal solutions emphasized the 
states, and economic solutions highlighted the importance of both. The Compact seems to 
affirm the idea that all actors matter a great deal—the host government, third party states, 
refugees, businesses, and host country citizens. While this certainly does not simplify the 
path to future solutions, its insights on the importance of comprehensive, inclusive policy 
formation plans are incredibly necessary for policymakers to recognize.  
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Local Economic Opportunities    
 Syrian refugees themselves have played an important role in devising innovative 
ways to expand their economic prospects. Compared to other groups of refugees, Syrians 
demonstrate remarkable levels of entrepreneurship in host countries.
38
 In Za‘atari refugee 
camp, for example, refugees developed informal markets shortly after they arrived. By 
the beginning of 2014, retail activity in the camp generated over $2 million USD a 
month. They now refer to the main street in Zaatari as ―Shams-Elysées‖—a play on the 
famous French shopping street and a local term, ―Sham‖, for Syria. Over 1,400 shops and 
50 stalls in caravans can be found along the Shams-Elysées today.  
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Figure 9.3 The Shams-Elyées. Source: ―The Entrepreneurial Spirit of the ‗Shams-
Elysees‘- Zaatari Refugee Camp,‖ One Journey (March 29, 2018), 
https://www.onejourneyfestival.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-entrepreneurial-spirit-of-the-
shams-elysees-zaatari-refugee-camp.  
 
  
Despite the fact that many Syrians—especially in camps—continue to lack formal 
employment, the group has proven to be quite economically active in other ways. In 
addition to refugee-led initiatives, a variety of programs aimed at increasing refugee 
participation in the Jordanian economy have been implemented by NGOs, private 
businesses, and international organizations. These include improving their access to 
credit, connecting them with employers, hosting job fairs, providing them with 
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specialized training, and more.
39
 Certain programs target particularly vulnerable 
populations, such as women, who face steep barriers to entering the labor market. Even 
the Jordanian government agreed to open two employment centers in Za‘atari and Afraq 
specifically for Syrian refugees. Such an opportunity was never presented to any other 
group of refugees in Jordan. While the effect of these projects are much smaller and 
localized in nature than something like the Global Compact, their success demonstrates 
the positive gains both refugees and Jordanians have experienced by allowing foreign 
NGOs and development organizations to operate in Jordan throughout the crisis.
 40
  
Given that encamped refugees generally face far fewer opportunities for 
employment than urban refugees, many of the projects specifically target refugees in 
camps. One such project, sponsored by The German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), targets refugee unemployment in conjunction 
with Jordan‘s waste management issues. BMZ established a program called Cash for 
Work in the Za‘atari refugee camp in 2016, in partnership with the UNHCR. The 
program features Syrian refugees collecting and sorting waste within the camps and 
selling it to Jordanian entrepreneurs.
41
 After the work is complete, profits are divided 
evenly among the workers. Additionally, the local Jordanian economy gets a boost and 
the camp is cleaner as a result.  
Targeting encamped populations also serves the purpose of overcoming the 
isolation refugees in camps can face from the remainder of society. Isolation, as Jordan 
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had learned from the Palestinian refugee camps, can lead to violence and dissolution of 
camp governance. More recent cases in other countries reveal that isolation and 
deprivation in camps can lead to extremism, as well.
42
 By allowing for greater economic 
involvement in camps, the Jordanian government may be strategically avoiding some of 
the most dangerous pitfalls camps can face. 
 Much smaller in scale than the Jordan Compact, this project demonstrates that 
development and employment can go hand in hand in more simple ways. Improving local 
communities and refugee livelihoods need not involve complex international agreements 
to be successful. Indeed, programs targeting the specific skills and needs of the regions in 
which they are situated may be more useful in quickly and effectively providing 
employment and furthering development. In future crises, both within Jordan and abroad, 
a combination of global projects and localized efforts like those described above is 
necessary for affecting the greatest number of economic livelihoods.  
 
V. Political-Legal Solutions  
Very little has changed about refugee law since the 1951 Convention. Prior to the 
Syrian crisis, the most important developments were likely the formation of urban 
refugee policy at the turn of the century and the expansion of the UNHCR mandate to 
include IDPs and other types of forced migrants.
43
 Yet the European migration crisis 
initiated a new, more urgent call for a reexamination of the existing international refugee 
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laws. In September of 2016, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted 
the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.
44
 The Declaration contains a 
number of symbolic affirmations of refugees‘ rights and expresses the determination of 
states to protect and assist their livelihoods in line with the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol. It expresses solidarity with those forced to flee, reiterates states‘ obligations to 
respect the human rights of refugees in full, agrees that greater responsibility sharing is 
necessarily, and pledges to increase support to countries disproportionately affected by 
refugee flows.
45
 In this sense, the Declaration reads very similar to the Convention texts 
and existing laws.  
More importantly, the Declaration produced a tangible policy framework for 
addressing refugee crises called the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. This 
framework is particularly relevant to Jordan, as it was quickly applied to the Syrian crisis 
and continues to govern policy responses organized by the UNHCR today. It evolved to 
be known as the Syrian Regional Response and Resilience Plan (3RP).
46
 This plan 
illustrates the extent to which Jordan‘s partnerships with the UNHCR, civil society 
organizations and international bodies have been formalized over the years, and clearly 
elucidates the policy goals of the actors in the years to come.   
The last aspect of the Declaration called upon the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Antonio Guterres, to propose a ―global compact on refugees‖ in his annual 
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report to the UN General Assembly in 2018. The UNHCR developed the Global Compact 
by engaging with states, UN partners, civil society organizations, and refugees in 
thematic discussions and formal consultations, as well as gauging the success of the 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. In December of 2018, the UN General 
Assembly approved the Global Compact and urged its implementation through its annual 
resolution on the UNHCR.
47
  
The international community remains divided on whether the Compact has 
made—or will make, in the future—any positive change on the issues observed in the 
international refugee regime today. Some criticize its declarations as cheap talk, intended 
to portray states as generously committing themselves to increasing refugees‘ rights but 
possessing little power to hold them responsible to do so. UNHCR officials, as expected, 
offer a more positive interpretation. They state that the Compact introduces a shift in 
thinking about what rights refugees deserve and how they should be helped that has the 
potential to create important changes in the future. States‘ willingness to transform their 
policies in light of these changes has yet to be seen. Whether the Compact will motivate 
them to do so is incredibly relevant to the initial responses and long-term policy decisions 
Jordan pursues in the years to come.      
 
The 3RP  
The first Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for the Syrian crisis was 
launched in Berlin in 2014. The Plan featured over 200 humanitarian and development 
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partners.
48
 Within Jordan, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation was 
tasked with overseeing the 3RP‘s implementation, and continues to do so today. It 
partners with the UN and various NGOs and humanitarian agencies to assess the impacts 
of 3RP initiatives throughout the year. Their findings are published in annual reports that 
the partners analyze extensively, compare to the results of neighboring countries, and 
utilize to adjust the planning goals of future years. In general, the reports have shown that 
progress is slow but tangible. The 2019 Sector Response Plans are summarized below:  
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Figure 9.4 Regional/Sectoral Response. Source: UNHCR, ―Regional Strategic Overview 
2019/2020‖, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67370. 
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For the first time, the 3RP provides Jordan with concrete metrics around which it 
can formulate its policies. The importance of this development should not be discounted: 
such a comprehensive national and regional response plan illustrates the incredible 
organizational development Jordan‘s refugee policy has undergone in the course of only a 
few years. The 3RP replaces the government‘s policy of having no policy for the Iraqi 
refugees with a multilateral, multiyear commitment to study and develop solutions for the 
Syrians. Given the government‘s willingness to cooperate, the success of the 3RP now 
depends on Jordan‘s ability to secure the proper funding and political support necessary 
to achieve its goals.  
 
Responsibility Sharing Mechanisms 
The fact that the responsibility of hosting Syrian refugees, both physically and 
financially, has overwhelming fallen on host states like Jordan has not been lost to 
scholars and policymakers. Particularly in recent years, many have proposed a number of 
different ways in which the responsibility sharing mechanisms discussed at length in 
Chapter 2 can be implemented within the context of the current crisis. Two mechanisms 
designed to increase non-host state contributions are discussed below.  
Guy Goodwin-Gil, a former UNHCR official and prominent scholar in the field, 
argues for legal enforcement of responsibility sharing. He points out that host countries 
are criticized and held accountable for involuntary refoulement, but donor countries face 
no repercussions if they do not meet their resettlement quotas or provide sufficient aid. In 
effect, only countries of first asylum are forced to comply with international law. Donor 
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states have little tangible incentives to do so and thus choose to ignore their financial and 
resettlement responsibilities handed down by the Convention and its Protocol. To address 
this deficit, Goodwin-Gil suggests that the UNHCR, donor countries and international 
financial bodies establish a funding mechanism by which the assets of the refugee source 
country are used to offset the cost of hosting its refugees abroad.
49
 By tracking which 
host countries and refugees receive this funding stream, the involved actors could 
accurately distribute the funds to populations in the direst need. 
If the source country refused to accept these demands, the UN could apply 
sanctions or similar enforcement mechanisms to force compliance. By 2014, the UN had 
already passed two resolutions condemning the Syrian regime as violating international 
law. Enforcing these resolutions by forcing Syria to assume responsibility for the 
displacement it caused could curtail its likelihood of furthering the crisis. Goodwin-Gil 
highlights the success of similar measures introduced by the UN Security Council 
following the first Gulf War of 1991.
50
 The Security Council declared Iraq to be liable for 
any direct losses that resulted from its illegal invasion of Kuwait, and created a 
compensation fund to be financed through a percentage of the country‘s oil exports. If 
Iraq failed to comply, the Council determined that funding would come through Iraqi 
assets held by foreign states, corporations, or agencies.
51
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Thus far, the UN has not sought to implement any system similar to the one 
envisioned by Goodwin-Gil. Over 1.3 million Syrians continue to remain in Jordan today 
and place an incredible strain on the country‘s economy, housing markets, and 
government budget. This burden has persisted throughout the crisis: just two years after it 
began, in 2014, Jordan required $1.9 billion to offset the costs of providing for additional 
Syrian refugees.
52
 Its recognition and acceptance of Syrian refugees was predominantly 
dependent on the fact that the UNHCR, other states, and international organizations 
offered them financial incentives to do so. Given the size and longevity of the crisis, 
these incentives have not been sufficient to meet Jordan‘s needs. A legally binding 
agreement to have its losses financed through Syrian assets could encourage Jordan to 
increase its livelihood and integration policies for Syrians in the years to come.  
Still, the system Goodwin-Gil proposes seems to punish Syria without addressing 
the shortcomings of typical donor countries. In a sense, it allows these countries—who 
possess far more capacity to provide the aid Goodwin-Gil envisions—to further evade 
their responsibility. Paul Mutter offered a more promising suggestion for responsibility 
sharing through what he calls a ―Middle Eastern Marshall Plan.‖  Mutter argues that the 
more rich nations neglected to fund refugee aid projects, the more dangerous conditions 
became within host countries. The conflict became increasingly prolonged, as well—all 
at the benefit of Assad and his allies. He states:  
The alternative is greater integration of the refugees into the host countries. This 
is an expensive proposition, but one that ought to be afforded as high (or higher) a 
priority as military expenditures against the Islamic State group. If the Friends of 
Syria can afford to carry out round-the-clock bombing runs, they can afford a 
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mini-Marshall Plan for the Middle East over the next couple of years. Even the 
public image good this would bring the coalition would help discredit the Islamic 
State group and placate refugees' frustrations.
53
 
 
 In other words, Mutter suggests that the funds rich nations allocate towards 
military expenditures may be more productively utilized if directed towards refugees. 
Despite the truth in Mutter‘s words, it is quite unlikely that such a proposition would 
receive direct support from the governments of the rich nations whom it targets. With 
enough popular support, however, it is possible that Mutter‘s proposal could gain 
momentum in the upcoming years. Responsibility sharing mechanisms are clearly 
difficult to practically implement, but remain important considerations in the search for 
more effective solutions.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Seeking alternatives to the durable solutions has proved no easy task for Jordan or 
the international community. While there has been no shortage of innovative strategies 
proposed, the implementation of their lofty goals have stopped many short of being called 
success stories. Increased mobility solutions focused on opening new pathways for 
refugee movement to third countries and utilizing existing channels more effectively. Of 
all the solutions, they are the most straightforward and easily applied. Yet third countries 
have largely failed to recognize the gains to be had from exploiting these strategies. As a 
result, few have been adopted on a large scale.  
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Economic solutions have been widely pursued on a local, national and global 
scale. Although the Jordan Compact received high praise upon its inception, its failure to 
consider key perspectives greatly diminished its impact. Local economic projects, 
however, have proved to be more effective in tangibly improving the lives of those they 
reach. In particular, projects targeting refugees in camps aid in averting the dangers 
accompanying isolation.  
In terms of political solutions, the Global Compact represents the culmination of a 
global shift towards the targeted, organized responses implemented by a number of states 
today. Although the Compact has not had a significant effect on refugee policy within 
many key donor states, the implementation of the 3RP in Jordan signifies an important 
step towards formalizing the state‘s refugee policy. Given the degree to which refugee 
policy in Jordan depends on fluctuating factors such as money and politics, a set of 
tangible policy goals provides a new level of permanency previously unseen.  
Analyzed in tandem, these alternative solutions suggest that increased cooperation 
could go a long way in facilitating more effective refugee policy. The success of a 
solution largely depends on its ability to accommodate the interests of those who 
implement refugee policy with the incentives of refugees themselves. They avoid policies 
which consider the needs of only certain refugee actors, and instead seek initiatives that 
allow both sets of actors to gain value from interacting. Finding this common ground has 
not been easy to achieve. Nevertheless, the proliferation of alternative solutions in Jordan 
provides important recognition of the fact that the future of refugee policy lies beyond of 
the durable solutions.  
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 The next chapter will analyze the cases of Palestinians, Iraqis and Syrians in 
Jordan from a new perspective. Relying upon interviews, presentations, and survey data, 
it will draw in the voices of NGO workers and refugees themselves. In doing so, it will 
seek to better understand the effects of the policies and responses discussed at length in 
the previous chapters.  
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Perspectives on the Ground                  10                            
 
I. Introduction 
 The case studies contained in the past five chapters examined the displacement of 
Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians in Jordan from a policy-centered perspective. They 
aimed to explain the government‘s motivations for responding to refugee crises in the 
ways that it does, and what implications these responses held for each of the refugee 
groups. In doing so, the case studies raised a number of questions. These questions 
included the following: which factors caused Jordan to open or close its borders to those 
seeking asylum? Did the government confer refugee status upon the displaced? When and 
why did the UNHCR or UNRWA play a role in managing the crisis? Did public opinion 
and/or the work of NGOs and private businesses affect refugee policy formation? How 
did the international community contribute to finding solutions—or not? What factors 
prompted certain solutions to be pursued over others? Which solutions to the crises were 
the most effective?  
 The case study chapters drew upon UN reports, previous scholarship, research 
institution publications, and other analytical sources in answering these questions. This 
chapter will supplement their findings by providing a range of on the ground perspectives 
of the refugee crises. It draws upon interviews with NGO workers, presentations 
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delivered by refugees, survey data, and conversations with other individuals in Jordan 
and the Palestinian territories. These practical perspectives serve as a necessary 
complement to the case study chapters‘ analyses in a variety of ways. Although the 
research affirms much of the previous conclusions, it provides a more accurately nuanced 
explanation of the facts on the ground. For example, the common rhetoric surrounding 
the status of Palestinian refugees is that they refuse to relinquish their refugee status so as 
to preserve the right of return. Indeed, this is what many Palestinians will say, when 
asked. Increasingly, however, Palestinians would also say that they do not believe return 
will ever actually occur. In other words, what they think will happen is quite different 
what they believe should happen.  
 In addition to providing more accurately nuanced accounts of differences between 
refugee populations, this chapter will also highlight what refugees, NGO workers, and 
Jordanian citizens perceive to be the most important conclusions to draw about refugee 
policy in Jordan. Given the multitude of factors which the case study chapters revealed 
affect policy, this analysis will hold particular importance for the direction policy should 
take in the future.  
The chapter will first analyze interviews conducted at two prominent NGOs that 
work with refugees in Jordan: the Jesuit Refugee Services, and the Middle Eastern 
Children‘s Institute. It will then turn to accounts from refugees on issues of resettlement, 
employability, social integration, and more. Next, it will consider a number of key 
findings when comparing a public opinion survey conducted with native Jordanians and 
  
307 
 
Syrian refugees in Jordan. Lastly, it will assess Palestinian public opinion through 
interviews and polls.  
Finally, this chapter will serve as a reminder that refugee policy must take into 
consideration the perspectives of those it directly impacts in order to be effective. High-
level reports and policy analyses are important, but so too are the realities experienced by 
refugees and those with whom they interact. This chapter hopes to ensure that refugees 
are not dehumanized by the magnitude of their plight.  
 
II. Perspectives from NGOs 
 Among the various groups influencing refugee policy in Jordan, non-
governmental organizations possess the most frequent interactions with refugees 
themselves. My research conducted in Amman included interviews with a number of 
different NGOs offering a wide range of services to refugees. Two of the most insightful 
interviews were those with the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) and the Middle East 
Children‘s Institute (MECI). The following section highlights the most important details 
drawn from each of these interviews.  
 
Jesuit Refugee Services  
The interview conducted with JRS Director Insherah Mousa provided a holistic 
picture of how different groups of refugees live in Jordan. It revealed that the measures of 
integration discussed in the case study chapters do not always tell the full story of how 
policies affect the livelihoods of refugees. The summary and analysis below will address 
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refugees‘ education, employment, and perspectives on return and resettlement, as well as 
the roles played by the UNHCR, NGOs, and donor states in Jordan.  
Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) is an international non-governmental organization 
that began operating in Jordan in 2008. While its initial operations targeted the displaced 
Iraqi population, it opened its services to other groups of refugees (e.g., Sudanese and 
Somalis) in 2010 and to Syrians in 2013.
1
 Today, it serves a diverse array of groups, 
including Sudanese, Somali, Yemeni, Ethiopian, Iraqi, Syrian, Palestinian, and Egyptian 
refugees. JRS offers two main lines of services for the refugee populations with which it 
works: home visits, and education. The home visits are intended to inform families of the 
services available to them through JRS, as well as the aid to which they are entitled by 
the government and UNHCR. This ensures that refugees possess full information about 
the resources at their disposal as they learn to live in Jordan.  
JRS spreads knowledge of its services through word-of-mouth; there is no 
‗recruiting‘ of refugees or explicit advertisement. In part, this is attributed to the fact that 
the INGO is already overburdened as is with its current operations. The organization also 
seeks to avoid the stigma of ―competing‖ over aid provision. JRS actively informs 
refugees about other NGOs that offer different services, which are plentiful in Amman. In 
addition to the UNHCR, JRS partners with a number of NGOs and INGOs in Jordan 
including the Center for Victims of Torture, the Danish Refugee Council, the Norwegian 
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Refugee Council, CARE International, HelpAge International, and more. In 2018, JRS 
served over 900 families and 4,000 individuals.
2
 
 The second aspect of JRS‘ services—education—targets the problem that many 
Iraqi, Syrian, and African refugees do not speak English or possess the educational tools 
to survive in Jordan or a third country. Unlike Jordanians, most of the refugees that arrive 
in Jordan are not taught English as a second language in their school systems. Given this 
reality, JRS offers five levels of English courses at their facility in Amman.  
Importantly, it also offers a variety of courses on computer skills, business 
management, and more to prepare refugees for easier integration into Jordanian society or 
that of a third country. JRS workers help refugees write their resumes, apply for 
scholarships, and connect with colleges abroad through online classes to attain a higher 
education degree. Refugees can continue to utilize JRS‘ online education resources even 
if they no longer rely on JRS services or have moved outside of Jordan. Through these 
courses, JRS seeks to help refugees overcome the most difficult obstacles to their 
employability in Jordan and resettlement countries.  
 JRS also targets the problem of high dropout rates among refugee children in 
public school systems. Their community learning center allows both children and their 
parents to learn English, Arabic, computer skills, and math. This center also allows 
students and parents to attend social support sessions that teach them healthy coping 
mechanisms for dealing with trauma. Although the sessions are labeled as ―support‖ 
rather than ―therapy‖, JRS will often refer individuals to a clinical psychologist and/or 
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psychiatrist if they prefer professional help. Light-hearted community events like bazaars, 
dialogue projects, movie nights, culture shows, and more complement these support 
groups. Given the high expenses refugees face living in Amman, social events provide a 
free opportunity for them to interact with fellow refugees and community members rather 
than isolate themselves in their homes.  
 Employees at JRS are well aware of the differences in treatment and experience 
between different refugee nationality groups. Mousa noted that Syrian refugees, in 
particular, live quite different lives in Jordan than Iraqi or African refugees. Her practical 
rationale was that the difference was caused by a combination of the timing of Syrian 
displacement and their sheer numbers. With regards to the first aspect, she explained that 
the economic situation in Jordan was more favorable from the years 2003 to 2007—
during which the largest numbers of Iraqis came—than it was in the years following, 
when the Syrians began to arrive.  
This reality, paired with the fact that many Iraqis were large investors in the 
Jordanian economy and held middle-class jobs, led the government to believe that they 
did not require significant formal support.
3
 Some Iraqis could rely on their existing 
wealth, they reasoned, and some could access work as middle-upper class professionals. 
Those that could afford neither option should be encouraged to move onward. Many of 
the Iraqis that JRS serves fall into the latter category, having arrived in Jordan without 
substantial resources and lacking the connections, education, or resources to migrate or 
resettle in a third country. This aligns well with the ideas put forth in Chapter 7, which 
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emphasized that Jordan‘s laissez-faire policies towards the Iraqis were driven by 
economic and political concerns. Mousa emphasized that the former factor may have 
been more important than the latter. 
 Syrians, on the other hand, arrived in overwhelming waves during a time when 
the Jordanian economy was performing poorly. Their demographics differed as well; 
many more Syrians were in need of financial assistance, which the government simply 
could not afford. JRS emphasized that the government likely feared that if they denied 
Syrians basic necessities on such a large scale, the refugees could resort to violence. 
Given the alternative of closing its borders to thousands seeking safety, the government 
thus turned to international organizations and donor states for help. Its choice to do so, 
paired with the eventual opening of the labor market to Syrian refugees, still drives 
divisions between Syrians and other groups of refugees today.  
Syrians continue to receive much more assistance than Iraqi and African refugees 
from the UNHCR, NGOs, and the government. Syrians can also access work permits for 
manufacturing, agricultural or construction positions, which are markets that possess a 
very small percentage of Jordanian laborers. Their ability to access both formal and 
informal work more easily than these other groups makes a great deal of difference. 
Mousa explains that many refugees vocalize their resentment of the division this creates 
between refugee groups. Over time, the organization has adopted to accommodate the 
needs of each groups‘ differences. In example, it offers classes and programs during the 
  
312 
 
day for unemployed refugees (mostly Iraqis and African refugees) and at night for other 
refugees (mostly Syrians) that work during the day.
4
  
 Expanding on the point of employment, Mousa explained that Iraqis trained as 
engineers, doctors, and professors occasionally receive access to work in large companies 
in Jordan. However, she qualified that the companies must be willing to pay for their 
work permits, which only some are able to do. Refugees with lower levels of education 
are not so lucky: no one would pay for a work permit for an Iraqi school teacher, Mousa 
explained, given how saturated the labor markets for teachers is in Jordan (and Amman, 
in particular). When asked about Palestinian refugees, she responded that they get along 
just fine with regards to work; many hold citizenship, and if they do not, they very likely 
hold work permits. Even most ex-Gazans are allowed to work as well.
5
  
 Today, the Jordanian government cedes a great deal of responsibility to the 
UNHCR and NGOs in Jordan over refugee assistance and aid activities. After all, none of 
the financial assistance the refugees receive comes from the government: all funds are 
derived from the UNHCR, whose pockets are filled via state donations. NGOs like JRS 
submit reports regarding the refugees with which they interact to various Ministries 
within the government, such as that of Education or Social Development, which then 
cooperate with the UNHCR and other actors to formulate policy response plans.  
 Many refugees that seek services at JRS also receive cash assistance from the 
UNHCR. Although for some this assistance represents their only form of income, Mousa 
explained that the UNHCR cash program often faces cuts and fails to deliver the 
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promised aid on its expected monthly basis. She described the uncertainty refugees face 
as a result, waiting each month to receive a text message from the UNHCR stating 
whether or not the cash had been deposited into their account. While the assistance 
payments used to be more reasonable, today Syrian refugee receives only 75 JDs per 
month. In most areas of Amman, this amount barely covers half of the cost of rent.  
The Iraqis who registered with the UNHCR in Jordan likewise did not receive any 
livable sum. When probed about the source of this instability, the JRS representative 
responded that cash assistance depends directly on funding from donors. By now, the 
Syrian crisis has ―exhausted‖ donors, who increasingly face calls to turn their attention to 
crises in areas such as Yemen or Burma. This trend applies to some of the major 
international organizations as well, like UNICEF, who chose to cut many of their 
programs in camps to divert resources to crises elsewhere.
6
  
 JRS perceives that refugees‘ opinions about repatriation depend greatly on their 
nationality. Palestinians may say that they wish to return home, but they only refer to the 
idea as a ―dream‖: at this point in the conflict, they hold little hope that return will ever 
be a reality. Most Iraqis likewise believe that there ―is no Iraq anymore‖. They think that 
the war destroyed all forms of social cohesion and political order that previously 
characterized their country. Instead, if they are unable to find quality work in Jordan, they 
prefer resettlement.  
Lastly, Syrians hold mixed views. Many still hope to return to Syria one day, 
though few report having plans to do so in the near future. Others see themselves 
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remaining in Jordan. They fear the political consequences they could face upon returning, 
and believe that physical and sociological reconstruction of the land must occur before 
they could be comfortable with return. Although some have received approval for 
resettlement, not all choose to leave: language barriers, different cultural and religious 
practices, and fear prevent some from making the journey to third countries such as 
Canada or the United States. Unless Syrian refugees are given the opportunity to work 
immediately with the skills they already possess, they do not perceive resettlement to be a 
particularly desirable or beneficial solution.  
 When asked how refugees in Jordan fared in comparison to other states, Mousa 
responded that Jordanians handle the refugee crises they have faced with ―good hearts‖. 
Pointing to Lebanon, she highlighted that Syrians and Palestinians there face much more 
discrimination, while Iraqis are generally denied entry altogether. Palestinians in Jordan, 
especially, ―think just like Jordanians‖, she said. Despite the hardships refugees face in 
Jordan, JRS seems to think that they still enjoy much more potential to sustain 
themselves than in neighboring states.  
This is particularly striking when one considers the fact that Jordanians 
themselves face difficulties in accessing quality public services. Hospitals and schools 
face serious issues of overcrowding, which tend to worsen with refugee influxes. Indeed, 
in Amman, the number of pupils in each class rose from 45 to 60 with the arrival of 
Syrian refugees.
7
 Jordanians are angered when such notable shifts manifest themselves 
without proper government or international organizations‘ support. Despite their 
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generosity towards refugees, they tend to resort to calling for restrictions on refugee entry 
or return. Public opinion is thus highly dependent on the ability of the government, 
international organizations and NGOs to offset the impact society feels from the refugees.  
  Mousa believed a number of steps could be taken to address the difficulties 
facing the refugee system in Jordan. To begin, she thought that the government should 
play a bigger role in organizing the system. Although the King himself advocates for 
increased investment in programs for Syrian refugees, his calls have recently fallen on 
deaf ears on the international level. Within Jordan, the poor state of the economy and 
strapped budget means that the government is hardly providing enough support for 
Jordanians themselves. Changing policies to be more favorable to refugees would be nice 
on paper, Mousa said, but they would be difficult to implement if the Jordanian public 
perceived them as infringing upon their own opportunities and well-being.  
Because of this, she believes that the private sector should adopt a larger role in 
supporting refugees. She cites a number of partnerships between international 
corporations that worked with the UNHCR in Jordan to employ refugees as quite 
effective, including those with IKEA and Zain. The Talent Beyond Boundaries program 
is also well-known among NGO workers and perceived to offer refugees valuable 
opportunities to find employment in resettlement countries that fits their particular skill 
set.
8
  
 The last set of questions I chose to ask related to the efficacy of the UNHCR and 
its durable solutions. Mousa immediately pointed out there was a ―protection gap‖ 
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between the UNHCR‘s stated policies and the services refugees actually receive. The 
rhetoric expressed by UNHCR member states at international conferences, featuring talk 
of expanding solutions and increasing cooperation, does little to address the realities on 
the ground of refugees freezing in camps or dying from treatable conditions due to a lack 
of healthcare. Rather than attempting to form new policies that few states, if any, will 
actually follow, the UNHCR should invest its resources in fundraising campaigns and 
direct donations towards new infrastructure in major host countries, like hospitals or 
schools.  
Moreover, many donor countries fail to acknowledge that refugee crises do not 
resolve themselves quickly. The Syrian crisis, though it has lasted over five years, still 
features many individuals in ―emergency‖ situations. As such, the UNHCR should take a 
more vocal position of advocacy to raise the funds necessary from donor states to fund 
the continuation of aid programs in host countries. Discussions of changing international 
laws and updating policy should wait until organizations and governments have found a 
way to effectively address the practical needs of refugees in crisis situations.  
 In conclusion, the JRS Director noted that the public‘s perception of refugees in 
Jordan is likely to get worse in the near future. The less aid Jordan receives from donor 
states and international organizations, the louder Jordanians call for Syrians, Iraqis and 
other groups of refugees to return home. The current environment does little to foster 
social cohesion. Moreover, if the current realities of waning donor support, declining 
domestic economic conditions, and divisive policies for refugees of different nationalities 
continue, refugees will be forced to address their situations in illegal or unproductive 
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ways. These could include black market employment, irregular onward migration, 
violence or crime, extremism, and more. Unfortunately, Mousa does not see any of these 
realities becoming less poignant in the near future.
9
  
 
The Middle East Children’s Institute  
My interview with a field worker at the Middle East Children‘s Institute (MECI) 
provided a much more in depth look at the education of refugee children in Jordan. It 
shows that Jordan has done particularly well in propping up NGO and UN programs in 
the field of education in the wake of the Syrian crisis. Yet this seems to be dependent on 
the foreign aid and donations these programs receive, which continue to decrease as 
support for the crisis wanes—emphasizing the point that the effectiveness of integration 
solutions in Jordan is very closely linked to international funding.  
Like JRS, MECI is an international NGO operating in Amman. MECI differs 
from JRS in that it was specifically established to serve Syrian refugees, with the 
mandate of providing education and protection to women and children in need.
10
 All of 
its services are available to Jordanians as well. This point is important; despite the fact 
that its programs are vastly underfunded and routinely experience budget cuts, MECI 
allows for equal access from refugees and citizens alike in Jordan. Doing so achieves two 
purposes: it allows refugees to feel a higher level of social cohesion and experience the 
same rights as everyone else, and helps Jordanians who are likewise struggling to support 
themselves benefit from international aid. What‘s more, the dialogue this structure 
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promotes between the two groups paves the way for a more natural integration process, 
be it temporary or permanent.  
Today, in Amman, MECI operates through a grant from UNICEF to provide 
education for refugee and Jordanian children aged 6 to 12. In partnership with UNICEF, 
MECI runs twenty four schools in Jordan that offer sessions lasting three and a half 
hours. Although its classes are open to refugees of all nationalities, eighty percent of its 
students are Syrian. The students take five classes: English, Arabic, math, art, and 
physical education. These traditional classes are supplemented by social support sessions. 
Social support classes are tailored to both adults and children, and are meant to teach 
child protection techniques and provide psychosocial support. It is these types of classes 
that the field worker believed are the most important in facilitating refugees‘ successful 
transitions into Jordanian society.    
With regards to education, the field worker believed that the government has done 
well by opening public schools to Syrians and establishing catch-up programs to ensure 
that children who have missed years or months of schooling do not fall behind their 
peers. Without catch-up programs, children are often forced to drop out of schools. The 
Ministry of Education has addressed the problem of dropouts, as well: a unique program 
allows children aged 9 to 12 to complete two academic years in only one year, enabling 
them to enter back into the school system at a more age-appropriate level. The field 
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worker points out that these kinds of initiatives have not been taken in nearby states like 
Lebanon, making the Syrians in Jordan quite fortunate in this respect.
11
  
UNICEF, running schools in partnership with MECI, has also made strides to 
reverse some of the obstacles preventing Syrian children from enrolling in public schools 
in higher numbers. In example, some children must work to support their families 
financially rather than attend school. UNICEF established a needs-based program to 
provide families in these situations with cash assistance, in an effort to alleviate the 
burden placed on children to work instead of receive an education. UNICEF partners with 
the UNHCR on a number of other programs to ensure that the latter agency‘s goals of 
providing greater access to quality education for refugee children is met, as part of its 
Comprehensive Response Framework. The field worker expressed that the UNHCR has 
done well in achieving its stated goals in the area of education in Jordan. Unlike Mousa, 
she did not perceive any significant gap in its policy work and the realities on the ground.   
According to the field worker, the refugees‘ perceptions of their treatment in 
Jordan are quite positive. Most Syrians feel that Jordan is a safe place for them to live, 
regardless of the longevity of their stay. The parents of children at MECI schools often 
hold work permits and are grateful that the Jordanian government has permitted them 
access to legal employment. The field worker reported that Syrians‘ interests with regards 
to durable solutions vary. Many of the families with which they interact express a desire 
to return to Syria one day. Others are content with their new lives in Jordan and would 
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prefer to stay indefinitely. Still others have relatives or connections in foreign countries, 
and hope to resettle when the circumstances allow them to do so.
12
  
The field worker also had a great deal to say about public opinion among 
Jordanians on the issue of Syrian refugees. At the beginning of the crisis, both Jordanian 
citizens and the government generously sought to ensure that refugees were given safety 
and rights within Jordan. The government opened schools to the refugees shortly after the 
peak of the crisis. Government officials often overlooked requirements of official 
documentation for children to enroll in schools in the short term.
13
 As the situation 
progressed, however, it became more and more difficult to ensure that these privileges 
were provided without negatively impacting the lives of Jordanians themselves. Public 
schools were already strapped for resources before Syrians arrived, and the sudden 
enrollment of refugee children in 2013 had a severe impact on class sizes and the quality 
of education received by Jordanian children. Jordan is a poor country, she said, and both 
the Syrians and Jordanians are aware of that fact. Much more aid is needed from the 
international community in order for Jordan to continue its tolerant policies for Syrians.  
The field worker perceived that the Jordanian government has an accurate 
understanding of what refugees want and need in the context of the Syrian crisis. It has 
experience with refugees; it knows, from the integration of Palestinians, that refugee 
groups have potential to contribute positively to society. MECI observes high levels of 
social cohesion among refugees groups and Jordanian nationals in Jordan. Still, the 
international community lacks a proper comprehension of how severe the crisis remains 
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and what should be done in Jordan to address the issues it creates. After seven years, 
funding for refugee programs in Jordan has decreased significantly, and continues to 
decline.
14
 The most important action that must be taken by the international community 
should be to maintain—and ideally, increase—funding for refugee programs in Jordan. 
Programs without funding will be shut down, and is very unlikely that the Jordanian 
government would step in to provide the service itself. International aid has a very acute 
impact on the lives of refugees in Jordan.  
 
III. Perspectives from Refugees 
 During my time in Jordan, I also attended a series of presentations delivered by 
refugees who were students in an Intermediate English class at JRS. The presentations 
covered a wide range of topics, including issues relating to a refugee‘s ability to find 
employment, social integration in Jordan, resettlement processes, and more. The students 
conducted their own interviews for the projects by connecting with respondents through 
NGOs like JRS, drawing upon familial or community networks, and sending out 
electronic surveys. The respondents varied in age, gender, nationality, and personal 
background, but all lived in Jordan as refugees or asylum seekers at the time of the 
survey. The projects presented offer valuable insight on a number of pertinent topics 
related to their perceptions of living in Jordan as a refugee and the role the international 
community plays in crises.  
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Refugee Employability 
 Refugees‘ opinions on the major challenges they face in finding employment and 
recommended solutions for host countries and countries of resettlement reveal that 
employability is a nuanced issue. The survey results of the presentations are discussed 
below.
15
  
 The first presentation, titled ―Refugees‘ Employability in the Host Countries and 
the Country of Resettlement‖, was conducted by two Iraqi refugees. The first question in 
their survey addressed whether international organizations or other states assisted 
refugees in finding work within host countries like Jordan. Two thirds of refugees 
responded that they did not. The wording of the question, ―assisting refugees to work‖, 
aimed to include any activities sponsored by international actors within Jordan that could 
help refugees. The results that the majority of refugees did not perceive having any 
international support in finding work is not surprising. Still, the 32.9 percent of refugees 
indicating that the international community does offer support to find work is not 
insignificant. It suggests that the initiatives by corporations abroad or international 
organizations have gained enough traction that nearly 1 in every 3 refugees knows of the 
opportunities they offer.  
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Question 1- Is there international support for assisting refugees to work in host 
countries? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1 International Support for Assisting Refugees‘ to Work in Host Countries. 
Source: Sabbagh et. al., ―Refugees‘ Employability in the Host Countries and the Country 
of Resettlement.‖ 
 
 
An equivalent percentage of refugees—67.1 per cent—believed that it was the 
government rather than international actors which help refugees find jobs: 
Question 10- Do governments help refuges to find jobs?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2 Do Governments Help Refugees find Jobs? Source: Sabbagh et. al., 
―Refugees‘ Employability in the Host Countries and the Country of Resettlement.‖ 
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Refugees also perceive that there are many more organizations helping to develop 
employment-related skills in resettlement countries. Indeed, most resettlement countries 
do have short-term programs for resettled refugees through which they can learn more 
about available employment opportunities, learn basic language skills, and develop their 
professional abilities.  
 
Question 5- Are there organizations that help developing the skills required in the 
labour market of resettlement countries? 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.3 Do Organizations Help Develop Skills in Resettlement Countries? Source: 
Sabbagh et. al., ―Refugees‘ Employability in the Host Countries and the Country of 
Resettlement.‖ 
 
Still, many refugees perceive that language is the overwhelming barrier they face 
when looking for jobs in resettlement countries. Refugees without English language 
fluency often experience difficulty in finding a job which matches their education or 
former work experience. Many are underemployed or remain unemployed for much 
longer as a result.  
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Question 16- What is the most significant obstacle for refugees when looking for job 
in the resettlement countries? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.4 Significant Obstacles to Finding Jobs in Resettlement Countries. Sabbagh et. 
al., ―Refugees‘ Employability in the Host Countries and the Country of Resettlement.‖ 
 
The perception of how well refugees working in resettlement countries integrated 
into their new societies was surprisingly high. Nearly three fourths of all survey 
respondents reported that integration was ―good‖, while another 17.1 per cent responded 
that it was ―excellent‖ and only 8.6 per cent said it was ―bad‖.  
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Question 12- How do you rate the integration of refugees working in resettlement 
societies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.5 Integration of Refugees in Resettlement Societies. Sabbagh et. al., 
―Refugees‘ Employability in the Host Countries and the Country of Resettlement.‖ 
 
 
The conclusion to their project provided suggested actions that host country 
governments, resettlement country governments, and refugees themselves should take. 
The authors first affirm that ―the responsibility of solving this problem falls on 
Governments at host countries and resettlement countries, and it falls on refugees too. In 
our opinion, cooperation is the pivotal solution to this issue.‖16 In other words, all those 
involved in refugee crises—even refugees themselves—have a duty to change their 
behaviour so as to address their resolutions more effectively. Their specific conclusions 
are summarized as follows:  
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 The international community should support host countries through greater 
financial aid so that they can provide job opportunities to refugees. They 
should monitor host countries‘ work to ensure that they are spending the aid 
appropriately.  
 Host countries should issue more work permits for refugees, fight racism in 
the workplace and prevent exploitation and low wages. It should also work 
with the UNHCR to process asylum and resettlement cases faster.  
 Resettlement countries should provide refugees with jobs that do not require 
language fluency, help improve their language skills through free courses, and 
support students in studying and holding part-time jobs.  
 Refugees should seek to integrate into their community by adapting to the 
labor market quickly, avoiding black market employment and depending on 
their own resources rather than financial aid.
17
  
 
This conclusion emphasizes that refugees believe there are a number of actions 
governments and refugees should be taking which do not necessarily require an increase 
in monetary resources. The act of increasing oversight on how donated funds are 
allocated could lessen resource waste and ensure that aid is not falling into corrupt hands. 
Fighting racism and exploitation, though difficult, would increase social cohesion in 
Jordan and create a more regulated economy. Likewise, incorporating refugees into 
language classes in resettlement countries—given that many already have the 
infrastructure to provide these services—is a low-cost but highly effective method of 
facilitating integration. Lastly, increasing self-reliance among refugees is known to 
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benefit host communities and refugee populations a great deal. The solutions offered by 
refugees are practical, easily-implemented options that host and donor countries would do 
well to consider.  
 
Social Integration 
 Another set of presentations focused on the difficulties refugees faced adapting to 
life and work in resettlement countries. The language, religion, and cultural practices of 
resettlement countries is often vastly different than what refugees experience in their 
home country, making resettlement a difficult option for most. The figures below 
highlight a number of factors which contribute to making integration a challenging 
process:  
 43% of refugees can speak the main language of the resettlement country, but 
only 21% report to be able to speak and write the language with full fluency. 
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Table 10.1 Refugees‘ Fluency in Language of Resettlement Country  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Ayad Yaqoob Al-Shaya, Suha Saeed Naoom, Ahmed Farhan 
Barakat, and Makarem Burhan, ―Oversees Skills and Qualifications Recognition,‖ 
presentation at Jesuit Refugees Services, January 8
th
, 2019.  
 
 
 46% of refugees report that they failed to connect with their new communities 
due to language difficulties, and 54% of children report difficulties relating to 
education due to language barriers. 
 86% of refugees are enrolled or show interest in being enrolled in language 
classes. 
 38.5% of refugees believe that physical disability, skin color, religion and 
nationality all affect refugees‘ access to work. 58.5% believe that these factors do 
not affect access to work, and the remainder was uncertain.  
 Only 38.5% of refugees said they had knowledge about labor laws in countries of 
resettlement; 61.5% said they did not know.
18
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Table 10.2 Knowledge of Resettlement Country‘s Labor Laws among Refugees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Ayad Yaqoob Al-Shaya, Suha Saeed Naoom, Ahmed Farhan 
Barakat, and Makarem Burhan, ―Oversees Skills and Qualifications Recognition,‖ 
presentation at Jesuit Refugees Services, January 8
th
, 2019.  
 
 
These figures confirm that language is one of the most important factors affecting 
integration in resettlement countries. Less than half of the refugees surveyed could speak 
or write the language of resettlement countries at all, and only a small minority could do 
so fluently. Increasing accessible and affordable language classes could go a long way in 
making resettlement a more desirable, beneficial solution.  
Another presentation analyzed the perceptions of social integration among only 
Iraqi refugees. Their analysis of results indicated that most survey respondents believed 
that the host country—in this case, Jordan—does not signficantly change their socio-
cultural behavior, does not guarantee their rights, and does not necessitate that they learn 
the host language. In comparison, most respondents agreed that resettlement countries 
38% 
62% 
Knowledge of Resettlement Country's Labor 
Laws among Refugees 
Possessed some knowledge
Possessed no knowledge
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treat men and women equally, provides for freedom of expression, protects against 
religious discrimination, and promotes interest in learning about new cultures.
19
 These 
opinions confirm that Jordan has not created a hospitable environment for Iraqi refugees: 
many feel socially isolated and perceive that there are few meaningful opportunties for 
integration. As a result, Iraqi refugees desire to resettle in third countries, which they 
believe offer a wider breadth of rights and freedoms accompanying the promise of a 
permanent new home.   
All the presentations on social integration concluded by encouraging refugees to 
make a greater effort to integrate themelves into their resettlement communities. 
Refugees tend to isolate themselves after they resettle, which often makes it more 
difficult to learn the new language, form social connections, understand the culture, and 
find work. Social integration is an incredibly important aspect of resettlement that is 
rarely discussed when speaking about refugee solutions or livelihoods.   
 
 
IV. Comparing Jordanians and Syrian Refugees 
One of the most informative surveys measuring public opinion in the Middle East 
is the Arab Barometer. Arab Barometer has conducted four waves of surveys of public 
opinion in a range of Middle Eastern countries, including Jordan, with the first wave 
beginning in 2006 and the most recent covering 2016-2017. The research is funded by the 
United States Agency for International Development, International Development 
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Research Centre, Qatar National Research Fund, Princeton University, and the University 
of Michigan.  
The survey data is gathered through face-to-face interviews and is meant to be 
nationally representative at the household level. The data summarized below come from 
samples of 1200 Jordanian citizens and 300 Syrian refugees living outside of camps in 
Jordan.  
 
Arab Barometer Results  
 How satisfied are you with the educational system in our country? 
 
Jordanian Response: 70.75% responded with ―satisfied‖ or ―very satisfied‖ 
Syrian Refugee Response: 63.3% responded with ―satisfied or ―very satisfied‖20 
 
 
 How satisfied are you with the healthcare system in our country? 
 
Jordanian Response: 78.3% responded with ―satisfied‖ or ―very satisfied‖ 
Syrian Refugee Response: 68.3% responded with ―satisfied‖ or ―very 
satisfied‖21 
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Table 10.3 Satisfaction with Education and Healthcare Systems in Jordan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Arab Barometer, ―Arab Barometer Wave IV (2016-2017),‖ 
(2018), http://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/. 
 
 
 Do you work?  
 
Jordanian Response: 30% responded ―yes‖; employment rate calculated at 
72.65%
22
 
Syrian Refugee Response: 20% responded ―yes‖; employment rate calculated at 
43.34%
23
 
                                                 
22
 Arab Barometer, ―Arab Barometer Wave IV (2016-2017).‖   
Only 145 of the respondents cited that this was because they were ―unemployed‖ or ―other‖: the rest were 
students, retired, or housewives. The employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of employed 
individuals by those in the unemployed or other category, as the remaining categories are not considered to 
be part of the labor market under the definition set forth by the ILO. This framework was likewise used to 
generate the employment statistics featured in previous chapters.  
23
 Only 81 of the respondents cited that this was because they were ―unemployed‖ or ―other‖: the rest were 
students, retired, or housewives. The employment rate is calculated using the same methodology cited 
above.  
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Table 10.4 Syrian Refugee Employment Rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Arab Barometer, ―Arab Barometer Wave IV (2016-2017).‖ 
 
 
 
Table 10.5 Jordanian Employment Rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Data adapted from Arab Barometer, ―Arab Barometer Wave 
IV (2016-2017).‖ 
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 What is the total monthly income for all household members? 
 
Jordanian Response: 66% said less than JOD450 a month, only 38% said less 
than JOD300 a month 
 
Syrian Refugee Response: 74.67% had incomes less than JOD450 a month, 67% 
had incomes less than JD300 a month
24
 
 
 
 
Table 10.6 Monthly Income Comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Data adapted from Arab Barometer, ―Arab Barometer Wave 
IV (2016-2017).‖ 
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 ―Arab Barometer Wave IV (2016-2017).‖ 
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 Would you like having immigrants and foreign workers as neighbors, dislike it, or 
not care? 
Jordanian Response: 32.83% responded with ―strongly dislike‖ or ―somewhat 
dislike‖ 
Syrian Refugee Response: 5% responded with ―strongly dislike‖ or ―somewhat 
dislike‖25 
 
 
 
Table 10.7 Dissatisfaction in Jordan with Foreign/Immigrant Neighbors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Data adapted from Arab Barometer, ―Arab Barometer Wave 
IV (2016-2017).‖ 
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 ―Arab Barometer Wave IV (2016-2017).‖ 
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 What is your country of origin? 
 
Only applicable to Jordanians:  29.17% Palestinian, 70.25% Jordanian, .5% 
were Syrian or other.
26
 
 
 
Table 10.8 Nationality of Jordanian Respondent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from Data adapted from Arab Barometer, ―Arab Barometer Wave 
IV (2016-2017).‖ 
 
 
 The first two questions of the survey confirm that Syrian refugees are only 
slightly less satisfied with the education and healthcare in Jordan. This seems expected, 
as they are formally allowed to access the same services as Jordanians but are known to 
experience discrimination or other difficulties in doing so. The third question reveals an 
interesting, though perhaps not unexpected, observation about Jordanians‘ opinions of 
                                                 
26
 ―Arab Barometer Wave IV (2016-2017).‖ 
29.19% 
70.31% 
0.50% 
Nationality of Jordanian Respondent  
Palestinian
Jordanian
Syrian Non-Refugee/Other
  
338 
 
foreigners or immigrants compared to refugees‘. Roughly one third of Jordanians 
responded that they would strongly or somewhat dislike having foreigners or immigrants 
as neighbors, compared to only five percent among Syrian refugees. This shows that 
there remains some level of distrust or dislike of refugees among Jordanian nationals, 
though these sentiments are not in the majority. Refugees, as expecteed, show very 
minimal levels of distrust towards foreigners.  
 The employment rates of Jordanians versus Syrians are also rather shocking. 
Jordanians have an effective employment rate of about 73 percent, while Syrians have a 
rate of only 43 percent. The nearly 30 percent gap between these figures is incredibly 
signficant. It shows that while some working age Syrian males were able to aquire work 
by 2016-2017, the majority had not. This confirms the observation that work permit 
initatives were slow to take hold. On a similar note, the survey reveals that Syrians are 
much more likely to live with very low incomes than Jordanians. Again, this is not 
surprising: poverty levels among refugees in Jordan are known to be high, especially 
given their diffuclties in finding work.  
 The last question of the survey was included merely to illustrate that a sizeable 
minority of Jordanian nationals identify Palestine as their country of origin. This shows 
that speaking of ―Jordanian public opinion‖ necessarily includes the opinions of refugees, 
or descendents of refugees, as well.   
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V.  Palestinian Perspectives 
 The majority of the analysis thus far has expressed opinions only from Syrian and 
Iraqi refugees. The common narrative in Jordan is that Palestinians, though many retain 
their legal status as refugees, have been integrated to such a degree that their livelihood 
needs and socio-economic rights do not necessitate consideration in the same way as 
those of the Syrians and Iraqis. Indeed, Chapters 5 and 6 showed that the question of 
solutions for the Palestinians is quite different than that for the other refugee populations. 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan have been given a practical solution, through integration; 
but have been deprived of a durable legal solution, as their refugee status persists. In 
Jordan, many Palestinian refugees have indeed been granted citizenship. The question 
must be raised of why Palestinians seek to maintain their legal refugeehood when, by 
today‘s practical standards, they are no longer refugees.  
 My conversations with Palestinians in the West Bank shed light on why the right 
of return continues to be considered sacred to Palestinian refugees. Many referred to the 
fact that Israel continues to uphold a law that any Jew in the world can ―return‖ to the 
State of Israel and be given citizenship. This law, called the Law of Return, was passed in 
1950 after the war and intended to encourage Jewish settlement in Israel.
27
 Palestinians 
take issue with the fact that they are prevented from returning to territory in Israel or 
Palestine (and their homes or villages, in particular) when Jews who have never lived 
there or have any tangible relation to the land are legally encouraged to settle there by the 
state. In a sense, the Law of Return allows repatriation for a people who are not refugees, 
                                                 
27
 ―The Law of Return 5710,‖ The State of Israel, last updated 2013, 
https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm.  
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and denies the same right to those that do hold refugee status. This notion is inherently 
contradictory. Although there is enough land available for refugees seeking return to 
occupy, it remains politically impossible for them to do so.  
 All this said, opinion among Palestinians on the right of return reflects increasing 
pessimism about its prospects. Palestinian Public Opinion Poll no. 69, conducted by a 
center at the An-Najah National University in October 2018, found the following results:  
 Two-thirds of Gazans say Palestinians should accept that the ―right of return‖ 
does not apply to Israel, but only to the West Bank and Gaza, if that is the price of 
a Palestinian state.  
 79 percent of Gazans would accept the ―permanent resettlement‖ of Palestinians 
from other countries in just the West Bank or Gaza, ―even if that is not where 
their families originally came from.‖  
 59 percent of Gazans say it would be a good idea if ―Arab states offered extra 
economic aid in order to resettle Palestinian refugees in the West Bank or Gaza, 
but not inside Israel.‖ 
 48 percent of West Bankers would accept that refugees not return to Israel, though 
52 percent are opposed.  
 Two thirds of West Bankers would accept the permanent resettlement of diaspora 
Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza even if their families originated inside 
Israel. 
  
341 
 
 The majority of West Bankers think that ―regardless of what‘s right, the reality is 
that… most Palestinians will not return to the 1948 lands.‖  
 Gazans agree by smaller margin—61 percent—that Palestinians will not return to 
the 1948 lands. 
 32 percent of Palestinians believe that the most vital goal confronting their people 
should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and 
villages; this compares to 42 percent, who believe that it should be to end Israeli 
occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
 28
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 David Pollock, ―For a State, Palestinians Would Cede Right of Return - and More,‖ The Washington 
Institute (December 3, 2018), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/for-a-state-
palestinians-would-cede-right-of-return. ―Public Opinion Poll No (69),‖ Palestinian Center for Policy and 
Survey Research (September 12, 2018), 
http://pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2069%20English%20full%20text%20June%202018.pdf.  
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Table 10.9 The Most Important Goals facing the Palestinian People  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data adapted from ―Public Opinion Poll No (69).‖  
 
These statistics demonstrate that achieving the right of return remains an 
important stated goal of the Palestinian people. Although they view it as an increasingly 
unrealistic option, it continues to serve as a bargaining chip in the ongoing struggle 
towards peace.  
 Perhaps the most poignant point made in my research was a comparison between 
the Nakbah and a recent American tragedy. A Palestinian in Ramallah explained that over 
750,000 people died or went missing after 1948. He then stated, ―Think about it—that‘s 
over one hundred September 11
th‘s.‖ If a tragedy of this magnitude occurred today, to 
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Americans, a call for justice and reparations would surely be expected. More than 
seventy years after the Nakbah, such calls by the Palestinians continue to be fair game, as 
there is no statute of limitations on war crimes. The Palestinian steadfastness—sumud, in 
Arabic—is rooted in the idea that time does not diminish their right to a just peace. A 
refugee from a destroyed village near Jerusalem called Lifta expressed his hope in the 
following way: ―Every occupier, every occupation in history has finished. And this will 
finish too‖. 
 Such opinions illustrate the broader reality that the circumstances, political 
interests, and practical facts of refugee crises are incredibly nuanced. The Palestinian case 
is like no other in the world. Still, given that Protracted Refugee Situations are 
increasingly common, refugee policy must find a way to adapt to the different realities of 
each displacement in a way that provides increased access to solutions while not 
compromising the desires of the refugees themselves. Palestinians provide a clear 
example of the ongoing struggle to do so. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
 The research in this chapter confirms that speaking of ―solutions‖ to refugee 
crises necessitates consideration of a broad array of facts and opinions. What constitutes a 
solution for one group of people may be very different compared to that of another. 
Given this reality, preserving refugees‘ abilities to choose amongst solutions and 
formulating policy around those choices is integral aspect of effective solutions.  
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Still, well-formulated policies do not always do what they set out to accomplish. 
As the interviews and data points included in this chapter demonstrate, ensuring that the 
policies implemented actually achieve their intended results and are beneficial to those 
invovled is not a simple or straightforward process.  Ultimately, this chapter shows that 
there can be no singular policy framework for addressing refugee crises: policy responses 
must be fluid, adaptive, and well-managed to be effective.  
 The next and final chapter will seek to draw conclusions to the questions raised at 
the beginning of this chapter. It will compare the factors which affect refugee policy for 
each of the crises, including Jordan‘s initial responses and its long term efforts towards 
durable solutions. Looking ahead, it will analyze what implications these past policy 
decisions have on the future treatment of refugees in Jordan. Whether NGOs, the 
UNHCR and UNRWA, and businesses will play a signficant role in implementing 
solutions will be addressed as well. Lastly, the chapter will discuss how international 
refugee law might evolve in the years to come.  
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Conclusion                                                       11                            
 
 
For many years, our country's security and stability and our citizens' generous 
compassion have led desperate refugees to our doors. In the past five years the Syrian 
crisis has sent Jordan's burden skyrocketing. Some 2.5 million Syrians have crossed into 
Jordan since 2011. Today we are hosting 1.5 million Syrians, one for every five of our 
own citizens. Across my country, Jordanians are suffering. No one is justified in 
questioning our commitment and sacrifices…all countries agree that the Syrian refugee 
crisis will be with us all for years to come, and a sustainable solution is the key. If 
regional refugee hosts are abandoned and left to fail, the need won't disappear. The crisis 
will simply spread further, prolonging the time it takes to end this ordeal. The cost in 
human suffering will be unspeakable….As a collective effort, we must now adequately 
respond to the true expected need, the true broad impact, and the true duration of the 
crisis. 
 
—King Abdullah II, at the UN Leaders‘ Summit on Refugees, 2016.1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The question at the heart of the preceding analysis was why the world has been 
unable to solve refugee crises. It has become clear that there is no simple or singular way 
to generate an answer. By analyzing refugee policy in Jordan, this manuscript aimed to 
shed light on how and why Jordan chose to ―solve‖ three major refugee crises in the ways 
that it did. In some instances, its choices restricted refugees‘ ability to pursue a higher 
quality of life or a political resolution to their refugee status. In many others, they 
                                                 
1 ―King urges increased global engagement ‗without delay‘ to tackle refugee crisis,‖ The Jordan Times 
(September 22, 2016), http://jordantimes.com/news/local/king-urges-increased-global-engagement-
without-delay%E2%80%99-tackle-refugee-crisis.  
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provided refugees with the safety, protection, and rights that they fundamentally deserve 
as human beings and global citizens.   
The world stands to learn a great deal from the lessons contained within the 
development of Jordan‘s refugee policy. Although it is far from perfect, Jordan illustrates 
a keen awareness of the enormous gravity its policies hold on the lives of refugees and 
the lives of those to whom it already owes protection—its citizens. Refugee policy in 
Jordan embodies a delicate balancing act between the two groups. Its ability to address 
the rights and protections of the former depends predictably on the particular set of 
circumstances surrounding each crisis. Given the variability in these circumstances, the 
efficacy of Jordan‘s policy solutions varies as well.  
Yet what sets Jordan apart from other host states is its repeated willingness to help 
refugees regardless of whether the circumstances enable it to benefit from doing so. 
When framed in the context of the global refugee crisis which persists today, the 
solutions pursued in Jordan demonstrate the power of the simple idea that refugees 
deserve rights and protection. There can be no substitute for this creed if solutions are to 
be made more effective in the future. In this chapter, the conclusions drawn will aim to 
unite the findings from each of the case studies around the positive commonalities they 
possess with regards to effective solutions.  
Stepping back, it is important to remember the context in which the Palestinian, 
Iraqi and Syrian crises were analyzed. This project began by explaining that Jordan 
represents just one case amidst a much larger global refugee crisis. Highlighting the 
realities of mass forced displacement which characterize much of the world today, it 
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emphasized the need to reconsider the international refugee regime. It described that 
refugee crises have grown increasingly protracted in recent times. As a result of this 
development, the responsibility placed on the host states has grown progressively more 
difficult to bear. Refugees are slipping through the widening cracks of the current 
protection system and waiting for years—even decades—for solutions which may never 
transpire. Jordan, having experienced three major refugee crises, is no stranger to the 
issues the international community faces in handling the protracted, proliferating nature 
of crises. It was thus a perfect candidate with which to pursue effective solutions.  
The study of solutions was first situated in a theoretical framework. Throughout 
the literature review, it became clear that refugee policy can be analyzed from a wide 
breath of perspectives. Scholars draw upon a variety of parameters to measure the success 
of policy solutions. From these parameters, three different categories of ―solutions‖ 
emerged: mobility solutions, political solutions, and economic solutions.  
The first group of scholars argued that solutions should be rooted in the concept 
of mobility. At the fundamental level, they viewed refugees as individuals who were 
forced to move outside their country of origin and are prevented by a lack of resources, 
legal ability, or otherwise from moving elsewhere. They suggest that expanding access to 
new pathways for resettlement and facilitating more porous borders between states would 
allow refugees‘ preferences to be respected. Such solutions are based in the idea of 
fundamental equality between all people—regardless of their physical location, 
citizenship status, and nationality. The implementation of these solutions, however, is 
becoming increasingly unfeasible in the current geopolitical climate.    
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 In contrast, political solutions emphasize the importance of international 
agreements between states and mechanisms that enable responsibility-sharing. Scholars 
who theorize about these solutions posit that strengthening the legal and political 
infrastructure regarding refugee policy can facilitate more effective responses and long 
term solutions to crises. They propose a variety of ways this can be accomplished, 
including through more comprehensive, multilateral policy responses, issue linkage, and 
greater cooperation in improving relevant laws. Although political solutions are the most 
straightforward to implement, they require an extensive amount of cooperation and 
agreement between states.    
The last group of scholars posited that solutions should necessarily be economic 
in nature. They believe that if states and economic actors perceived refugees to be an 
economic asset rather than a liability, they would be more likely to embrace policies that 
provide refugees with self-sustainability. To do so, they envisioned partnerships between 
the private and public sectors that allow refugees to work and participate in economic 
activities to a much greater degree. Such solutions have the potential to simultaneously 
deliver benefits to host and donor states, businesses, and refugees. Compared to the two 
previous theories, economic solutions provide the most inventive and untested grounds 
for improving refugees‘ rights and livelihoods in the future.  
Chapter 3 supplemented this theoretical analysis with historical background on 
the UN refugee agencies and the state of Jordan. It walked through the evolution of 
refugee policy over the years under the UNHCR and UNRWA, highlighting the ways it 
progressed in response to changes in the geopolitical environment, the realities of aid 
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deficits, and the evolving nature of refugee displacement. It provided necessary context 
with which to understand the nature of the Jordanian government‘s policy decisions over 
the years, parsing out the most important events in the formation of Jordan‘s modern 
society, economy, and political structure. This background concluded by illustrating 
statistics on global refugee crisis today. In particular, it emphasized that durable solutions 
and burden sharing have become increasingly unavailable options for policymakers and 
refugees.  
Against this backdrop of theory and history, the analysis of refugee policy in 
Jordan began with the case of the Palestinians. The policies which emerged in response to 
the Palestinians‘ displacement set a precedence of Jordanian generosity towards refugees. 
Although local integration generally experiences limited success as a durable solution, 
the Palestinians proved to be an original ―success‖ story. Not even the Palestinian story, 
however, is free of the nuance of persistent inequality and discrimination. The analysis 
concluded by emphasizing the legacy Palestinians have left on Jordan and its future 
refugee policies.  
The Iraqi case painted a much less optimistic picture of the difficulties Jordan 
faces in overcoming the constraints of money and politics to address refugee crises. 
Unlike the Palestinians, the Iraqis were never offered integration on a large scale. The 
Jordanian government, lacking the financial and political backing of both its people and 
the international community, pursued ―solutions‖ that ensured the Iraqis‘ stay would only 
be temporary.  
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A few short years later, the Syrian crisis prompted a remarkable departure from 
Jordan‘s past policies. The Syrians arrived with overwhelming numbers and 
demonstrated need. Faced with a humanitarian disaster, Jordan made the monumental 
decision to ask for help from the UNHCR. Syrians became enveloped in a regional 
response plan that aimed to increase their quality of life in Jordan through the 
establishment of camps, the extension of aid to urban refugees, the use of foreign aid, and 
the extensive involvement of NGOs. Still, Jordan struggled to mitigate the effects of the 
Syrians‘ presence on domestic conditions. It began to seek alternative solutions. 
Although not all of these alternative solutions have delivered their intended results, their 
pursuit represented an immensely important effort to increase the efficacy of refugee aid 
and protection in Jordan.  
Each of the case studies offered an examination of the factors which led to 
displacement, the initial responses offered by the Jordanian government and other actors 
involved, and the effectiveness of the durable solutions. They concluded by analyzing the 
state of each refugee population in Jordan today, which often added an unexpected catch 
to the narrative. The chapters relied predominantly on UNRWA and UNHCR research 
publications, and were later supplemented by interviews, presentations, and survey data 
that provided current, on-the-ground perspectives of life in Jordan. The former provided 
quantitative measures of the effectiveness of the solutions, allowing them to be more 
easily compared across crises. The latter served to highlight how effective refugees and 
aid workers perceived Jordanian policy to be.  
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The conclusions drawn below will compare the two major components of 
Jordan‘s evolving refugee policy: initial responses, and durable solutions. It seeks to 
reveal what lessons the world can learn from Jordan to further its efforts in solving 
refugee crises.  
 
II. Drawing Comparisons: Initial Responses  
 A number of common trends can be discerned by looking at how Jordan initially 
responded to each crisis. Initial responses were defined as policy decisions that Jordan 
put forth on a formal and informal basis that affected the entry and initial settlement of 
refugees.  These addressed whether refugees were allowed to cross the border into 
Jordan, given prima facie refugee status or citizenship, received aid from NGOs or the 
UNHCR/UNRWA, placed in camps, and given access to alternative solutions.  
Throughout all three crises, Jordan consistently demonstrated its willingness to 
maintain open borders until security conditions rendered it unwilling to doing so. On the 
other hand, whether Jordan accepted aid from other states, NGOs, or the UNHCR or 
UNRWA varied. Its decisions were rooted in both international and domestic political 
factors, and will likely continue to depend on these factors in the future. Lastly, Jordan 
has never viewed camps as a desirable solution. Even so, it chooses to rely on camps 
when necessary as a temporary alternative to local integration and repatriation.  
The table below illustrates how Jordan‘s initial policy responses varied for each 
refugee population.  
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Table 11.1 Comparison of Initial Policy Responses  
 
 
Initial Responses 
 
 
 
Palestinians 
 
 
Iraqis 
 
 
Syrians 
 
Border access 
 
Yes.* 
 
*Limited in current 
Syrian crisis. 
 
Yes.* 
 
*Limited after 
2006. 
 
Yes.* 
 
*Certain border 
crossings closed 
after 2016.  
 
 
Prima facie refugee 
status  
 
 
Yes.* 
 
*UNRWA mandate 
confers status upon 
those who fled after 
1948 conflict. 
 
 
Yes/No.* 
 
* UNHCR 
provided between 
2007 and 2012. 
 
 
No.* 
 
*UNHCR 
provided 
“Temporary 
Protection 
Status.” 
 
 
Camps  
 
 
Yes. 
 
 
No. 
 
 
Yes. 
 
Aid from NGOs 
 
Yes. 
 
Yes/No.* 
 
*Available after 
2007. 
 
Yes. 
 
Aid from 
UNHCR/UNRWA  
 
Yes. 
 
Yes/No.* 
 
*Limited UNHCR 
presence prior to 
2007. 
 
Yes. 
 
International aid  
 
Yes. 
 
Yes/No.* 
 
*Limited 
throughout crisis. 
 
Yes. 
Source: Original Compilation by Author.  
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To understand these characterizations, it is necessary to revisit each of the cases. 
Both regional and international alliances and conflicts largely determined Jordan‘s initial 
responses to the Palestinian crisis in 1947. During and after the crisis, Jordan welcomed 
all Palestinians into their lands and sought to ensure that their needs were met. It 
welcomed aid from foreign states and NGOs, set up camps, and allowed UNRWA to 
organize protection. Domestic support did not play a large role in motivating Jordan‘s 
responses, which were instead driven by territorial ambitions, generosity towards its Arab 
brethren, and desire for foreign support. 
When the Iraqis began arriving in Jordan in the 1990s, the government took a 
laissez-faire approach. Their numbers were not large enough to truly create a burden or 
disturbance; and, moreover, Jordan wanted to avoid handling another refugee issue for as 
long as possible. When the Iraq War began, Jordan initially allowed displaced Iraqis to 
enter its borders. Still, it refused to label them refugees. Its unwillingness to do so can be 
explained by a combination of economic and political factors. With regards to the 
economics of the crisis, Jordan saw little reason—much less opportunity—to spend its 
limited budget on aid for the Iraqis. The government was moreover constrained by its 
desire pacify its citizens‘ opposition to integration and remain neutral in the War. 
Jordan‘s typical inclination to help refugees was muted by a lasting fear created by the 
Palestinian refugees‘ legacy that recognized refugees would inevitably become 
permanent features in Jordanian society. As a result, Iraqis were denied many of the 
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initial rights given to Palestinians, including citizenship, camps, and multiple sources of 
aid.  
When the Syrians arrived in 2012, Jordan maintained open borders and a non-
committal policy on their refugee status. As with Palestinian case, however, it was not 
long before the government invited the UNHCR into the country to establish camps and 
organize aid. What prompted it do so was the magnitude and rapidity with which the 
refugees arrived in Jordan. Although the government was unwilling to keep out such a 
large population of its neighbors, it feared the repercussions of Syrian self-settlement on 
Jordanians and the national budget. As a result, it resorted to camps. When most Syrians 
chose to avert camps and settle independently in urban areas, Jordan was forced to 
reconsider its policy options. Initial responses transitioned into long-term plans for aid 
distribution facilitated by multiple partners; increased access to durable solutions; and the 
introduction of new, alternative solutions. 
 
III. Drawing Comparisons: Durable and Alternative Solutions   
 Comparing the Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian crises, it is clear that the efficacy of 
solutions depends on a number of factors. First among these is Jordan‘s willingness to 
implement each solution. Amidst a variety of considerations, money and politics have 
proven to have the greatest impact on the choice of solutions that Jordan pursues. The 
former of these—the financials of supporting refugees—has become even more important 
than the latter. Jordan‘s political motivations emerge out of both domestic conditions and 
the nature of its relations with other states.  
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 Turning to each of the durable solutions, it is clear that Jordan exercises the least 
control over repatriation. Although Jordan prefers to avoid forced repatriation, it has 
become a last resort when domestic conditions or security concerns mandate it necessary. 
Likewise, resettlement does not present itself as an effective solution to crises in Jordan 
on any significant scale. The majority of ―typical‖ resettlement countries do not respond 
to refugee crises with the same incentive structure as Jordan. Despite possessing both the 
money and physical resources to accommodate refugee flows, they lack the generosity 
that Jordan possesses and instead prioritize nationalist political interests. Local 
integration tells a more nuanced story. Although Jordan has enabled integration to be a 
successful solution, it is only a viable option when certain key conditions are met. In 
other words, Jordan allows for integration when it is within its political interests and 
financial ability to do so.  
 The table below illustrates how effective each of the durable and alternative 
solutions proved for each refugee population:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
356 
 
Table 11.2 Comparison of Durable and Alternative Solutions  
 
Type of Solution 
 
 
Palestinians 
 
Iraqis 
 
Syrians 
 
Citizenship 
 
 
Yes. 
 
 
No. 
 
 
No. 
 
 
 
Repatriation 
 
 
Highly Ineffective. 
 
 
 
 
Ineffective. 
 
 
Ineffective. 
 
Local Integration 
 
 
 
 
Highly Effective. 
 
 
 
 
Ineffective. 
 
Moderately 
Effective. 
Resettlement  
Highly Ineffective.  
 
Ineffective. 
 
Ineffective. 
 
“Alternative” 
solutions  
 
None. 
 
Ineffective. 
 
Moderately 
Effective.  
 
Source: Original Compilation by Author.  
 
 Across all of the crises, repatriation and resettlement proved ineffective. Only 
Palestinians were provided with citizenship. Location integration produced more 
interesting results: it was highly effective for Palestinians, ineffective for Iraqis, and 
moderately effective for the Syrians. The efficacy of alternative solutions varied as well. 
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Alternative solutions were never provided to Palestinians—and have not been widely 
implemented for Iraqis—but they have proved moderately effective for Syrian refugees.  
 The takeaway from these findings is twofold. First, refugee policy in Jordan does 
not trend in a linear fashion. Instead, the efficacy of solutions depends on the 
circumstances of each crisis, which render Jordan more or less able to adequately assist 
and protect refugees. Second, the solutions which have been most effective are those over 
which Jordan has the most direct control: integration, and alternative solutions. Even 
though many factors could prevent Jordan from displaying the generosity it does towards 
refugees, it has proven far more willing to help refugees reach effective solutions that 
nearly all other states in the region.   
 Local integration and alternative solutions thus deserve further inquiry. In the 
presence of sufficient support from both the government and the international 
community, local integration can be successful in providing refugees with adequate 
standards of livelihood and political belonging, as well as satisfying Jordanian interests. 
Yet the realities of modern refugee crises—as well as the domestic conditions within 
Jordan—dictate that local integration is unlikely to succeed on a large scale unless it is 
accompanied by measures which mitigate the direct impact of refugees on the host 
society. 
Given this reality, it necessary to consider how alternative solutions will impact 
the future of refugee policy in Jordan. Alternative solutions based in mobility theory, 
which facilitate the legal movement of refugees between states, have not been seriously 
implemented in Jordan. If applied, they hold the potential to overcome the lengthy 
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resettlement processes available to only a few, very vulnerable refugees. Forming 
additional pathways for onward migration around concepts like labor and education could 
raise the incentives for resettlement states that stand to benefit from increasing specific 
demographics of their population. Jordan should seek out ways to incentivize its Western 
allies to adopt mobility policies. 
Jordan holds the most experience and success with economic-based alternative 
solutions. Economic solutions typically seek to open up greater opportunity for refugee 
employment, while simultaneously reducing refugees‘ negative impact on the host 
economy. Conceptually, allowing refugees to fill gaps in the labor force and create new 
business enterprises should boost production efficiencies in Jordanian markets. In reality, 
as the case of Syrians in Jordan demonstrates, these policies must be very carefully and 
comprehensively arranged in order to be effective. The Jordan Compact, heralded early-
on as an innovative success, fell short of its intended results due to its failure to consider 
practical details and include the opinions of all those involved in its execution. 
Policymakers in Jordan and elsewhere should use the Compact as a guide to understand 
how economic partnerships can be implemented more effectively in the future. The 
lessons Jordan has learned from its recent experience with the Syrian crisis have made it 
well-equipped to handle future refugee flows in a way that mitigates negative 
repercussions on its domestic economy and society.  
Political solutions in Jordan have featured UNHCR-led initiatives to organize 
increased aid to refugees and implement livelihood programs, with the help of the 
government and other partners. While some of these merely represent improvements in 
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past policies, new approaches have been introduced as well. The Comprehensive Refugee 
Response framework demonstrated how Jordan‘s partnership with the UNHCR increased 
the efficiency of crisis management and ensured the pursuit of a more systematic, data-
driven plan for addressing refugees‘ needs. Notably, the 3RP serves to unite the goals of 
the Jordanian government, the UNHCR, NGOs, and other IOs. It trends in the direction 
of a true responsibility sharing mechanism, in which non-host states would supply a fair 
contribution to the formation of effective solutions. Whether any states will spearhead 
this unforeseen level of cooperation in years to come will be an integral determinant of 
the success of future refugee policies.  
 
IV. The Future of Solutions  
 What do these conclusions in Jordan imply about the world‘s ability to solve 
refugee crisis? First and foremost, they affirm the basic fact that solutions are within 
reach. Refugee crises do not constitute a global issue that is beyond the grasp of policy—
not yet, at least. Moreover, the cases in Jordan illustrate that refugee crises are not a 
matter which any state or organization can solve alone. Providing the aid and resources 
necessary to support refugees requires more than that which one host country can 
provide. Cooperation between many actors in all aspects of each crisis is necessary in 
order for both initial responses and durable solutions to be effective.  
 The progression of policy in Jordan also reveals that the generosity of refugee-
hosting countries will be unsustainable without greater support. Jordan has demonstrated 
its willingness to accept help from a wide range of actors, including NGOs, international 
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organizations, private businesses, and other states. If high levels of cooperation and 
burden sharing do not materialize, refugee hosting states cannot be expected to pursue 
effective solutions on their own.  
 Lastly, it is not enough to target only improvement in the durable solutions with 
future polices. States, organizations, and all those seeking to help refugees must look 
beyond the existing system and towards one which works within the recognized 
constraints of states‘ interests, the nature of conditions which produce and perpetuate 
crises, and the realities of protracted displacement. Simply put, they must embrace 
alternative solutions.  
 
V. Conclusion  
The world has not yet accepted the necessary preconditions for attaining effective 
refugee solutions. Yet the time when this will occur may not remain so far in the future. 
This analysis showed that the international community has reached a clear and accurate 
understanding of the problems within the existing international refugee regime. Effective 
solutions require much higher levels of cooperation, much more equitable sharing of 
responsibility, and a much greater emphasis on implementing innovative new policies. 
What remains to be seen is whether the world will choose to act to address these 
problems—or if it will continue to allow refugee crises to persist, unsolved, indefinitely.   
In the end, its decision is very likely to hinge on a singular factor. The global 
community can only overcome the issue of refugee crises if it first accepts the idea that 
refugees are deserving of their time, money, attention, and—most importantly—their 
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respect. Many states and individuals continue to regard refugees as a dangerous burden 
on their society. Very little is likely to change about refugee policy if this ideology is not 
replaced by one which recognizes refugees as vulnerable individuals deserving of rights, 
protection, safety, and support. The very same people who enjoy the privilege of feeling 
like they will never face the possibility of becoming refugees themselves may very well 
become the refugees of tomorrow. With this mindset, they may feel differently about 
sharing the responsibility of helping the refugees of today.  
The fact that Jordan differed from so many other states in its refugee policy 
became a common mantra throughout this analysis. Hopefully, this does not remain the 
case in the future. As the quote by King Abdullah at the beginning of this chapter 
expresses, it will be impossible to prevent massive human suffering without a collective 
effort to pursue sustainable solutions. Jordan has addressed with refugees with ―good 
hearts‖, as Insherah Mousa stated. It is time that the rest of the world does the same.  
The introduction to this project began with a statement from Filippo Grandi, the 
UN High Commissioner. Grandi addressed the entire world when he conveyed the 
gravity the current moment holds for the formulators of global refugee policy. His words 
expressed both despair at the magnitude of the crisis and hope in the world‘s potential to 
overcome. Drawing conclusions from the case of Jordan invokes similar emotions. In 
differing ways and varying degrees, all groups of refugees in Jordan experienced the 
repercussions of inadequate solutions. The fact that Jordan has proven willing to 
incorporate new, innovative solutions which allow it to better protect refugees‘ rights and 
enable their livelihoods confirms that High Commissioner Grandi was right to be 
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hopeful. If the world looked more like Jordan, it would be a much better place for 
refugees.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A:  Interview Questions for NGO employees 
 
1. Please describe your work with refugees.  
2. How would you describe, generally, Jordan‘s policies towards refugees?  
3. Do the refugees with whom you interact often receive aid or services from the 
UNCHR or UNRWA? The government? Non-governmental or private 
organizations?  
4. What is your experience with government aid programs for refugees? Do you 
consider them effective?  
5. Have you interacted with other non-governmental or private organizations that 
provide services for refugees while in Jordan? If so, in what capacity?  
6. Do you believe that refugees in Jordan possess greater opportunities than those in 
neighboring countries?   
7. Do the refugees with whom you interact have plans to stay in Jordan? Would they 
prefer to resettle to another country or repatriate in the future? Please elaborate.  
8. Do you feel the Jordanian government should offer greater assistance to refugees? 
If so, in what ways?   
9. Do you believe the Jordanian government should formulate a uniform, legal 
policy addressing refugees?  
10. Do you feel the UNHCR or UNRWA should offer greater assistance to refugees? 
If so, in what ways? 
a. Do you believe that the traditional durable solutions set forth by the 
UNHCR of repatriation, resettlement and local integration are effective?  
b. In what ways could the UNHCR or UNRWA more effectively offer aid 
and protection to refugees? 
11. Do you feel the international community should offer greater assistance to 
refugees in Jordan? If so, in what ways?   
12. How would you describe public opinion towards different groups of refugees in 
Jordan?  
13. Do you believe Jordan‘s refugee policy will evolve in the future? If so, how?  
14. Do you believe other states‘ policies towards refugees will evolve in the future? If 
so, how?  
15. How do you believe refugees‘ definition under international law will evolve in the 
future?  
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Appendix B: Interview Questions for Palestinians 
 
1. How would you describe your daily lifestyle?  
2. Why have you chosen to remain in Israel/Palestine rather than migrate elsewhere?  
3. Have you ever received aid from the UNRWA? Why or why not?  
4. Do you have family or friends that have chosen to migrate or have fled from 
Israel/Palestine? To where did they go?  
5. How do you perceive Palestinians who have chosen to migrate or have fled from 
Israel/Palestine?  
6. Do you believe that Palestinians in Jordan possess greater opportunities than those 
in Israel/Palestine?  
7. Do you have plans or aspirations to migrate in the future?  
8. Do you feel the government should offer greater assistance to Palestinian 
refugees? If so, in what ways?  
9. Do you feel the UNRWA should offer greater assistance to Palestinian refugees? 
If so, in what ways?  
10. Do you feel the international community should offer greater assistance to 
Palestinian refugees? If so, in what ways?  
 
 
Appendix C: Interview Questions for Refugees in Jordan 
 
1. What is your country of origin?  
2. What factor(s) led to your displacement? In other words, what forced you to flee?  
3. Was Jordan your intended destination? If so, why? If not, why not?  
4. Did you receive help from any individual or organization in traveling to Jordan as 
a refugee?  
5. Please describe your arrival in Jordan and the asylum process you underwent.  
6. Did you live in a refugee camp? If so, why? If not, why not?  
7. Did you receive any assistance in acquiring your current place of residence? If so, 
from whom?  
8. Have you received aid in any kind from the UNRWA or UNHCR? Why or why 
not?  
9. How would you describe your daily lifestyle in Jordan?  
10. How would you describe Jordan‘s policies towards refugees?  
11. What is your experience with government aid programs for refugees? Do you 
consider them effective?  
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12. Have you interacted with non-governmental or private organizations that provide 
services for refugees while in Jordan? If so, in what capacity?  
13. Why have you chosen to remain in Jordan rather than migrate elsewhere?  
14. Do you have family or friends that have chosen to migrate from Jordan? If so, to 
where did they go?  
15. Do you believe that refugees in Jordan possess greater opportunities than those in 
neighboring countries?  
16. Do you have plans or aspirations to stay in Jordan?  
17. Do you have plans or aspirations to resettle to another country in the future? If so, 
where?  
18. Do you have plans or aspirations to return to your country of origin in the future? 
19. Do you feel the government should offer greater assistance to refugees? If so, in 
what ways?  
20. Do you feel the UNHCR or UNRWA should offer greater assistance to refugees? 
If so, in what ways?  
21. Do you feel the international community should offer greater assistance to 
refugees? If so, in what ways?  
22. How would you describe public opinion towards different groups of refugees in 
Jordan?  
23. Do you believe Jordan‘s refugee policy will evolve in the future? If so, how? 
